Oliver v. Bartholomew

• Decision Date: 25 November 2019
• Docket Number: No. 18-2506,18-2506
• Parties: LEE OLIVER, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. ELIZABETH BARTHOLOMEW, Staff to the Sexual Offender Advisory Board, in her Individual Capacity; STEPHEN T. MOYER, Secretary of Public Safety & Correctional Services, in his Individual Capacity; MONTGOMERY COUNTY, Defendants - Appellees, and GREGG L. HERSHBERGER, Former Secretary of Public Safety & Correctional Services, In his Individual Capacity; GARY D. MAYNARD, Former Secretary of Public Safety & Correctional Services, In his Individual Capacity; MARY ANN SAAR, Former Secretary of Public Safety & Correctional Services, In her Individual Capacity; STUART O. SIMMS, Former Secretary of Public Safety & Correctional Services, In his Individual Capacity; SHELLEY LIPTON, Montgomery County Police Department Sex Offender Registry Unit, In her Individual Capacity; DETECTIVE M. PARKER, Montgomery County Police Department Sex Offender Registry Unit, In his Individual Capacity; JIM CUNNINGHAM, Montgomery County Police Department Sex Offender Registry Unit, In his Individual Capacity; DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES; SEXUAL OFFENDER ADVISORY BOARD, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

LEE OLIVER, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. ELIZABETH BARTHOLOMEW, Staff to the Sexual Offender Advisory Board,in her Individual Capacity; STEPHEN T. MOYER, Secretary of Public Safety & Correctional Services,in his Individual Capacity; MONTGOMERY COUNTY, Defendants - Appellees,

and

GREGG L. HERSHBERGER, Former Secretary of Public Safety & Correctional Services,

In his Individual Capacity; GARY D. MAYNARD, Former Secretary of Public Safety & Correctional Services,

In his Individual Capacity; MARY ANN SAAR,

Former Secretary of Public Safety & Correctional Services, In her Individual Capacity;

STUART O. SIMMS, Former Secretary of Public Safety & Correctional Services, In his Individual Capacity;

SHELLEY LIPTON, Montgomery County Police Department Sex Offender Registry Unit,

In her Individual Capacity;

DETECTIVE M. PARKER, Montgomery County Police Department Sex Offender Registry Unit,

In his Individual Capacity; JIM CUNNINGHAM,

Montgomery County Police Department Sex Offender Registry Unit, In his Individual Capacity;

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES;

SEXUAL OFFENDER ADVISORY BOARD, Defendants.

No. 18-2506

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Submitted: November 20, 2019

November 25, 2019

UNPUBLISHED

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. (1:18-cv-00323-CCB) Before MOTZ and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Breon L. Johnson, LAW OFFICE OF BREON L. JOHNSON, Rosedale, Maryland, for Appellant. Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General, Michael O. Doyle, Assistant Attorney General, Edward J. Kelley, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Towson, Maryland; Marc P. Hansen, County Attorney, John P. Markovs, Deputy County Attorney, Edward B. Lattner, Chief, Division of Government Operations and Appeals, Patricia Lisehora Kane, Chief, Division of Litigation, Erin J. Ashbarry, Associate County Attorney, OFFICE OF THE COUNTY ATTORNEY, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Lee Oliver appeals the district court's order granting Defendants' motions to strike his amended complaint and denying his motion for leave to amend the complaint.^* On appeal, Oliver argues that the district court erroneously concluded that his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) claims were futile and, in the alternative, abused its discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. We affirm.

A party may amend a pleading once as a matter of right within 21 days of service of the pleading or of a responsive pleading or motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). "In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). "Although leave to amend should be freely given when justice so requires, . . . [a] district court may deny a motion to amend when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, the moving party has acted in bad faith, or the amendment would be futile." Equal Rights Ctr. v. Niles Bolton Assocs., 602 F.3d 597, 603 (4th Cir. 2010) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). We generally review a district court's decision to deny leave to amend for abuse of discretion. United States ex rel. Ahumada v. NISH, 756 F.3d 268, 274 (4th Cir. 2014). When a district court denies a motion to amend on the ground of futility, however, we review the district court's legal conclusions de novo. Id. Upon a review of the record, we find no error in thedistrict court's conclusion that the proposed amendment of Oliver's § 1983 claims was futile. We therefore affirm the district court's decision to strike the amended complaint and deny Oliver leave to amend as to these claims.

Oliver next argues that, even if his federal claims were properly rejected, the district court erred in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. We disagree. The district court "enjoys wide latitude in determining whether or not to retain jurisdiction over...