Oliver v. Civil Service Commission of City of Chicago

• Decision Date: 02 March 1967
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 50863
• Citation: 224 N.E.2d 671,80 Ill.App.2d 329
• Parties: Lacy OLIVER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF the CITY OF CHICAGO, Arthur J. Ward,Superintendent of the House of Correction of the City of Chicago, and the Cityof Chicago, a municipal corporation, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 671

224 N.E.2d 671

80 Ill.App.2d 329

Lacy OLIVER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF the CITY OF CHICAGO, Arthur J. Ward,Superintendent of the House of Correction of the City of Chicago, and the Cityof Chicago, a municipal corporation Defendants-Appellants.

Gen. No. 50863.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

March 2, 1967.

Raymond F. Simon, Corp. Counsel of City of Chicago, Chicago, Sydney R. Drebin, Marsile J. Hughes, Asst. Corp. Counsel, of counsel, for appellants.

Richard L. Clayter, Chicago, for appellee.

SCHWARTZ, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook County vacating and setting aside a decision of the Civil Service Commission of the City of Chicago. On May 8, 1963, the Commission found the plaintiff guilty of conduct unbecoming an employee of the City of Chicago and ordered that he be discharged from his position as a guard at the House of Correction. Oliver filed a 'Petition to Correct Order' with the Commission, which was denied on September 4, 1963. Thereafter he instituted an action for administrative review. The Circuit Court heard the case and ordered plaintiff's reinstatement. The Commission appeals from this order, contending that (1) the trial court had no jurisdiction to review the decision of the Commission because the action for administrative review was not filed within the time allotted by the Administrative Review Act, and (2) the Commission properly discharged plaintiff for conduct unbecoming an employee. The events precipitating his discharge follow.

On December 9, 1962, at about 2:00 a.m. plaintiff was in the Green Diamond Lounge in Chicago when police officers arrived to investigate a report that an armed man was in the vicinity. Plaintiff volunteered to assist the officers, exhibited his badge and, according to one of the policemen, identified himself as a police officer. He told the officers that a small man on crutches had dropped a toy pistol in the tavern; that he had cautioned the man about frightening people; and that he had assisted in chasing the man from the tavern. After relating the story to the officers, plaintiff turned to the patrons of the tavern and shouted, 'Everybody out.' Plaintiff then accompanied the police as they searched the area for the small man with the toy pistol. A crowd gathered and the police tried to disperse it. They also suggested to plaintiff that he should go home. Plaintiff did not comply with their request, so the officers arrested him for disorderly conduct. A search revealed that he was carrying a 38-caliber revolver, and in addition to the disorderly conduct charge he was charged with impersonating a police officer and unlawful use of weapons. Plaintiff was tried on February 15, 1963 and found not guilty on the foregoing charges.

Following plaintiff's arrest, his superior at the House of Correction filed charges and specifications with the Commission, asking that plaintiff be discharge (1) for conduct unbecoming an employee, (2) disobedience of orders, and (3) violation of law. On motion of the Commission the charges were later reduced to disobedience of orders.

The evidence produced at the hearing before the Commission established that the rules of the House of Correction prohibited guards and custodial employees from carrying firearms, except when authorized to do so on official business. ¹

On May 8, 1963, the Commission found plaintiff guilty of the charges preferred against him and ordered his discharge. Two paragraphs of the Commission's order related to the charges of disorderly conduct and violation of law, charges which had been stricken during the hearing. Upon noting this error plaintiff's attorney filed his petition to correct the order and did not initiate a suit for administrative review until the petition was denied by the Commission. In order to resolve the issues presented on this appeal, we must first determine when the official proceedings of the Commission were terminated, since an action for administrative review must be commenced within 35 days of the rendition of the final decision of the administrative agency. ²

Judicial review of an administrative decision may not be had until the aggrieved party has exhausted his administrative remedies. The Administrative Review Act provides that if an agency provides a method for rehearing a case, either by an agency rule or by a statutory provision, then an agency decision is not an appealable 'administrative decision' until the aggrieved party requests rehearing and his petition is denied. The statute further provides that in the event an agency does not have a provision for rehearing, the final order becomes ripe for review when it is rendered by the agency. ³ The parties to this suit stipulated that the Commission does not have any rule or regulation providing a means for the rehearing of its decisions and therefore under the applicable provisions of the Administrative Review Act the order of May 8, 1963, was an 'administrative decision,' and the period for review began to run as of that date.

Plaintiff argues that the Commission has the inherent power to correct its orders, just as courts have continuing jurisdiction over their own decrees. On this basis he contends that the Commission could correct its order even though there was no specific provision in the rules or in the ordinance for reheaing. The law is clear however that regulatory agencies have no inherent powers. They are creatures of statute, vested only with those powers specifically conferred upon them by the...