Oliver v. Patton

• Decision Date: 12 June 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 12-CV-00442-JHP-TLW
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Oklahoma
• Parties: CARLOS DAVID OLIVER, JR. Petitioner, v. ROBERT PATTON, Director, Respondent.

CARLOS DAVID OLIVER, JR. Petitioner, v. ROBERT PATTON, Director,¹ Respondent.

Case No. 12-CV-00442-JHP-TLW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

June 12, 2015

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is the 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition (Dkt. # 1) filed by Petitioner, Carlos David Oliver, Jr., a state prisoner appearing pro se. Respondent filed a response to the petition (Dkt. # 9), and provided the state court record necessary for resolution of Petitioner's claims (Dkt. ## 9, 10). Petitioner filed a reply (Dkt. # 11). For the reasons discussed below, the petition for writ of habeas corpus shall be denied.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was charged, by Information filed in Tulsa County District Court, Case No. CF-2010-0018, with Robbery with a Firearm (Count 1), Assault with a Dangerous Weapon (Count 2), Assault with a Dangerous Weapon While Masked or Disguised (Count 3), and Resisting an Officer (Count 4), all After Former Conviction of Two or More Felonies. (Dkt. # 9-5 at 1). Petitioner's jury trial began on August 17, 2010. During voir dire, Petitioner announced his decision to enter a blindplea of guilty to the charges. (Dkt. # 10-1, Tr. Vol. I at 124). After a lengthy colloquy with Petitioner, the trial judge accepted Petitioner's plea. Id. at 129. On September 17, 2010, Petitioner filed a letter with the district court explaining that, regardless of the sentence the court would impose during Petitioner's subsequent sentencing hearing, Petitioner wished to withdraw his blind plea. See Dkt. # 10-2, Tr. Sent. Hr'g at 2. On October 4, 2010, the trial judge sentenced Petitioner to thirty-seven (37) years imprisonment on Count 1, twenty (20) years imprisonment on Counts 2 and 3, and one (1) year imprisonment on Count 4. (Dkt. # 10-2, Tr. Sent. Hr'g at 4). The trial judge ordered the sentences to run concurrently. Id. Attorney Brian Rayl represented Petitioner during trial and the change of plea proceedings. See Dkt. # 10-1, Tr. Vol. I.

On October 26, 2010, the trial court held a hearing on Petitioner's motion to withdraw his plea. (Dkt. # 10-3, Tr. Mot. Withdraw Plea Hr'g). The district court denied the motion. Id. at 50. Attorney Ian Shahan represented Petitioner at the hearing. Id. at 1.

Represented by attorney Lee Ann Jones Peters, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA). (Dkt. # 9-1). He raised the following propositions of error:

Proposition I: The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to let Petitioner withdraw his plea where the evidence showed the plea was entered in haste and without due deliberation, and out of frustration with his attorney, who was pressuring him to plead guilty.

Proposition II: The trial court erred in accepting Petitioner's plea of guilty to resisting arrest because there was not a sufficient factual basis for it.

Proposition III: Petitioner's blind plea of guilty was involuntary as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to convey the State's offer of a plea bargain.

Proposition IV: Mr. Oliver's right to be free from double jeopardy and double punishment was violated.

Proposition V: Because Petitioner did not understand the law in relation to the facts, the pleas to Counts 2, 3, and 4 were not knowingly and voluntarily entered, and Petitioner should have been allowed to withdraw them.

Proposition VI: Trial counsel rendered ineffective representation when he urged his client to enter pleas of guilty to two crimes that were barred by double jeopardy and to another crime that his client did not commit. His representation was also ineffective when he failed to advocate on his client's behalf at sentencing.

Proposition VII: Petitioner was deprived of the constitutionally guaranteed assistance of counsel at the hearing on the motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

See id. The OCCA remanded the case to the district court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's claim that his attorney was ineffective for failing to inform Petitioner of the State's plea offer (Proposition III). See Dkt. # 9-5 at 5-6. On June 17, 2011, the district court held the evidentiary hearing, see Dkt. # 10-4, Tr. Evid. Hr'g, and, thereafter, filed a response with the OCCA detailing its findings of fact, see Dkt. # 9-3. In an unpublished opinion, filed October 7, 2011, in Case No. C-2010-1060, the OCCA granted relief on Propositions II and IV, reversing the district court's order denying Petitioner's motion to withdraw pleas as to Counts 2 and 4 and remanding to the district court with instructions to dismiss those counts. See Dkt. # 9-5 at 4-5, 8-9. The OCCA denied relief on Petitioner's remaining propositions of error and affirmed the order of the district court denying Petitioner's motion to withdraw pleas of guilty as to Counts 1 and 3. See id. at 10-11.

On August 3, 2012, Petitioner commenced this federal action by filing his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. # 1). Petitioner raises five (5) grounds of error, as follows:

Ground I: The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to let Petitioner withdraw his plea where the evidence showed the plea was entered in haste and without due deliberation, and out of frustration with his attorney, who was pressuring him to plead guilty.

Ground II: Petitioner's blind plea of guilty was involuntary as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to convey the State's offer of a plea bargain.

Ground III: Because Petitioner did not understand the law in relation to the facts, the pleas to Counts 2, 3, and 4 were not knowingly and voluntarily entered, and Petitioner should have been allowed to withdraw them.

Ground IV: Trial counsel rendered ineffective representation when he urged his client to enter pleas of guilty to two crimes that were barred by double jeopardy and to another crime that his client did not commit. His representation was also ineffective when he failed to advocate on his client's behalf at sentencing.

Ground V: Petitioner was deprived of the constitutionally guaranteed assistance of counsel at the hearing on the motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

See Dkt. # 1. Respondent argues that as to Grounds I, II, IV and V, Petitioner is not entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), and that Ground III is a matter of state law not cognizable on federal habeas review. See Dkt. # 9.

ANALYSIS

A. Exhaustion/Evidentiary Hearing

As a preliminary matter, the Court must determine whether Petitioner meets the exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982). Petitioner raised Grounds I-V to the OCCA on certiorari appeal. Therefore, the exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) is satisfied.

The Court also finds that Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000).

B. Claims adjudicated by the OCCA

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) provides the standard to be applied by federal courts reviewing constitutional claims brought by prisoners challenging state convictions. Under the AEDPA, when a state court has adjudicated a claim, a petitioner may obtain federal habeas relief only if the state court decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100-04 (2011); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 386 (2000); Neill v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1044, 1050-51 (10th Cir. 2001). "Clearly established Federal law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions." White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (citations omitted).

When a state court applies the correct federal law to deny relief, a federal habeas court may consider only whether the state court applied the federal law in an objectively reasonable manner. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 699 (2002); Hooper v. Mullin, 314 F.3d 1162, 1169 (10th Cir. 2002). An unreasonable application by the state courts is "not merely wrong; even 'clear error' will not suffice." White, 134 S. Ct. at 1702 (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003)). The petitioner "'must show that the state court's ruling . . . was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.'" Id. (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 103); see also Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1787 (2013).

"When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary." Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. Section 2254(d) bars relitigation of claims adjudicated on the merits in state courts and federal courts review these claims under the deferential standard of § 2254(d). Id. at 98-100; Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007). Further, the "determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Here, Petitioner presented his claims to the OCCA on certiorari appeal. See Dkt. # 9-1. Because the OCCA addressed Petitioner's claims on the merits, the Court will review these claims under the standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

1. Trial court erred in refusing to allow Petitioner to withdraw his blind pleas (Ground I)

In Ground I, Petitioner argues his plea was "entered in haste and without due deliberation, and out of frustration with his attorney who was pressuring him to...