Oliphant v. Commissioner of Correction, (SC 17225).
Decision Date | 26 July 2005 |
Docket Number | (SC 17225). |
Citation | 877 A.2d 761,274 Conn. 563 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | ANTHONY W. OLIPHANT v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION. |
Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Katz, Palmer and Zarella, Js.
Christopher M. Neary, deputy assistant public defender, with whom was Sandra J. Crowell, assistant public defender, for the appellant (petitioner).
James A. Killen, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Linda Howe, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
Following our grant of certification,1 the petitioner, Anthony W. Oliphant, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the habeas court's sua sponte dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner's principal claim is that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the habeas court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his petition because he was not in "custody" within the meaning of General Statutes § 52-4662 when his petition was filed. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following facts and procedural history. Oliphant v. Commissioner of Correction, 83 Conn. App. 10, 11, 847 A.2d 1080 (2004).
Thus, the petitioner's April sentences ran for 129 days before the concurrent September sentence was imposed. After the concurrent sentence was imposed, the April sentences and the September sentence overlapped until the April sentences expired. On December 3, 1998, the petitioner, acting pro se, filed the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus. At that time, the April sentences had expired fully and he was serving only the September sentence.
The petition consisted of a preprinted form. "In the space provided to list sentences . . . the petitioner listed only the April sentences. On the form the petitioner claimed, inter alia, that his right to be free of double jeopardy was violated, that his attorney failed to contact certain witnesses and threatened other witnesses, that he was the victim of selective or vindictive prosecution and that he was not tried by an impartial jury. The form allowed the petitioner to challenge the legality of his convictions or the terms of his confinement. The form provided that it was to be used to challenge either the former or the latter, but not both. The petitioner challenged only the underlying convictions and not his confinement. Appended to the form were two typed pages containing a litany of allegations, including: a conspiracy had been formed against the petitioner because he had made a civil rights complaint; the petitioner's name had been changed without his consent, which led to the denial of telephone privileges during his trials; a conflict existed between him and his attorney; and his attorney was ineffective for a variety of reasons.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 11-12.
The petitioner appealed from the judgment of the habeas court to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the habeas court's judgment of dismissal. Id., 16. This certified appeal followed.
The petitioner claims on appeal that the Appellate Court improperly failed to construe liberally his pro se habeas petition when it concluded that the petition did not challenge his unexpired September conviction. Alternatively, he claims that, even if the petition is construed as challenging the April convictions, the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the habeas court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, he argues that he was in custody under the challenged April sentences at the time his petition was filed. Additionally, the petitioner claims that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the habeas court's dismissal of his habeas petition sua sponte without notice or a hearing. We reject the petitioner's first two claims and decline to address his third claim because it is outside the scope of the question certified for review by this court. See Practice Book § 84-9.4
As a preliminary matter, we set forth the standard of review. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Neiman v. Yale University, 270 Conn. 244, 250-51, 851 A.2d 1165 (2004). "This court has often stated that the question of subject matter jurisdiction, because it addresses the basic competency of the court, can be raised by any of the parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) ABC, LLC v. State Ethics Commission, 264 Conn. 812, 822-23, 826 A.2d 1077 (2003).
Because it is undisputed that the petitioner was in custody on his September conviction within the meaning of § 52-466 when he filed his habeas petition, we first address the petitioner's claim that the Appellate Court failed to construe his petition broadly as an attack on his September conviction. The petitioner cites Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S. Ct. 285, 106, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976), for the proposition that courts must construe pro se pleadings liberally.5 Although the federal rule of construction for pro se pleadings is not binding on this court, Connecticut follows a similar rule of construction. (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hill v. Williams, 74 Conn. App. 654, 655-56, 813 A.2d 130, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 918, 822 A.2d 242 (2003). The courts adhere to this rule to ensure that pro se litigants receive a full and fair opportunity to be heard, regardless of their "lack of legal education and experience . . . ." Higgins v. Hartford County Bar Assn., 109 Conn. 690, 692, 145 A. 20 (1929).
This rule of construction has limits, however. "Although we allow pro se litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Strobel v. Strobel, 64 Conn. App. 614, 618, 781 A.2d 356, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 937, 786 A.2d 426 (2001). A habeas court "does not have the discretion to look beyond the pleadings and trial evidence to decide claims not raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jenkins v. Commissioner of Correction, 52 Conn. App. 385, 406, 726 A.2d 657, cert. denied, 249 Conn. 920, 733 A.2d 233 (1999). In addition, while courts should not construe pleadings narrowly and technically, courts also cannot contort pleadings "in such a way so as to strain the bounds of rational comprehension." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Broadnax v. New Haven, 270 Conn. 133, 174, 851 A.2d 1113 (2004).
In his habeas petition, the petitioner listed only the April convictions, which he referred to specifically by docket number. Under "[t]otal effective sentence," the petitioner typed: "Fifteen (15) Months." He listed April 25, 1995, as the sentencing date. Although his petition makes an indirect and passing reference to the September sentence,6 this reference cannot be read as an allegation that the September sentence had been enhanced by the April convictions,7 even under a broad and liberal reading. Moreover, at the time of the...
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