OLIVER BY HINES v. McClung

• Decision Date: 20 December 1995
• Docket Number: Cause No. 1:94-CV-364.
• Citation: 919 F. Supp. 1206
• Parties: Amanda L. OLIVER by her natural guardian Becky L. HINES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Kevin McCLUNG, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

919 F. Supp. 1206

Amanda L. OLIVER by her natural guardian Becky L. HINES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Kevin McCLUNG, et al., Defendants.

Cause No. 1:94-CV-364.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

December 20, 1995.

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Offer Korin, Frank C. Capozza, Katz and Korin PC, Indianapolis, IN, for plaintiffs.

Carla J. Baird, Hunt, Suedhoff, Borror & Eilbacher, Fort Wayne, IN, David R. Day, Johnson, Smith, Pence, Densborn, Wright & Heath, Indianapolis, IN, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

WILLIAM C. LEE, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on October 2, 1995. Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on October 20, 1995, in conjunction with Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants filed a reply Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Answer Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on November 6, 1995. Finally, Plaintiffs filed their Reply to Defendants' Answer Brief on November 17, 1995. For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Virtually all of the underlying facts of this case are undisputed. At the time of the incident which is the subject of this lawsuit, the Plaintiffs, Amanda L. Oliver ("Oliver"), Angela J. Wright ("Wright"), Andrea D. Roach ("Roach"), April L. Rogers ("Rogers"), Summer Stanton ("Stanton"), and Maria Sargent ("Sargent") (also referred to collectively as "Plaintiffs") were seventh grade students attending West Jay County Junior High School ("West Jay"), an Indiana public school operated by the Jay County School Corporation ("Jay County"). Plaintiffs named as Defendants the Board of Trustees for the Jay County School Corporation ("School Board") and George Gilbert ("Gilbert"), Superintendent, in their official capacities. In addition, Plaintiffs named as Defendants Kevin McClung ("McClung"), principal at West Jay, Robert Prescott ("Prescott"), a teacher at West Jay, Janice Miller ("Miller"), also a teacher at West Jay, and Diana Stewart ("Stewart"), a substitute food service worker at West Jay. (Plaintiffs subsequently agreed to dismiss Prescott from the suit.)

The Plaintiffs allege that they were the victims of an illegal search performed by McClung, Miller and Stewart on March 4, 1994. Plaintiffs assert a claim based on a violation of their constitutional rights, as well as several state law claims.

The facts reveal that on March 4, 1994, immediately following their physical education class, two female students reported to their gym teacher, Prescott, that four dollars and fifty cents ($4.50) was missing from the locker room. Prescott informed McClung of the girls' allegation of possible theft. McClung decided to conduct a search of the students and their lockers. He asked Miller and Stewart to assist him in the search. McClung then told all the girls in the gym class to remain in the gym. He then directed girls to go into the locker room in pairs. Once inside, McClung, Miller and Stewart searched the girls' lockers and book bags. They also instructed the girls to remove their shoes and socks in an effort to uncover the missing loot.

Stewart then suggested that the girls could hide the money in their bras, and asked McClung if he wanted the girls' bras searched. McClung decided to conduct such a search and ordered Miller and Stewart to take the girls to another part of the locker room to do so. All of the "strip searches" were conducted in a similar fashion, although the specific details of each one vary somewhat. Rogers, for example, was forced to remove her bra, which she did from underneath her shirt, and hand it to Stewart for examination. Rogers Deposition, pp. 19-20. Roach was told by Stewart to remove her shirt and bra, which she did, so they could be inspected. Stewart then patted Roach's pockets on the outside of her pants, and placed her hands inside the girl's pockets. Roach Deposition, pp. 22-23. Oliver went into the locker room and removed her pants and shirt and handed them to Stewart for inspection. She was then told to loosen the straps of her bra to see if any money fell out. Oliver Deposition, pp. 22-23. Wright was told by Stewart to shake her bra to see if any money fell out. Stewart also patted Wright's pockets. Wright Deposition, pp. 21-22. Sargent was told to take off her shirt by either Stewart or Miller, who then checked Sargent's bra by lifting it up. Sargent was then told to unbutton her pants and either Miller or Stewart checked the waistline of Sargent's pants by sticking a thumb in the waistline and going around the waist. Sargent Deposition, pp. 24-25. Stanton was also told to remove her shirt and pull the straps of her bra off her shoulders. Stanton Deposition, pp. 46-47. Once the girls were searched they were permitted to leave the gym and go on to their next class.

At some point later that same day, McClung concluded that the search had been a mistake. He spent that evening and the rest of the weekend contacting the parents of all the students who were subjected to the search in order to report what had taken place. On the following Monday morning, McClung met with the girls and apologized to them.

The plaintiffs allege that this search was unreasonable and therefore a violation of their Fourth Amendment right. They claim that they were embarrassed, humiliated, and in some cases traumatized by the event. Three of the girls originally filed suit, asserting a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint was later amended to add three additional plaintiffs.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). However, Rule 56(c) is not a requirement that the moving party negate his opponent's claim. Fitzpatrick v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 916 F.2d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir. 1990). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and in which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the directed verdict standard under Rule 50(a), which requires the court to grant a directed verdict where there can be but one reasonable conclusion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is not sufficient to successfully oppose summary judgment; "there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. at 251, 106 S.Ct. at 2512; In Re Matter of Wildman, 859 F.2d 553, 557 (7th Cir.1988); Klein v. Ryan, 847 F.2d 368, 374 (7th Cir.1988); Valentine v. Joliet Township High Sch. Dist. No. 204, 802 F.2d 981, 986 (7th Cir.1986). No genuine issue for trial exists "where the record as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 957 F.2d 317, 322 (7th Cir.1992) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).

Initially, Rule 56 requires the moving party to inform the court of the basis for the motion, and to identify those portions of the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The non-moving party may oppose the motion with any of the evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), but reliance on the pleadings alone is not sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Goka v. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646, 649 (7th Cir.1988); Guenin v. Sendra Corp., 700 F.Supp. 973, 974 (N.D.Ind.1988); Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d 102, 105 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 960, 104 S.Ct. 392, 78 L.Ed.2d 336 (1983). In ruling on a summary judgment motion the court accepts as true the non-moving party's evidence, draws all legitimate inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and does not weigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-251, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. However, "it is a gratuitous cruelty to parties and their witnesses to put them through the emotional ordeal of a trial when the outcome is foreordained" and in such cases summary judgment is appropriate. Mason v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank, 704 F.2d 361, 367 (7th Cir.1983).

Substantive law determines which facts are material; that is, which facts might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not preclude summary judgment even when they are in dispute. Id. The issue of fact must be genuine. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e). To establish a genuine issue of fact, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1356; First Nat'l Bank of Cicero v. Lewco Sec. Corp., 860 F.2d 1407, 1411 (7th Cir. 1988). The non-moving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. A summary judgment determination is...