Oliver v. Petit

• Decision Date: 19 July 1981
• Citation: 432 A.2d 428
• Parties: Josephine OLIVER v. Michael PETIT, Commissioner of Department of Human Services of the State of Maine and City of Augusta.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 428

432 A.2d 428

Josephine OLIVER v. Michael PETIT, Commissioner of Department of Human Services of the State of Maine and City of Augusta.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Jan. 19, 1981.

Decided July 19, 1981.

Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Inc., Kim M. Vandermeulen (orally), Richard M. Goldman, Augusta, for plaintiff.

Richard S. Cohen, William C. Nugent (orally), Asst. Attys. Gen., Augusta, for Petit.

Sanborn, Moreshead, Schade & Dawson, Charles E. Moreshead (orally), Augusta, for defendant.

Before WERNICK, GODFREY, NICHOLS, GLASSMAN ^* and CARTER, JJ., and DUFRESNE, A.R.J.

CARTER, Justice.

The plaintiff, Josephine Oliver, appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Kennebec County) affirming a fair hearing decision of the Department of Human Services. ¹ We affirm the judgment below.

From January 1 to March 22, 1979, the City of Augusta provided Oliver with municipal general assistance through the program established pursuant to 22 M.R.S.A. §§ 4450-4508. ² When she applied for this municipal assistance, on December 29, 1978, Oliver signed a form containing the following provisions:

I request that General Assistance be provided to me during the period in which my S.S.I. application is pending.

In consideration of the prompt payment of General Assistance by Augusta, Me., (Name of Town)

I hereby authorize the Social Security Administration to make the initial payment of Supplemental Income Benefits for which I am determined to be eligible to the State of Maine Department of Human Services.

I further authorize the State of Maine Department of Human Services to deduct from my initial payment an amount sufficient to reimburse Augusta, Me. for interim assistance paid to me; and after making such deduction, the Maine Department of Human Services will promptly pay the balance, if any, to me. It is understood that in the event of disagreement, I will have the right to a Hearing from the Maine Department of Human Services with respect to such apportionment of my first payment. This agreement pertains only to initial payment of Supplemental Security Income Benefits. (Name of Town)

On January 9, 1979, Oliver applied to the federal Social Security Administration for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. ³ She was found to be eligible, and in March 1979 the Social Security Administration issued an initial payment of $290.70 for SSI benefits retroactive to January. Therefore, this payment covered the period during which Oliver had already received assistance from the City. Pursuant to the reimbursement authorization, the Social Security Administration made this initial payment to the Maine Department of Human Services. The Department of Human Services reimbursed the City for $187.36 that the City had expended on Oliver's behalf and paid the balance of $103.34 to Oliver.

After receiving notification of this disbursement of her retroactive SSI payment, Oliver requested and received a fair hearing from the Department of Human Services. ⁴ At the hearing, Oliver raised two issues. First, she argued that the reimbursement agreement had not been adequately explained to her and that she had not understood it. Second, she argued that the reimbursement program was prohibited by the Maine General Assistance Law. The fair hearing officer upheld the reimbursement, finding as a fact that the agreement had been explained to her before she signed it and that she understood that the City of Augusta would be reimbursed from her first SSI check.

The Superior Court affirmed the decision without opinion, and Oliver now appeals to this Court. Oliver does not ask this Court to review the fair hearing officer's factual findings. She argues only that the reimbursement program itself is invalid under Maine law.

The reimbursement authorization which Oliver signed was based on a written agreement between the State of Maine Department of Human Services and the City of Augusta, for the stated purpose of "assuring the availability of assistance to meet the basic needs of applicants for (SSI benefits) pending determination of their eligibility." ⁵ That agreement was, in turn, based on a contract between the State and the federal government, by which the State agreed to participate in the optional Interim Reimbursement Program made available by 42 U.S.C. § 1383(g). ⁶

In challenging the reimbursement program, Oliver relies primarily on 22 M.R.S.A. § 4500-A, which states:

A municipality or the State which has incurred net general assistance costs for the support of any eligible person may recover the full amount expended for such support either from the person so relieved or from any person liable for his support, their executors or administrators, in a civil action. In no case shall a municipality or the State be authorized to recover, through a civil action, the full or part of the amount expended for the support of a previously eligible person:

1. Repayment. If as a result of the repayment of such amount this person would, in all probability, again become eligible for general assistance; or

2. Public assistance. If this person is presently receiving any form of public assistance.

The predecessors of section 4500-A were enacted to give the municipality a cause of action for recovery of assistance furnished to an indigent person and to create an implied promise on the part of the recipient to make that reimbursement. See City of Auburn v. Inhabitants of Town of Farmington, 133 Me. 213, 175 A. 475 (1934); Inhabitants of Kennebunkport v. Smith, 22 Me. 445 (1843). In 1977, as part of a general modernization of the municipal general assistance law, the second sentence was added to section 4500-A, limiting the scope of the power to recover through a civil action. P.L. 1977, ch. 417, § 11. ⁷ Although both sentences of section 4500-A plainly refer to "a civil action," Oliver argues that the statute applied not only to a court action by the State or municipality, but to any procedure for recovery of general assistance. Since, as an SSI recipient, she is "presently receiving any form of public assistance," she argues that the City and the State are prohibited from implementing the reimbursement agreements.

We conclude that section 4500-A applies only to civil suits. ⁸ It does not prohibit the contractual arrangement by which the recipient of general assistance agrees to have the municipality reimbursed if she subsequently receives duplicate assistance through the SSI program.

Oliver also contends that even if the reimbursement program is not in violation of section 4500-A, the program is invalid because the Department of Human Services did not have proper authorization from the Legislature. This contention is without merit. The Department...