Oliphant v. Estate of Brunetti

• Decision Date: 15 November 2002
• Docket Number: No. 20010238-CA.,20010238-CA.
• Citation: Oliphant v. Estate of Brunetti, 2002 UT App 375, 460 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 64 P.3d 587 (Utah App. 2002)
• Parties: Roger OLIPHANT, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. ESTATE of Joseph R. BRUNETTI and its heirs and assigns; and Florence Brunetti, Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

64 P.3d 587

2002 UT App 375

Roger OLIPHANT, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. ESTATE of Joseph R. BRUNETTI and its heirs and assigns; and Florence Brunetti, Defendants and Appellants.

No. 20010238-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

November 15, 2002.

Rehearing Denied January 10, 2003.

Brian W. Steffensen and William J. Middleton, Salt Lake City, for Appellants.

Lee Rudd, Draper, for Appellee.

Before Judges BENCH, ORME, and THORNE, Jr.

OPINION

ORME, Judge.

¶ 1 This appeal challenges the propriety of an independent action in which relief was granted from a default judgment that had been purportedly satisfied through payment of the underlying obligation. Especially given the coordination between the judge who entered the default judgment and the judge who decided the independent action, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Roger Oliphant had several financial dealings with Joseph and Florence Brunetti in the 1980s and 1990s. Their respective views of the transactions ultimately varied quite dramatically. Oliphant believed that (1) he was paid $5,000 by the Brunettis as a finder's fee in connection with a loan they made to Heinz Rose; (2) he had no responsibility for repayment of the Rose loan; and (3) he owed the Brunettis something by reason of a failed business dealing in the purchase and sale of coins, but the amount owed should be "net" of the value of coins the Brunettis retained after the venture failed.

¶ 3 The Brunettis' position, as reflected in a complaint they filed in May of 1995, was that (1) they had loaned $5,000 to Oliphant which had not been repaid; (2) Oliphant was liable for repayment of $50,000 loaned to Rose on Oliphant's advice; and (3) Oliphant was liable for repayment of the full $19,000 that the Brunettis had invested in the coin business. After Oliphant answered the complaint, Oliphant and the Brunettis agreed that Oliphant would make periodic cash payments to the Brunettis. Oliphant made a number of payments, and the 1995 complaint was eventually dismissed.

¶ 4 In October of 1997, an identical complaint was filed by the Brunettis against Oliphant. Oliphant claims he never received this complaint, but a return of service in the file says otherwise. A default judgment was taken against him a few months later. Oliphant also claims he never received the notice of entry of default judgment that was sent to him, and the certificate of mailing does reflect that an incorrect zip code was used. Notwithstanding the default judgment, according to a ledger sheet Oliphant maintained, Oliphant continued to make— and the Brunettis continued to receive and accept—periodic payments pursuant to the prior arrangement. Oliphant claims he first learned of the default judgment when he was served with a writ of execution on April 20, 2000, by which time Joseph Brunetti had died.

¶ 5 On April 27, 2000, Oliphant paid $6,400 to Florence Brunetti. She acknowledged receipt of the payment and its intended legal effect by signing a document, prepared by Oliphant, which provided, in its entirety, as follows:

Joseph and Florence Brunetti along with Roger A. Oliphant agreed to settle all claims in the amount of $24,000.00 paid by Roger A. Oliphant to Joseph & Florence Brunetti.

Amount of monies paid to Joseph and Florence Brunetti through December 31, 1999[i]s $17,600.00. Balance owing is $6,400.00.

Monies received by Florence Brunetti on April 27, [20]00 from Roger A. Oliphant is $6,400.00[.]

With final payment of $6,400.00, bringing total payments of $24,000.00 without interest PAID IN FULL. Joseph and Florence Brunetti and successors have settled, released and resolved all claims, suits, judgements, etc. against Roger A. Oliphant, including Civil nos XXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXX, Third District Court.

Apparently at the same time, Florence signed her name at the bottom of a copy of Oliphant's ledger sheet, which showed prior payments totalling $17,600, a final payment of $6,400, and a zero balance.

¶ 6 On June 1, 2000, in the face of execution on the default judgment, Oliphant filed an action against the Brunettis seeking relief from the default judgment. That action was assigned to Judge Bohling. Later that month, Judge Noel, who had entered the default judgment, stayed execution of the judgment pending disposition of the action assigned to Judge Bohling. In that action, the Brunettis filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Oliphant filed a motion for summary judgment. The court concluded the obligations underlying the default judgment had been discharged, and the judgment thereby satisfied, through an accord and satisfaction. Accordingly, the court granted Oliphant's motion and denied the Brunettis' motions. The Brunettis appeal.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 7 Multiple issues are raised. We believe the issues meriting discussion boil down to these three.¹ First, did Judge Bohling have the authority to consider Oliphant's challenge to the default judgment in the 1997 action entered by Judge Noel? Questions of the scope of judicial authority are reviewed for correctness. Cf. Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81,¶ 8, 31 P.3d 1147 (subject matter jurisdiction); State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241,¶ 8, 31 P.3d 615 (authority to impose sentence in absentia), cert. granted, 42 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002).

¶ 8 Second, if Judge Bohling had such authority, was he limited to treating the action as tantamount to a motion for relief from judgment under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? "[T]he interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law that we review for correctness." Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89,¶ 15, 16 P.3d 540.

¶ 9 Third, if Judge Bohling was not constrained by rule 60(b), was summary judgment properly entered on a theory of accord and satisfaction? Whether summary judgment was properly entered on the record before Judge Bohling and whether an accord and satisfaction were established on that record are also questions of law, which we review for correctness. See Gerbich v. Numed Inc., 1999 UT 37,¶ 10, 977 P.2d 1205 (summary judgment); ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4,¶ 17, 998 P.2d 254 (accord and satisfaction).

ANALYSIS

¶ 10 The thrust of the Brunettis' argument, perhaps well-taken as far as it goes, is that any consideration of the viability of the judgment entered in the 1997 action should have been undertaken by Judge Noel, who entered the judgment, rather than Judge Bohling. We need not decide whether, in all circumstances, a judge would have the power to consider, in an independent action, the continued vitality of a judgment entered by another judge. Largely overlooked by the Brunettis is that Judge Noel was apprised of the independent action and had the opportunity to require that the parties raise with him any challenge to his judgment, either by moving to consolidate the independent action with the 1997 action or by filing an appropriate post-judgment motion in the 1997 action. Instead, fully cognizant of the independent action, Judge Noel stayed execution of his judgment pending resolution of the independent action. In essence, then, Judge Noel deferred to Judge Bohling to resolve the challenge to Judge Noel's judgment and, in the process, obviated the range of problems presented by having a different judge second-guessing the judgment entered by a colleague. This knowledge and coordination between the two judges makes the Brunettis' first argument something of a red herring,² and we turn our attention to the remaining two issues.

I. Effect of Rule 60(b)

¶ 11 The thrust of the Brunettis' argument is that by bringing an independent action, Oliphant avoided his burden to demonstrate that the default judgment was a result of "excusable neglect." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). And insofar as Oliphant's claim was premised on fraud or misconduct under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), the Brunettis contend Oliphant's action was untimely. See id. 60(b) ("The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.").

¶ 12 We are not persuaded. Even if Oliphant was bound to proceed under rule 60(b)—a doubtful proposition in view of the rule's explicit recognition, with our emphasis, that "[t]he procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independentaction"—Oliphant's theory should not be viewed as confined to subparts (1) and (3) of rule 60(b). Rather, the thrust of his argument brings him comfortably within subpart (5), entitling a party to relief if "the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged... or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). Such a claim only has to be raised "within a reasonable time," id. 60(b), and the independent action was brought almost immediately after renewed execution efforts seemingly precluded by the parties' settlement. Accordingly, we now turn to consider whether, on the merits, Oliphant was entitled to the relief he was granted.

II. Merits

¶ 13 Judge Bohling concluded Oliphant was entitled to relief from the default judgment because the underlying dispute had been resolved pursuant to "a valid accord and satisfaction." In reaching that result, he concluded that the document signed by Florence Brunetti was "clear and unambiguous on its face."

¶ 14 These conclusions appear to be sound. "Whether the terms of a contract are ambiguous is a question of law which we review for correctness." Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah Ct.App.1994). "Contract language may be ambiguous if it is unclear, omits terms, or if the terms used to express the intention of the parties may be understood to have two or more plausible meanings." Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 790 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (citation omitted). Absent ambiguity, interpretation of a contract presents a question of law rather...