Oldman v. State

Citation998 P.2d 957
Decision Date08 March 2000
Docket NumberNo. 97-168.,97-168.
PartiesSteven Charles OLDMAN, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

Representing Appellant: Sylvia L. Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Assistant Public Defender; and Walter Eggers, Assistant Public Defender.

Representing Appellee: William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior

Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; and Sean Scoggin, Student Intern.

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,1 JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

The primary claim of error presented by Steven Charles Oldman (Oldman), who was convicted of a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502 (Lexis 1999),2 is that an emergency room physician should not have been permitted to testify about statements made to him by the victim with respect to the identity of her assailant. An additional issue is raised attacking the refusal of the trial court to declare a mistrial after a prospective juror, responding to a question by defense counsel on voir dire, declared, in effect, that he thought Oldman was guilty. We hold that the hearsay statements recounted by the emergency physician were admissible in evidence under W.R.E. 803(2) and 803(4), and no error was committed in admitting that testimony. We also hold that the trial judge effectively cured any adverse effect of the comment by the prospective juror by confirming the commitment of the remaining members of the panel to the presumption of innocence. The Judgment and Sentence entered in the trial court is affirmed.

In his Brief of the Appellant, Oldman states the issues in this way:

I. Whether the district court denied the appellant his constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses when it allowed [the emergency room physician] to testify to statements made by [the victim]?
II. Whether the district court should have granted the appellant's motion for a mistrial after a potential juror poisoned the entire panel?

The issues stated in the Brief of Appellee, filed by the State of Wyoming, are:

I. Did the district court properly allow Dr. Steger to testify to Sheila Oldman's statements identifying appellant as the person who had beaten her?
II. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's motion for a mistrial after a prospective juror expressed his opinion of appellant's guilt?

At the time of the material events in this case, Oldman was living in Riverton. The victim also lived in Riverton in an apartment with two of her four children. The victim and Oldman had lived together off and on for some ten to twelve years. They had four children together, and although never formally married, they held themselves out as husband and wife. The victim was six-months pregnant bearing the couple's fifth child. On the afternoon of April 2, 1995, the victim's neighbor heard a male voice yelling and screaming in the victim's apartment. Again at about 3:00 a.m. the next day, the neighbor heard a male yelling, and that was followed by the sound of a woman or a child crying. The neighbor called 911, and reported what he had overheard. He then heard a voice outside in the alley, and looking out his window, he saw a man walking away. He did not see the man's face, but the neighbor described him as having the same build, hair color, and skin tone as Oldman.

Two Riverton police officers were dispatched to the apartment in response to the neighbor's call. Before they arrived at the apartment, the dispatcher informed the officers that a badly beaten woman had arrived at the police station. The woman told the dispatcher that she had just left the apartment where the officers had been sent. The officers returned to the station, and they found the victim badly beaten, bleeding, crying, and hysterical. One of the officers asked what had happened, and the victim replied, "My husband beat me up." She then was asked, "Who is your husband"? The victim replied that it was "Steven Oldman."

After the officers obtained some additional details from the victim, they went to the apartment to look for Oldman. They did not find Oldman, and when they returned to the police station, the victim informed them she was pregnant. The officers called an ambulance which took the victim to the hospital. The attending physician, who saw the victim in the emergency room, noted a black and blue eye; facial bruising; and a "significant number of human bite marks" on her back, arm, thigh, hands, and feet. Although the physician did not ask, the victim told him that her husband had beaten her and bitten her.

Oldman was charged with the crime of aggravated assault upon a woman whom he knew to be pregnant in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(iv). He was tried before a jury on August 14, 1995. The victim did not appear, but a police officer and the attending physician in the emergency room both testified about the statements she made to them identifying Oldman as her assailant. Oldman objected to the testimony of the attending physician as hearsay, but the trial court overruled the objection, invoking W.R.E. 803(4). Oldman was found guilty by the jury, and, on October 10, 1995, the district court pronounced a sentence of seven to ten years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. Oldman has appealed from the Judgment and Sentence.

In support of his first claim of error, Oldman contends that the trial court should not have allowed the emergency room physician to testify about the statements the victim made to him during the course of the medical treatment. The State argues that both W.R.E. 803(2) and 803(4) justify the testimony of the physician about the victim's statements. The trial court ruled that the testimony was admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule under W.R.E. 803(4), citing as authority White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992). We hold that the testimony was admissible under either paragraph of W.R.E. 803. We eschew the temptation to dispose of this claim of error on the ground that the testimony was simply cumulative to the testimony of the investigating police officer, which the trial court received over a similar defense objection pursuant to W.R.E. 803(2). The testimony of the police officer is not an issue on appeal.

Our review of rulings by a trial court, admitting or excluding evidence, is premised upon deference to the trial court, and we do not reverse a case because of evidentiary rulings unless an abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Horton v. State, 764 P.2d 674, 676-77 (Wyo.1988). Recently, we revisited the definition of "abuse of discretion" in Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo.1998). We ratified in Vaughn our adoption of this definition in Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo.1986):

Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. Byerly v. Madsen, 41 Wash.App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236 (1985).

In Blake v. State, 933 P.2d 474, 477 (Wyo. 1997), we expressed the same concept in slightly different language, saying "[t]he burden is upon appellant to demonstrate such abuse, i.e., that the court acted in a manner exceeding the bounds of reason and could not rationally conclude as it did." Our inquiry into this claim of error is framed in the context of whether the trial court drew conclusions from objective criteria; exercised a sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances; and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously.

Hearsay evidence generally is excluded by W.R.E. 802, which provides, "[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Wyoming or by statute." The definition of hearsay is found in W.R.E. 801(c): "`Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Twenty-three specific exceptions to the hearsay rule together with a catch-all exception are set forth in W.R.E. 803 which permits testimony on evidence that W.R.E. 802 otherwise would exclude. The second exception found in W.R.E. 803(2) permits evidence as to "excited utterance," and W.R.E. 803(4) permits "[s]tatements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment."

An excited utterance, defined by W.R.E. 803(2), is "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition[.]" We have said with respect to the excited utterance exception:

The exception is founded upon the proposition that a statement made during the stress of excitement resulting from a startling event is probably trustworthy, since there is not leisure to reflect, contrive or fabricate. Lancaster v. People, 200 Colo. 448, 615 P.2d 720 (1980); Bankers Life Co. v. Nelson, 56 Wyo. 243, 108 P.2d 584 (1940), rehearing denied, 56 Wyo. 513, 111 P.2d 136 (1941).

Kelly v. State, 694 P.2d 126, 130 (Wyo.1985).

The rule assumes the presence of a startling event which temporarily stills the senses and alleviates any motive to fabricate. Horton, 764 P.2d at 674.

Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 74 (Wyo.1989). A leading treatise explains that the excited utterance exception is justified by "the special reliability that is furnished when excitement suspends the declarant's powers of reflection and fabrication." 2 John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 272 at 204 (5th ed.1999).

Pursuant to W.R.E. 803(4), "[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general...

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