Olin v. Scales, Case No: 6:12-cv-1455-Orl-28TBS

• Decision Date: 22 April 2014
• Docket Number: Case No: 6:12-cv-1455-Orl-28TBS
• Parties: JOHN OLIN, Plaintiff, v. PATRICK SCALES and JERRY L. DEMINGS, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

JOHN OLIN, Plaintiff, v. PATRICK SCALES and JERRY L. DEMINGS, Defendants.

Case No: 6:12-cv-1455-Orl-28TBS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA ORLANDO DIVISION

DONE and ORDERED: April 22, 2014

ORDER

Alleging federal constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims of false imprisonment and battery, Plaintiff John Olin has sued Orange County Sheriff's Deputy Patrick Scales and Sheriff Jerry L. Demings. Mr. Olin alleges that his civil rights were violated when he was prosecuted for resisting a law enforcement officer without violence. He also alleges that Sheriff Demings failed to train his deputies and maintained a custom or policy of failing to protect citizens against malicious prosecution. Defendants have filed motions for summary judgment that are before the Court for consideration. Because arguable probable cause existed to support the charge of resisting arrest without violence, the motions for summary judgment must be granted. The state law claims will be remanded to the state court from which this case was removed.

I. Background

On December 16, 2008, Shantee Davenport, a young mother, accidentally locked her eleven-month-old daughter in her car after doing laundry at a laundromat in the CentralPark Plaza shopping center in Orlando. (See Davenport Dep. at 9, 17-21).¹ After she finished her laundry and left the laundromat, she placed the baby in the car and turned on the engine and air conditioning because it was warm outside. (Davenport Dep. at 19; but see Castro Dep. at 33 ("It wasn't that hot.")). She then loaded her laundry in the vehicle, but when she tried to reenter her car, she realized that she had accidentally locked herself out of the car with the baby inside. (Davenport Dep. at 20-21). After trying to open each door, she obtained the help of Deputy Scales, who was at the shopping center on his lunch break. (Scales Aff. ¶¶ 6-7; see also Davenport Dep. at 21-22).

Deputy Scales accompanied Ms. Davenport to her car. (Scales Aff. ¶ 7; see also Davenport Dep. at 27). Upon confirming that the doors were locked and that the baby was in the car, Deputy Scales called the Orange County Sheriff's Office dispatch center, which then notified the fire department. (Scales Aff. ¶ 7). Within a few minutes, several firefighters in a fire engine came to assist Ms. Davenport. (Id. ¶¶ 7-8; Geering Dep. at 10). While some of the firefighters attempted to open Ms. Davenport's car, another firefighter called a locksmith. (See Geering Dep. at 22-23; Rodriguez Dep. at 12). The locksmitharrived and parked directly behind the fire engine, and the two vehicles blocked several cars in the parking lot, (Scales Dep. at 32-33; Castro Dep. at 22), including Mr. Olin's car.

Mr. Olin, who was also visiting the shopping center on his lunch break, headed to his car after learning that the firefighters were assisting in freeing a child locked in a car. (Olin Dep. at 175-76). According to Mr. Olin, he asked two firefighters if he could move his car and they told him he could,² so he started backing out of the space but was soon blocked by the arrival of the locksmith's car. (Id. at 177-79). At that point, Mr. Olin blew his horn and yelled at the locksmith to let him out.³ (Id. at 183-84). Mr. Olin asked the locksmith if he could move his car or if they could switch spots.⁴ (Id. at 185; Castro Dep. at 25). When Mr. Olin began talking with the locksmith, Deputy Scales directed the locksmith to move toward Ms. Davenport's car and work on unlocking it. (Castro Dep. at 30).

Deputy Scales approached Mr. Olin, (Olin Dep. at 186), who was described as angry and agitated by many bystanders,⁵ (see Pineiro Dep. at 20-21; Geering Dep. at 27-28;Rodriguez Dep. at 18; but see Davenport Dep. at 36 (describing Mr. Olin as "not angry violent, just kind of irritated")). According to one firefighter, Mr. Olin's aggressive behavior was not typical in this type of situation. (See Geering Dep. at 27-28). Mr. Olin's behavior was distracting to the firefighters, the locksmith, and Deputy Scales. (Geering Dep. at 28; Dunn Dep. at 24; Castro Dep. at 40). Deputy Scales and the firefighters were concerned that if Deputy Scales did not take control of the situation, Mr. Olin would attempt to move his vehicle and endanger the firefighters at the scene. (Scales Aff. ¶ 10; Geering Dep. at 29; Dunn Dep. at 24; Rodriguez Dep. at 29). After Deputy Scales approached Mr. Olin, Deputy Scales either asked or told Mr. Olin to wait for the situation to be resolved before attempting to leave. (Olin Dep. at 195; Scales Dep. at 38). Mr. Olin responded that he wanted to get back to work and stepped out of his vehicle. (Olin Dep. at 195-96). Deputy Scales told Mr. Olin that he needed to see his driver's license. (Olin Aff. ¶ 14; see also Scales Dep. at 42).

It is undisputed that Deputy Scales then handcuffed Mr. Olin.⁶ (Olin Aff. ¶ 21; Scales Dep. at 45-46). Mr. Olin claims that this occurred as he was reaching for his wallet to get his driver's license⁷ and that Deputy Scales "attacked" him. (Olin Dep. at 197). Mr. Olinasserts that Deputy Scales used force to handcuff him, including kicking his legs and shoving him onto the car. (Id. at 198-99).⁸ Deputy Scales and observers maintain, however, that he used only minimal force. (See Scales Dep. at 46-47; Castro Dep. at 37-38; Geering Dep. at 36). Deputy Scales then led Mr. Olin to the curb and told him to sit on the sidewalk. (Olin Dep. at 200-01; see also Scales Dep. at 50). At this point, one of Mr. Olin's co-workers approached and tried to calm him down. (Kupiec Dep. at 68 ("I've never seen someone that upset.")).

After Ms. Davenport's car was unlocked, Deputy Scales released Mr. Olin from handcuffs. (Olin Dep. at 204). Mr. Olin estimates that he was handcuffed between twenty and thirty minutes. (Id.). Deputy Scales told Mr. Olin that he would not be brought to jail at that time but that the deputy was going to file charges against him. (Scales Dep. at 61; see also Olin Dep. at 213). Mr. Olin told Deputy Scales that he would sue him,⁹ and Deputy Scales walked backed to his car and left the scene. (Scales Aff. ¶ 15). Deputy Scales obtained sworn statements from firefighters, who stated that Deputy Scales secured the scene in the best way he could and that his presence ensured the safety of those at the scene. (Dunn Statement, Doc. 52-1, at 16; Geering Statement, Doc. 52-1, at 18 ("If Deputy Scales had not intervened, I believe that [Mr. Olin] would have tried to drive through the scene.")).

Deputy Scales completed an arrest affidavit, (Scales Dep. at 85; Arrest Aff., Doc. 72-7), and in February 2009 the state attorney charged Mr. Olin with resisting an officer without violence under section 843.02, Florida Statutes, (Pl.'s Resp. to Def. Scales's Req. Admiss., Doc. 62-1, at 4-5). The case against Mr. Olin was pending through May 2009 in state court, (id.), but was eventually dismissed, (Tr., Doc. 72-4, at 3; see also Tr., Doc. 72-3).

Mr. Olin then filed this lawsuit in state court against Deputy Scales and Sheriff Jerry L. Demings, alleging state law claims of false imprisonment (Count I) and battery (Count IV) against Deputy Scales and false imprisonment against Sheriff Demings (Count V). (Fourth Am. Compl., Doc. 47). Mr. Olin also alleged federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for "violation of civil rights" against Sheriff Demings (Count II) and malicious prosecution against Deputy Scales (Count III), (Id.). The case was removed to this Court, and Deputy Scales and Sheriff Demings filed motions for summary judgment. (Docs. 50 & 51). Because there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to either of the federal claims, the motions for summary judgment must be granted as to Counts II and III, and the case will be remanded to the state court for resolution of the remaining claims.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issues of material fact remain. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). That burden "may be discharged by 'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court construes the facts and allreasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and it may not weigh evidence or determine credibility. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). However, summary judgment should be granted "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

When faced with a "properly supported motion for summary judgment, [the nonmoving party] must come forward with specific factual evidence, presenting more than mere allegations." Gargiulo v. G.M. Sales, Inc., 131 F.3d 995, 999 (11th Cir. 1997). "'In a response to a motion for summary judgment, a party cannot rely on ignorance of facts, on speculation, or on suspicion, and may not escape summary judgment in the mere hope that something will turn up at trial.' Essentially, the inquiry is 'whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the [factfinder] or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Sawyer v. Southwest Airlines Co., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262 (D. Kan. 2003) (quoting Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir. 1988), and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)); see also LaRoche v. Denny's, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 1999) ("The law is clear . . . that suspicion, perception, opinion, and belief cannot be...