Oliver v. Enriquez.
| Decision Date | 07 May 1912 |
| Citation | 124 P. 798,17 N.M. 222 |
| Parties | OLIVER et al.v.ENRIQUEZ. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court.
Held, that a complaint, in a suit to quiet title, which states that “the plaintiff by virtue of divers deeds of conveyance, etc., from the grant of the Colony of Refugio, and of long and continuous adverse possession under color of title, etc., are the owners in fee simple” of the real estate described, fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
Held, that the allegation that plaintiffs were the owners in fee simple was a conclusion of law, based upon the facts previously pleaded, and, as the facts were not sufficient to show title in plaintiff, the allegations were insufficient.
Subsection 274 of article 16, c. 107, S. L. 1907, does not require a party to set forth any facts, as to the derivation of his title, but simply requires a statement of the ultimate fact as to his ownership, and whether he claims a fee-simple estate, or other interest, whatever it may be.
Appeal from District Court, Dona Ana County; before Justice Wright.
Action by Joseph Brown Oliver and another against Jose Enriquez. From an order setting aside a judgment, plaintiffs appeal. Appeal dismissed, and cause remanded.
Sub-section 274 of article 16 S.L. 1907 does not require a party to set forth any facts, as to the derivation of his title, but simply requires a statement of the ultimate fact as to his ownership, and whether he claims a fee simple estate, or other interest, whatever it may be.
This action was instituted in the district court of Dona Ana county, by appellants, to quiet their title to certain real estate described in the complaint. Service of summons was duly made upon the appellee, who failed to appear, and judgment by default was entered against him, quieting the title to the real estate in appellants. Thereafter, and after the expiration of the term of court at which the judgment was entered, appellee moved to set aside the judgment upon the ground that the complaint, upon which the original judgment was based, did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and upon certain other grounds, other than irregularity, which need not be stated. The court sustained the motion and set aside the judgment, and appellants appeal.
Wade & Wade, of Las Cruces, for appellants. W. R. Reber, of Las Cruces, for appellee.
ROBERTS, C. J. (after stating the facts as above).
Several grounds of error are presented by appellants; but, in view of our conclusion, it is not necessary to give any consideration to them, as appellants admit that, if the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the order of the trial court in setting aside the judgment was properly made, even though the term at which it was entered had expired. Cyc. vol. 23, p. 905, lays down the rule, and it is supported by the uniform holding of practically all the courts, that, “where a judgment is entirely void for want of jurisdiction, the power to vacate it or set it aside is not limited to the term at which it was rendered, but may be exercised at a succeeding term.” And if the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the court had no jurisdiction to enter any judgment thereon.
[1] The portion of the complaint necessary to consider, to dispose of the question as to its sufficiency, reads as follows: “The plaintiffs, by Edward C. Wade, their attorney, complain of the above-named defendant, and complaining allege: (1)That the plaintiffs, by virtue of divers deeds of conveyance and confirmation from the grant of the Colony of Refugio, a body corporate, and of long and continuous adverse possession under color of title by themselves and their predecessors in interest, are the owners in fee simple of the following tracts of land situated in the county of Dona Ana and territory of New Mexico and in that certain land grant commonly known as the ‘Refugio Colony Grant’ confirmed by the Court of Private Land Claims to the Corporation of Refugio in and by a certain decree of July 13, 1901, that is to say.” The pleader then sets out a full description of the real estate by metes and bounds.
Appellee contends that the above allegations do not show a fee-simple title in appellants, and that the statement as to the title of appellants is but a legal conclusion based upon and drawn from the facts previously pleaded. It requires no argument to sustain the proposition that a party, seeking to have his title quieted against an adverse claimant, must show title in himself, to the lands in controversy, and the complaint must allege, clearly and directly, and with certainty, to a common intent such title in the plaintiff. 32 Cyc. 1350. It is also true that allegations respecting title must not be in the shape of legal conclusions, but the facts must be expressly averred, or other facts must be alleged from which the fact of title is necessarily inferred. 21 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 718.
[2] The appellants, in their complaint, do not allege that they are the owners in fee simple of the real estate described in the complaint, clearly and directly, but say “by virtue of divers deeds of conveyance and confirmation from the grant of...
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