Oliver v. South Carolina Dept. of Highways and Public Transp.

Decision Date02 June 1992
Docket NumberNo. 23726,23726
Citation309 S.C. 313,422 S.E.2d 128
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesJoey M. OLIVER, as Guardian Ad Litem for Bradford Michael Oliver, a Minor Over the Age of Fourteen Years, Respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS AND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION, Appellant. . Heard

Charles E. Carpenter, Jr. and Deborah L. Harrison, both of Richardson, Plowden, Grier & Howser, Columbia, and Joseph P. McLean, of Clarke, Johnson & Peterson, Florence, for appellant.

Kevin M. Barth and R. Bryan Harwell, both of Harwell, Ballenger & DeBerry, Florence, for respondent.

TOAL, Justice:

This appeal arises out of Oliver's action against the South Carolina Department of Highways and Public Transportation ("Highway Department") for negligence. The issues presented on appeal are whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of proximate cause and whether the trial court erred in taxing costs against the Highway Department. We affirm on the issue of proximate cause and reverse and remand the taxing of costs.

FACTS

On June 1, 1989, Bradford Michael Oliver ("Oliver") was traveling east on a Kawasaki motorcycle in the outside lane of Highway 76/501, a four-lane road. A truck was also traveling east on Highway 76/501 but in the inside lane. When the truck abruptly changed lanes in front of Oliver, his motorcycle collided with the right front fender of the truck. The impact caused Oliver, still positioned on the motorcycle, to leave the roadway, cross the sidewalk, and strike a Lincoln Town Car parked in Tucker's Used Cars ("Tucker's") lot. The Lincoln was parked facing the roadway with its front bumper either at or extending over the edge of the sidewalk. The Highway Department concedes the Lincoln was at least partially obstructing the right-of-way which extends one foot from the inside edge of the sidewalk. There was testimony that the used cars had been positioned over the right-of-way for many years. Three previous accidents occurred at this site when motorists collided with the used cars.

When the front tire of Oliver's motorcycle hit the extreme left end of the Lincoln's front bumper, Oliver's helmet struck the corner of the bumper five or six inches behind the front of the car. This impact brought Oliver's body to a sudden stop. According to the medical testimony, Oliver suffered a "deceleration type" of injury to his spinal cord which occurred at the moment of impact when his body came to a sudden stop. This injury resulted in Oliver's total and permanent paraplegia. An accident reconstructionist opined that if the Lincoln had been placed further back onto the lot, out of the right-of-way, Oliver would have collided with the front of the car at a more shallow angle so that he would have been deflected back parallel to the road; and, therefore, he would not have experienced the sudden deceleration on impact. Oliver brought this action alleging the Highway Department was negligent for failing to keep the right-of-way clear. 1 The jury awarded Oliver damages in the amount of $3,250,000.00. The trial judge reduced this award to the $250,000.00, pursuant to the statutory cap provided in the South Carolina Tort Claims Act for tort actions against the State. S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-120 (Supp.1991). On Oliver's post trial motion, the trial judge awarded Oliver $19,944.95 in costs which included expert witness fees, trial exhibits expenses and the expense of copying medical records.

LAW/ANALYSIS
Proximate Cause

Proximate cause requires proof of both causation in fact, and legal cause. "Causation in fact is proved by establishing the injury would not have occurred 'but for' the defendant's negligence." Whitlaw v. Kroger Co., 306 S.C. 51, 410 S.E.2d 251, 253 (1991) (quoting Bramlette v. Charter-Medical-Columbia, 302 S.C. 68, 74, 393 S.E.2d 914, 916 (1990)). The Highway Department contends that even if the right-of-way had been unobstructed, Oliver would have collided with one of the cars on the lot. Thus, the Highway Department claims that the positioning of the car was not the cause in fact of Oliver's injuries. According to the accident reconstructionist's testimony, however, had the Lincoln been parked behind the right-of-way line, Oliver's motorcycle would have hit the front of the bumper which would have caused a glancing type collision. Thus, Oliver would not have experienced the "deceleration type" injury to his spinal cord which resulted in his paraplegia.

"Legal cause is proved by establishing foreseeability." Id. "The standard by which foreseeability is determined is that of looking to the 'natural and probable consequences' of the complained of act." Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 462, 242 S.E.2d 671, 675 (1978). The Highway Department maintains its negligence was too remote to constitute the legal cause of Oliver's injuries and that the sole proximate cause of his injuries was the negligence of the truck driver. In Tobias v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 190 S.C. 181, 2 S.E.2d 686 (1939), the defendant light company's failure to maintain protective covers on the guy wires of a telephone pole was upheld as a proximate cause of injuries sustained by the plaintiff pedestrian when he was thrown into a guy wire after having been hit by a negligent motorist. In pertinent part, we held that:

[W]hile the general rule is that, if, subsequently to an original wrongful or negligent act, a new cause has intervened, of itself sufficient to stand as the cause of the injury, the former must be considered as too remote, still, if the character of the intervening act claimed to break the connection between the original wrongful act and the subsequent injury was such that its probable or natural consequences could reasonably have been anticipated, apprehended, or foreseen by the original wrongdoer, the causal connection is not broken and the original wrongdoer is responsible for all the consequences resulting from the intervening act.

Id. at 187, 2 S.E.2d at 687-88. Further, it is not necessary for the Highway Department to have been able to foresee the particular event which occurred.

"[I]t is enough that it should have contemplated the probable happening of some accident of this kind, involving bodily injury to others which ought to have been guarded against; and the doer of the act cannot shelter himself behind the defense that the actual consequence was one that rarely follows from that particular act. He may be held liable for anything which, after the injury is complete, appears to have been a natural and probable consequence of his act or omission."

Id. at 187, 2 S.E.2d at 688. Furthermore, legal cause is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. Only when the evidence is susceptible to only one inference does it become a matter of law for the court. Matthews v. Porter, 239 S.C. 620, 124 S.E.2d 321 (1962).

The Highway Department argues the only foreseeable injury due to obstructed sidewalk was to pedestrians using the sidewalk. The Highway Department's own witness, however, acknowledged obstructions of the right-of-way posed a danger to users of the highway. Finally, there had been three prior accidents involving cars parked on the lot and motorists using the highway. Thus, we find there was sufficient evidence that an accident of this kind was foreseeable. Accordingly, we affirm the jury's finding as to proximate cause.

Taxing of Costs

The Highway Department argues the trial court erred in awarding costs to Oliver by including expert witness fees and expenses for trial exhibits (photographs and sketches). We agree and reverse and remand for reconsideration of costs consistent with this opinion.

"Costs and expenses of actions and proceedings are allowed to...

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