Oliver v. Martin

Decision Date03 June 1983
PartiesBrian OLIVER v. Elwin L. MARTIN. 1
CourtMaine Supreme Court

Hewes, Culley, Feehan & Beals, George W. Beals (orally), Portland, for plaintiff.

Tom Brand (orally), Portland, for defendant.

Before GODFREY, NICHOLS, ROBERTS, CARTER, VIOLETTE and WATHEN, JJ.

VIOLETTE, Justice.

In February 1979, plaintiff Oliver began this action against Martin for assault. Two years later, Martin was ordered defaulted for his failure to file a timely responsive pre-trial memorandum. After a hearing on damages in Superior Court, Cumberland County, judgment was entered for compensatory and punitive damages against Martin. On appeal, Martin raises several alleged errors. We vacate the judgment and remand for a new hearing on punitive damages.

First, Martin objects to being defaulted. Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 16 generally requires a party to file a responsive pre-trial memorandum within 20 days after service of the other party's pre-trial memorandum. Failure to file a responsive pre-trial memorandum is grounds for the imposition of sanctions, including default, M.R.Civ.P. 16(a)(1), and such imposition of a default is reviewable only for abuse of discretion. Reeves v. Travelers Insurance Co., 421 A.2d 47, 48n.2 & 49-50 (Me.1980); see Sheepscot Land Corp. v. Gregory, 383 A.2d 16, 20 (Me.1978).

The plaintiff in this case sent Martin's counsel a copy of his pre-trial memorandum in February, 1980; the plaintiff's filing of his memorandum was noted on the docket February 27, 1980. Martin's successor counsel, who entered the case on March 12, then requested a copy of plaintiff's pre-trial memorandum on October 27 and was apparently sent one on December 12. On these facts, we are unable to conclude that the presiding justice abused his discretion when, on February 18, 1981, he ordered Martin defaulted for his failure to file either a responsive pre-trial memorandum or a request for an extension of time to file. Cf. Lerman v. Inhabitants of the City of Portland, 406 A.2d 903, 904 (Me.1979) (upholding dismissal of plaintiff's action for failure to comply with pre-trial order for ten months).

Next, Martin contends that the trial justice improperly restricted the scope of testimony in the hearing on damages. Martin appears to raise two objections: first, that the justice erred in restricting the scope of the hearing to damages alone and, second, that evidence relevant to punitive damages was improperly excluded.

Martin appeared at the damages hearing pro se. He now contends that, because he did not understand that he had been defaulted, he should have been permitted to relitigate his liability at the damages hearing. Once Martin was defaulted, however, the court properly held a hearing limited in scope to the issue of damages. M.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2); Field, McKusick & Wroth, Maine Civil Procedure § 55.6 (Supp.1981). Furthermore, it was Martin's own option to appear pro se; he cannot now be heard to claim that he regrets that decision.

We agree, however, with Martin's contention that the presiding justice erred in limiting the introduction of evidence potentially relevant to punitive damages. 2 Martin's default established only his liability; all questions relating to damages, whether compensatory or punitive, remained open for determination at the damages hearing. See M.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2). Punitive damages must be based on the trier of fact's assessment of whether and to what degree defendant's tortious conduct was accompanied by aggravating circumstances; i.e., whether it was intentional, wanton, malicious, reckless, or grossly negligent. McKinnon v. Tibbetts, 440 A.2d 1028, 1031 & n. 3 (Me.1982); Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., ...

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16 cases
  • Tuttle v. Raymond
    • United States
    • Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)
    • June 21, 1985
    ...Co., 440 A.2d 359, 361 n. 4 (Me.1982); see, e.g., Hanover Insurance Co. v. Hayward, 464 A.2d 156, 158 n. 2 (Me.1983); Oliver v. Martin, 460 A.2d 594, 595 n. 2 (Me.1983). This case presents such an occasion. 1 We refuse to abolish common law punitive damages in Maine. We do take this opportu......
  • Finn v. Lipman
    • United States
    • Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)
    • March 11, 1987
    ...court and is reviewable only for abuse of that discretion. Pelletier et ux. v. Pathiraja, 519 A.2d 187, 190 (Me.1986); Oliver v. Martin, 460 A.2d 594, 595 (Me.1983). Finn has failed to demonstrate to this court that the trial court abused its discretion in not imposing sanctions on As a pre......
  • Shannon v. SASSEVILLE
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maine
    • February 12, 2010
    ...conduct was `intentional, wanton, malicious, reckless, or grossly negligent.'" Hanover Ins. Co., 464 A.2d at 158 (quoting Oliver v. Martin, 460 A.2d 594, 595 (Me.1983)).5 Under federal constitutional law, the judge must evaluate whether a punitive damage award is excessive by considering: "......
  • Hanover Ins. Co. v. Hayward
    • United States
    • Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)
    • August 8, 1983
    ...may include whether the defendant's conduct was "intentional, wanton, malicious, reckless, or grossly negligent." Oliver v. Martin, 460 A.2d 594 at 595 (Me.1983); McKinnon v. Tibbetts, 440 A.2d 1028, 1031 (Me.1982); See Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148, 155 (Me.1979). Mitigati......
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