Olive v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 20 January 2023
• Docket Number: C20-0356JLR
• Parties: OSCAR LEE OLIVE, IV, Plaintiff, v. HAYLEY MARIE ROBINSON, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington

OSCAR LEE OLIVE, IV, Plaintiff, v. HAYLEY MARIE ROBINSON, Defendant.

No. C20-0356JLR

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle

January 20, 2023

ORDER

JAMES L. ROBART UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court is pro se Plaintiff Oscar Lee Olive IV's motion for entry of default judgment against pro se Defendant Hayley Marie Robinson pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) and Local Rule 55(b)(2). (Mot. (Dkt. # 42).) Ms. Robinson did not file a response to the motion. (See generally Dkt.) The court has considered the motion, the declarations filed in support of the motion, the balance of the record, and the applicable law. Being fully advised, the court GRANTS IN PART Mr Olive's motion.

II. BACKGROUND

Mr. Olive initiated this action against the Ms. Robinson on March 4, 2020, alleging that Ms. Robinson published defamatory statements about him on her website, https://irelandrosemarie.wordpress.com. (See generally (Compl. (Dkt. # 1) ¶ 14.) Specifically, Mr. Olive asserts that in 2019, Ms. Robinson falsely stated on her website, https://irelandrosemarie.wordpress.com,^[1] that Mr. Olive had sexually assaulted Kiersten Alexandra Klag, a model Mr. Olive knows.^[2] (See FAC ¶¶ 14, 25.) According to Mr. Olive, Ms. Robinson knew the statement was false and made the statement with the intent to injure Mr. Olive both personally and professionally. (See id. ¶¶ 14-20.) Ms. Robinson's statement allegedly caused Mr. Olive's reputation, business, and mental health to suffer. (See id. ¶¶ 17-20.) In this action, he brings claims against Ms. Robinson for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (See generally id. ¶¶ 24-32.)

This the second case that Mr. Olive has initiated against Ms. Robinson. In the first case, which was in front of Magistrate Judge Brian A. Tsuchida, Mr. Olive asserted similar claims of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on Ms. Robinson's alleged publication of defamatory statements on Facebook in 2016. See FAC, Olive v. Robinson, No. C18-0862BAT (W.D. Wash. July 30, 2018), Dkt. # 11. One of the allegedly defamatory statements at issue in that case is essentially identical to the statement at issue here-namely, that Mr. Olive sexually assaulted Ms. Klag. See Id. ¶ 10. During that proceeding, Ms. Robinson filed for bankruptcy and United States Bankruptcy Court Chief Judge Marc Barreca held a trial to determine whether any of Mr. Olive's claims against Ms. Robinson were dischargeable in bankruptcy. See Status Report, Olive v. Robinson, No. C18-0862BAT (W.D. Wash. Apr. 17, 2021), Dkt. # 70, Ex. 1 (“Bankruptcy Claim Discharge Order & Hr. Tr.”). Chief Judge Barreca held, in pertinent part, that Mr. Olive failed to establish his claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, but that he did establish a claim for defamation based on statements made by Ms. Robinson in the “first Facebook video accusing [Mr. Olive] of sexually assaulting Ms. Klag.” See id. at 8-18. Chief Judge Barreca permitted Mr. Olive to return to Magistrate Judge Tsuchida for a determination of actual damages with respect to Mr. Olive's defamation claim. See id. at 20-23. Magistrate Judge Tsuchida awarded Mr. Olive presumed general damages in the amount of $15,000.00 for his defamation claim against Ms. Robinson. See 7/9/21 Order at 4-5, Olive v. Robinson, No. C18-0862BAT (W.D. Wash. Apr. 17, 2021), Dkt. # 73 (finding that Mr. Olive “failed to show that he suffered actual damages of $63,203.00 as a result of [Ms. Robinson's] defamatory Facebook posting”).

Mr. Olive amended his complaint on May 3, 2022, to include references to the findings of Chief Judge Barreca. (See generally FAC; Dkt.) Although Ms. Robinson appeared in this action and answered the initial complaint, she failed to answer or otherwise defend against Mr. Olive's amended complaint. (See generally Dkt.; Answer (Dkt. # 9).) On September 14, 2022, the Clerk granted Mr. Olive's motion for default and entered an order of default against Ms. Robinson. (9/14/21 Order (Dkt. # 39); Mot. for Default (Dkt. # 38).)

Mr. Olive now asks the court to enter a default judgment against Ms. Robinson in the amount of $300,192-$100,000 for emotional distress and $200,192 for loss of income. (Mot. at 1, 16.) He also asks the court to enjoin Ms. Robinson “from continuing to publish defamatory false statements as alleged in the [f]irst [a]mended [c]omplaint on any website owned and/or operated by” Ms. Robinson. (Id. at 16.)

III. ANALYSIS

The court begins by discussing the relevant legal standard governing motions for default judgment before discussing the merits of Mr. Olive's motion.

A. Legal Standard

If a defendant fails to plead or otherwise defend, the clerk enters the party's default. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). Then, upon a plaintiff's request or motion, the court may grant default judgment for the plaintiff. Id. 55(b)(2). Entry of default judgment is left to the court's sound discretion. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). Because granting or denying relief is within the court's discretion, a defendant's default does not automatically entitle a plaintiff to a court-ordered judgment. Id. In exercising its discretion, the court considers seven factors (the “Eitel factors”): (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff if relief is denied; (2) the substantive merits of the plaintiff's claims; (3) the sufficiency of the claims raised in the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in relationship to the defendant's behavior; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the preference for decisions on the merits when reasonably possible. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986).

Generally, default judgment is a two-step process: first, the court determines that a default judgment should be entered; then, it determines the amount and character of the relief that should be awarded. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987). At the default judgment stage, well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, except those related to damages, are considered admitted and are sufficient to establish a defendant's liability. Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977); Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(b)(6); TeleVideo, 826 F.2d at 917-18. The court must ensure that the amount of damages is reasonable and demonstrated by the plaintiff's evidence.^[3] See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b); TeleVideo, 826 F.2d at 917-18; LG Elecs., Inc. v. Advance Creative Comput. Corp., 212 F.Supp.2d 1171, 1178 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“[T]he evident policy of [Rule 55(b)] is that even a defaulting party is entitled to have its opponent produce some evidence to support an award of damages.”). And “[a] default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c).

B. Jurisdiction

“To avoid entering a default judgment that can later be successfully attacked as void, a court should determine whether it has the power, i.e., the jurisdiction, to enter the judgment in the first place.” See In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). First, there can be no reasonable dispute that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. The court has diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), over this case because Mr. Olive is a citizen of Florida and Ms. Robinson is a citizen of the State of Washington, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00 (see FAC ¶¶ 1-2, 6, 16-22). Second, the court has personal jurisdiction over Ms. Robinson because she is domiciled in Washington State, was properly served by Mr. Olive, and appeared in this action without challenging personal jurisdiction. (See generally id. ¶ 2; Affs. of Service (Dkt. ## 7, 8); Dkt.); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that a court may exercise general jurisdiction over a defendant if the defendant is domiciled in the forum state).

C. Whether the Eitel Factors Favor Default Judgment

Default judgment is warranted in this case because, on balance, the Eitel factors weigh in favor of such judgment. The court discusses each factor in turn.

1. Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff

The first Eitel factor considers whether the plaintiff will suffer prejudice if default judgment is not entered. See PepsiCo, Inc., v. Cal. Security Cans, 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Ms. Robinson has demonstrated an unwillingness to participate in this lawsuit given her failure to respond to or otherwise defend against Mr. Olive's amended complaint. (See generally Dkt.) As a result, Mr. Olive will suffer prejudice if default judgment is not entered because he will “be denied the right to judicial resolution” of his claims and will be “without other recourse for recovery.” Elektra Entm't Grp. Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 391 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Curtis v. Illumination Arts, Inc., 33 F.Supp.3d 1200, 1211 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (“‘[P]rejudice' exists where the plaintiff has no ‘recourse for recovery' other than default judgment.” (quoting Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 499 (C.D. Cal. 2003))). Thus, the first Eitel factor weighs in favor of entering default judgment.

2. Substantive Merits and Sufficiency of the Complaint

The second and third Eitel factors-the substantive merits of the plaintiff's claim and the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint-are frequently analyzed together. PepsiCo, 238 F.Supp.2d at 1175. For these two factors to weigh in favor of default judgment, the complaint's allegations must be sufficient to state a claim for relief. Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386 1388 (9th Cir. 1978). A...