Oldham v. State

• Decision Date: 13 March 1946
• Docket Number: 28137.
• Citation: 65 N.E.2d 414,224 Ind. 150
• Parties: OLDHAM v. STATE.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

65 N.E.2d 414

224 Ind. 150

OLDHAM v. STATE.

No. 28137.

Supreme Court of Indiana

March 13, 1946

Appeal from Criminal Court, Marion County; William D Bain, judge.

Ira M. Holmes, of Indianapolis, for appellant.

James A. Emmert, Atty. Gen., and Frank E. Coughlin, First Asst Atty. Gen., for appellee.

GILKISON Judge.

The appellant was charged by indictment with the crime of murder in the first degree in the court below. To this charge he waived an arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty. Trial was by jury. The verdict found appellant guilty of manslaughter and that he is 39 years old. The judgment committed him to the Indiana State Prison for not less than two nor more than twenty-one years.

The assignment of errors raises the questions:

1. That the trial court erred in overruling the appellant's motion for new trial.

2. The trial court erred in overruling appellant's request for instructions Nos. 1 and 2.

The motion for new trial is for the reasons:

The verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence.

The verdict is contrary to law.

Error of law in refusing to give defendant's requested instruction No. 1.

Error of law in refusing to give defendant's requested instruction No. 2.

We shall discuss these alleged errors in reverse order.

Instruction No. 1 tendered by defendant is as follows: 'To warrant the conviction of the defendant herein, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the charges made against the defendant in the indictment. It is not sufficient if the State has enveloped this case in mystery, that is incapable of understanding without inferring the guilt of the defendant. The state in order or convict this defendant is required to explain all mystery sufficiently to remove all reasonable doubt and to establish facts that are susceptible of explanation upon no reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the defendant, and that point to his guilt beyond any other reasonable solution and beyond all reasonable doubt.'

Instruction No. 2 tendered by defendant is as follows: 'A reasonable doubt does not include every possible doubt that might exist in the field of man's speculation, but in a case where the defendant's liberty is in jeopardy as in this case, there must not only be a conscientous belief of guilt, but there must be a conscientious conviction that there is no reasonable doubt of guilt.'

It will be noted that the two instructions tendered are on the subject of reasonable doubt. The court by its own instructions Nos. 20, 21 and 22, fully and correctly instructed the jury on this subject, covering every point contained in the two tendered instructions, except the matter of 'mystery' contained in tendered instruction No. 1. We have examined the evidence as recited in appellant's brief and in the bill of exceptions, and we find no mystery therein. Deputy Coroner Lewis, who arrived at the scene of the homicide between 6 and 7 o'clock in the evening of the homicide, on turning over the body of the dead man observed an open red handled, single blade pocket knife covered with blood lying under the body. The dead man's right hand was not clutching the knife. There was some evidence from other witnesses that the knife was near the palm of the right hand, the little finger being curved toward it. Since the dead man's throat had been cut so that the head was almost severed from the body, all the evidence concerning the physical conditions of the body, the room in which it was, the furniture and the knife was properly heard, but there was no mystery in this evidence. Whether this knife or another was the one with which the homicide had been committed was not material in determining the defendant's guilt or innocence but all matters connected therewith were proper evidence for the jury to consider. Since there was no mystery to be solved instruction No. 1 could only have tended to mislead and confuse the jury, and in so far as it referred to a mystery, it was not applicable to the case made by the evidence. We think no error was committed in refusing the two tendered instructions. Loftus v. State, 1945, Ind., 63 N.E.2d 290; Walters v. State, 1914, 183 Ind. 178, 181, 108 N.E. 583; Roots and Another v. Tyner and Another, 1857, 10 Ind. 87, 92; Knapp v. State, 1906, 168 Ind. 153, 161, 79 N.E. 1076, 11 Ann.Cas. 604; Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 1923, 264 U.S. 375, 393, 44 S.Ct. 391, 68 L.Ed. 748; Johnson v. Johnson, 1917, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335; 6 A.L.R. 1031, 1037; Conroy v. Fall River Herald News Pub. Co., 1940, 306 Mass. 488, 28 N.E.2d 729, 132 A.L.R. 927; 14 R.C.L., § 44, Instructions, 775; 53 Am.Jur., § 525, Trial, 422.

We now consider the contentions that the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law. The evidence indicates that a fight started between appellant and decedent at a craps game, and when the fighters produced knives, the bystanders all hurriedly left the room, one of them having received a cut on the hand. None of them were present when the fatal blows were struck. The deputy coroner testified ...