Oldham v. Chandler-Halford
| Decision Date | 21 February 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. C 93-0284.,C 93-0284. |
| Citation | 877 F. Supp. 1340 |
| Parties | Ronald Roscoe Collier OLDHAM, Plaintiff, v. Sally CHANDLER-HALFORD, et al., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Oldham, pro se.
Kristin Ensign, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ........................................ 1343
II. THE MOTION FOR AN INJUNCTION ................................. 1346
A. Purpose Of And Standards For Preliminary Injunctions ...... 1346
B. Preliminary Injunctions In § 1983 Cases ................... 1347
C. Oldham's Application For Injunctive Relief ................ 1348
III. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ............................... 1348
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT ............................................. 1350
A. Undisputed Facts .......................................... 1350
B. Disputed Facts ............................................ 1351
V. LEGAL ANALYSIS ............................................... 1351
A. The Fourteenth Amendment Claim ............................ 1351
1. Property Interest ...................................... 1352
2. Liberty Interest ....................................... 1352
B. Eighth Amendment Claims ................................... 1353
1. Deliberate Indifference To A Serious Medical Need ...... 1354
2. Deliberate Indifference To A Risk Of Harm .............. 1355
C. Respondeat Superior Liability ............................. 1356
D. Failure To Designate An Expert ............................ 1357
VI. CONCLUSION ................................................... 1357
Plaintiff, a prisoner in the Iowa Department of Corrections system, has moved for partial summary judgment in his lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison officials. The claims encompassed in the prisoner's motion for partial summary judgment allege deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition and a substantial risk of harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment, asserting that defendants caused the prisoner to reinjure a previously broken wrist when they assigned him to an upper bunk despite a medical restriction on his activities. Defendants, various prison officials and corrections officers, have cross-moved for partial summary judgment on the ground that certain of the officials cannot be held liable on a claim based on respondeat superior, and on the ground that there was no deliberate indifference or cruel and unusual punishment involved in the circumstances alleged by the prisoner. The prisoner also seeks a restraining order and preliminary injunction protecting his legal materials during his transfers within the correctional system and preventing alleged interference with delivery of his legal mail to his attorney and the court in violation of the First Amendment.
On November 5, 1993, plaintiff Ronald Roscoe Collier Oldham filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. That application was granted on November 24, 1993, and Oldham's lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging various violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, was filed that day. Oldham filed an amended complaint on December 2, 1993. Defendants are Sally Chandler-Halford, the director of corrections for the state of Iowa, John Thalacker, the warden of the Iowa Mens Reformatory (IMR) at Anamosa, Iowa, lieutenants Terryl Richardson and Larry Farrington, and correctional officers "Copper," who was never identified or served, Gregory Jones, Sr., Keith Kirchner, and John Linvell, Jr., all at the IMR.
Neither the complaint nor either party's motion for summary judgment is a model of lucid pleading or argument. The amended complaint alleges five causes of action arising from two incidents during Oldham's incarceration at the IMR. Causes of action one, two, three, and five arise from Oldham's assignment on April 16, 1993, to a top bunk. According to the complaint, Oldham had previously fractured his left wrist, and consequently had a medical restriction on his activities. Despite this restriction, the complaint alleges, Oldham was assigned to the top bunk of a set of three, and, as a result, Oldham reinjured his wrist on May 23, 1993, while attempting to climb into his bunk.
Oldham's first claim, denominated "Malicious Indifference," alleges that IMR officers displayed deliberate indifference to Oldham's serious medical condition in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. This claim alleges that defendants violated Oldham's rights when they assigned him to the top bunk on April 16, 1993, despite the doctor's restrictions on his activities, thus causing the reinjury to Oldham's wrist. Oldham's second claim, "Failure to Fallow sic Doctors Orders," asserts that the decision of the IMR officers to assign him to an upper bunk despite his medical restriction also constituted another violation of Oldham's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. This claim alleges that Oldham had made the medical restriction known to the prison officials who made the bunk assignment by showing them a copy of the restriction. The third claim, "Clausing sic an Injury," asserts that the assignment to an upper bunk was the cause of Oldham's reinjury to his wrist, and yet another violation of Oldham's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Oldham's fifth claim, and the last arising from his assignment to an upper bunk, asserts a "Fourteenth Amendment" claim of "Cruel and Unusell sic Punishment," in the form of placing a "person in danger where that person is likely to get hurt."
In light of Oldham's pro se status at the time this complaint was filed,1 the court believes that it can and should construe these four causes of action as two claims alleging violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and a third claim alleging violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause.2 Oldham's first through third causes of action are essentially redundant statements of a single Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition, and shall be so construed as Count I. Oldham's fifth cause of action, on the other hand, asserts a different form of Eighth Amendment violation, this time alleging deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm to an inmate, although such claims are more frequently encountered in situations where prison officials are alleged to have failed to protect an inmate from violence perpetrated by other inmates or excessive force used by prison officials. See Farmer v. Brennan, ___ U.S. ___, ___- ___, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1976-77, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (); Helling v. McKinney, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 2480, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993) (). This cause of action shall be construed as Count II.
Oldham's pleadings admittedly offer little explanation of the basis for Fourteenth Amendment claims apart from stating that the claims in each of his causes of action one, two, three, and five are based on that amendment.3 However, reading the complaint liberally, the court concludes that Oldham was attempting to assert that he had a property or liberty interest in a lower bunk as the result of the medical restriction placed on his activity by his doctor and that he was deprived of that interest without the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.4 The court will therefore construe Oldham's first, second, third, and fifth causes of action as also stating, as Count III, a claim for violation of Oldham's Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process.5
Oldham's fourth claim arises from a different incident or series of incidents in September of 1993 in which he was denied Tylenol prescribed by another doctor for preoperative pain preceding surgery on Oldham's face. Oldham alleges not only that he was denied the prescribed medication, but that the correctional officers he approached refused to allow him to discuss the problem with their superior officer, and that one officer taunted him to sue her for refusing to give him the medication. In this claim, Oldham asserts deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court will construe this to be Count IV of Oldham's complaint.
Thus, as the court has construed the complaint, it involves four counts. Count I (formerly Oldham's causes of action one, two, and three) alleges violation of Oldham's Eighth Amendment rights in the deliberate indifference of defendants to Oldham's serious medical condition, causing reinjury to Oldham's wrist on May 23, 1994, by assigning Oldham a top bunk on April 16, 1993, despite a doctor's order for restrictions on Oldham's activities. Count II (formerly Oldham's fifth cause of action) alleges that in assigning Oldham a top bunk on April 16, 1993, defendants were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to Oldham in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Count III (formerly Oldham's "Fourteenth Amendment" allegations in his causes of action one, two, three, and five) asserts violation of Oldham's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving him of his property or liberty interest in a lower bunk. Count IV (formerly Oldham's fourth cause of action) alleges deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition for refusal of defendants to provide Oldham...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Grimes v. Dist. of Columbia, Civil Case No. 08–2024 (RJL)
..., 292 F.3d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 2002) ; Gorton v. Todd , 793 F.Supp.2d 1171, 1186 (E.D. Cal. 2011) ; but see Oldham v. Chandler–Halford , 877 F.Supp. 1340, 1357 (N.D. Iowa 1995). Courts have relied on expert testimony to establish overcrowding, as well. See Brown v. Plata , 563 U.S. 493, 535,......
-
Murphy v. Campbell
...U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989); Choate v. Lockhart, 7 F.3d 1370, 1376 (8th Cir.1993); Oldham v. Chandler-Halford, 877 F.Supp. 1340, 1356 (N.D.Iowa 1995). The Eighth Circuit has discussed the ways in which a supervisor can incur liability under § 1983 as follows: A sup......
-
Pennington v. Taylor
...presented an immediate, substantial threat to his health. Other courts have held similarly. For example, in Oldham v. Chandler-Halford, 877 F.Supp. 1340, 1355 (N.D.Iowa 1995), the plaintiff fractured his arm. The court determined that the defendants' reliance on the absence of any medical a......
-
Lane v. Sources
...was recklessly indifferent to a risk that he might be injured by carrying a locker box up the steps. See, e.g., Oldham v. Chandler-Halford, 877 F.Supp. 1340 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (although common sense might suggest that having an inmate with a recently fractured wrist climb into a top bunk migh......