Oliver v. Powell

• Decision Date: 04 September 2002
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 01-411-AM.,CIV.A. 01-411-AM.
• Citation: 250 F.Supp.2d 593
• Parties: Dan OLIVER, Plaintiff, v. H. POWELL, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

250 F.Supp.2d 593

Dan OLIVER, Plaintiff, v. H. POWELL, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV.A. 01-411-AM.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division.

September 4, 2002.

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Dan L. Oliver, Waverly, VA, pro se.

Pamela Anne Sargent, Office of Atty. Gen, Richmond, VA, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HILTON, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the Court on cross Motions for Summary Judgment. On December 28, 2001, the Court received responsive materials from the plaintiff. Thus, this matter is ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment must granted, and plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied.

I.

Plaintiff was incarcerated at Southampton Correctional Center from December 28, 1999 through October 6, 2000. This action presents a laundry list of claims alleged during his stay there. Plaintiff raises the following claims in his complaint:

1. Defendants filed false disciplinary charges against him in retaliation for lawsuits filed against prison officials;

2. Defendants held plaintiff in his cell past his allotted law library time;

3. Defendants returned plaintiffs personal mail without notice to him, nor an explanation to the sender of the reason for the return;

4. Defendants called plaintiff out of school and harassed him about his grievances; 5. Defendants issued passes in conflict with his school schedule;

6. Defendants woke plaintiff at 11:30 p.m. to deliver his mail;

7. Defendants limited plaintiff to one grievance per week for 135 days because he filed them against prison officials;

8. Defendants refused to investigate an assault on plaintiff committed by an inmate and an officer;

9. Defendants assaulted plaintiff by poking him in the back just because he did not hear them;

10. Defendants opened plaintiffs legal mail outside his presence on two occasions;

11. Defendants refused to send plaintiffs letters to the governor and others;

12. Defendants deprived plaintiff of sleep while housed in the segregation unit by making noise;

13. Defendants transferred plaintiff to a higher classification level facility based on false disciplinary charges;

14. Defendants placed plaintiff in a segregation cell with roaches, leaky toilets, peeling paint, and writing on the walls;

15. DOP 851, VDOC's policy regarding the processing of general correspondence, is unconstitutional, depriving plaintiff of his First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights;

16. DOP 861.6-5, a VDOC regulation authorizing fines for disciplinary charges filed, is unconstitutional, depriving plaintiff of his First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights;

II.

The principles governing disposition of summary judgment motions are well-established. On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate that "there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). The facts themselves, and the inferences to be drawn from those facts, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 364 (4th Cir. 1985). Summary judgment is appropriate when a party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The opposing party must do more than "simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Moreover, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Only factual disputes that "might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude ... summary judgment." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. And finally, where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, as here, "Rule 56(e) requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, All U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

III.

As a preliminary matter, defendants Johnson, Harrison, and Gilmore must be dismissed from the outset. To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must affirmatively show that the "official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiffs rights." Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir.1985) (citations and quotations omitted). Accord Garraghty v. Virginia, 52 F.3d 1274, 1280 (4th Cir.1995); Wheeler v. Gilmore, 998 F.Supp. 666, 668 n. 5 (E.D.Va.1998). Moreover, plaintiff may not avail himself of the doctrine of respondeat superior, as this doctrine is inapplicable to § 1983 claims. Wright, 766 F.2d at 850. Thus, each named defendant must have had personal knowledge of and involvement in the alleged violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights for the action to proceed against them. In the instant complaint, plaintiff fails to include defendants Johnson and Harrison in any of the allegations. Moreover, defendant Gilmore is mentioned peripherally. Thus, it is clear that plaintiff included these defendants in an attempt to implicate them under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

It is a well-established principle that respondeat superior is not a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Phrased differently, § 1983 does not permit a state official to be held liable solely because one of his or her employees committed a tort. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

The doctrine of supervisory liability, however, renders supervisors liable under § 1983 for constitutional torts committed by employees in furtherance of official policies, including regulations, ordinances, decisions, and informal customs. See id. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018. The Fourth Circuit has held that supervisors may also be held liable for indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct. See Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir.1984); Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 935-36 (4th Cir.1983) (holding that municipalities may be liable for "omissions," which include indifference or tacit authorization).

In making a claim of supervisory liability in the prison context, a plaintiff has the burden of showing that "prisoners face a pervasive and unreasonable risk of harm from some specified source [and that] the supervisor's corrective inaction amounts to deliberate indifference or `tacit authorization...'." Slakan, 737 F.2d at 373 (quoting Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096, 1101 (4th Cir.1980)). Moreover, a plaintiff "cannot satisfy this burden of proof by pointing to a single incident or isolated incidents ...." Id. (emphasis added). Instead, supervisory liability may only be imposed where "there is a history of widespread abuse." Wellington, 111 F.2d at 936. Therefore, a plaintiff who is able to prove deliberate indifference, tacit authorization, or widespread and pervasive abuses may be able to establish supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. No such showing has been made in the instant action. Therefore, defendants Johnson, Harrison, and Gilmore must be dismissed.

Further, plaintiff names "all of Southampton Correctional Center" as a defendant in this action. Correctional centers and jails are immune under § 1983 and are not considered proper defendants. See McCoy v. Chesapeake Corr. Ctr., 788 F.Supp. 890 (E.D.Va.1992). Therefore, insofar as plaintiff names Southampton Correctional Center as a defendant, it must be dismissed.

IV.

In their motion for summary judgment, defendants raise the defense of qualified immunity. "To avoid excessive disruption of government, a qualified immunity is recognized to protect government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damage suits insofar as the official's conduct does not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Suarez Corp. Indus, v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 685 (4th Cir.2000) (internal quotations omitted). The Supreme Court of the United States has adopted a two-prong test for evaluating claims of qualified immunity. "The threshold inquiry a court must undertake in a qualified immunity analysis is whether plaintiffs allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation." Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 2513, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). "[I]f so, [the court must] then proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation." Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999). Moreover, with regard to the latter inquiry, it must be determined whether a reasonable state official could have understood that the conduct at issue violated the clearly established right. See, e.g., Henderson v. Simms, 223 F.3d 267, 273 (4th Cir.2000).

Thus, analyzing the application of qualified immunity requires that the Court first review the merits of plaintiffs constitutional claims. In the instant case, plaintiff has not alleged a deprivation of an actual constitutional right. "If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. As a result, the Court need not proceed beyond the initial inquiry.

Claim 1

Plaintiff sets forth many instances in which he claims that defendants filed false disciplinary charges in retaliation...