Oliver v. Spartanburg Reg'l Healthcare Sys. Inc.
| Decision Date | 08 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 7:15-4759-MGL-KFM |
| Parties | Katherine Oliver, Plaintiff, v. Spartanburg Regional Healthcare System Inc. and Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation, doing business as Wabtec Corporation, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
This matter is before the court on motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and to stay by defendant Spartanburg Regional Healthcare System, Inc. ("SHRS") (docs. 37, 38). Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(A), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g) (D.S.C.), all pretrial matters in employment discrimination cases are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration.
The plaintiff filed her original complaint on November 30, 2015, alleging that defendant SRHS was liable under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1991 ("ADA") because it was an "agent" of her employer, defendant Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation ("Wabtec"). On January 11, 2016, defendant SRHS moved to dismiss the complaint arguing that it cannot be held liable under Title I as an agent of a plaintiff's employer (doc. 6). On January 19, 2016, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding a theory under Title I of the ADA that not only was the defendant SRHS an agent of Wabtec, but that it is also liable under Title I because it was in fact the plaintiff's employer. The plaintiff's amended complaint also added that the defendant SRHS was liable under Title II of the ADA to the extent it acted as the plaintiff's employer (doc. 9). On February 2, 2016, the defendant SRHS moved to dismiss the amended complaint (doc. 15).
On February 28, 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion to amend her first amended complaint with the consent of defendant SRHS (doc. 21). The undersigned granted that motion on March 8, 2016 (doc. 26), and also ruled that the two pending motions to dismiss (docs. 6, 15) were rendered moot by the filing of the second amended complaint, which was filed by the plaintiff that same day (doc. 28). Defendant SRHS filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint on April 1, 2016, and a motion to stay on April 5, 2016 (docs. 37, 38). The plaintiff filed responses in opposition to the motions on April 18, 2016 (docs. 39, 40), and defendant SRHS filed a reply on April 28, 2016 (doc. 43). Accordingly, the motions to dismiss the second amended complaint and to stay (docs. 37, 38) are now ripe for the court's consideration.
The plaintiff alleges as follows in her second amended complaint (doc. 28): Defendant Wabtec purportedly made a conditional offer of employment to the plaintiff of a position as a computer numerically controlled ("CNC") operator (id. ¶¶ 7-8). As part of its pre-employment process, Wabtec sends prospective employees to SRHS for pre-employment physicals (id. ¶ 4). During its examination of the plaintiff, SRHS learned the plaintiff had two medical conditions, scoliosis and diabetes (id. ¶ 11). Based solely on these disclosures, and without fully evaluating the plaintiff, SRHS imposed disqualifying "restrictions" on the plaintiff that were not reflective of her ability to perform the essential functions of the job offered to her (id. ¶ 12). The plaintiff attempted to provide information to establish that the conditions posed no hurdle to her performing her job functions, but Wabtec refused to consider the information and rescinded its offer of employment (id. ¶¶ 13-14).
The plaintiff further alleges that because Wabtec would consider only information provided by SRHS, it effectively ceded to SRHS all control over who would be employed in such situations, and SRHS exercised full control over this function (id. ¶ 15). SRHS either followed improper direction from Wabtec to screen out persons with disabilities, or SRHS knew or should have known that any criteria provided by Wabtec was not bona fide, did not accurately reflect job content, and did not account for the defendants' obligations to consider reasonable accommodations to the extent they are necessary (id. ¶ 19). The plaintiff alleges that the possibility that SRHS was acting on improper direction from Wabtec to screen out persons with certain disabilities is supported by the fact that the same personnel at SRHS later screened the plaintiff for the same position with a different employer and imposed no restrictions (id. ¶ 20).
The plaintiff alleges that defendant SRHS is both an agent of Wabtec (id. ¶ 4) and acted as the plaintiff's employer in its own right (id. ¶ 27). The plaintiff contends that defendants SRHS and Wabtec "have improperly used the pre-employment medical exam regimen of the ADA to screen out individuals with medical conditions, rather than using it as method to determine whether individuals can perform essential functions with or without reasonable accommodations"; "have maintained one or more policies and practices that violate the ADA and has discriminated against Plaintiff because of her disability and/or Defendant's perception of Plaintiff's conditions and/or Plaintiff's record of impairments, namely her diabetes and scoliosis"; and discriminated against her "on the basis of her disabilities and refused to consider or provide any reasonable accommodation that Defendants could reasonably believe to be necessary to permit Plaintiff to perform the essential functions of the position she was offered" (id. ¶¶ 23, 25-26). The plaintiff contends that SRHS's actions violate both Titles I and II of the ADA (id. ¶ 27) .
The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of a complaint." Williams v. Preiss-Wal Pat III, LLC, 17 F. Supp. 3d 528, 531 (D.S.C. 2014) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). "[T]he facts alleged 'must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level' and must provide 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Robinson v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 551 F.3d 218, 222 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 569 (2007)). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
While a complaint "does not need [to allege] detailed factual allegations," pleadings that contain mere "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). Stated differently, "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show [n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.' " Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). When determining a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must take all well-pled material allegations of the complaint as admitted and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. De Sole v. U.S., 947 F.2d 1169, 1171 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969)).
Defendant SRHS first argues that it is not subject to Title I of the ADA as the plaintiff's employer or as an agent of her employer, defendant Wabtec (doc. 37-1 at 5-10). Title I of the ADA prohibits a "covered entity" from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The ADA defines a "covered entity" as "an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee." Id. § 12111(2). Further, under the ADA, "[t]he term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce . . . and any agent of such person . . . ." Id. § 12111(5)(A). The language is virtually identical to the definition of "employer" in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. Id. § 2000e(b). "There is no significant difference between the definition of the term 'employer' in the two statutes." Carparts Distribution Ctr. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n, 37 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1994). The ADA prohibits an employer from requiring an applicant to undergo a "pre-employment" medical examination, unless it is focused on "the ability of the applicant to perform job-related functions." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(a) ( ).
SRHS argues that this District has "directly rejected" the plaintiff's theory that it may be held liable as Wabtec's agent under the ADA (doc. 37-1 at 6-9). SRHS further argues that it cannot be the plaintiff's employer under Title I's definition of "employer" (doc. 37-1 at 9-10). Specifically, SRHS relies on Williams v. Grimes Aerospace Co., 988 F. Supp. 925 (D.S.C. 1997). In Williams, the Honorable Henry M. Herlong, Jr., (now) Senior United States District Judge, considered a plaintiff's attempt to hold both the staffing company who placed her and the company where she was placed liable as each other's agents underTitle VII. Id. at 936. Judge Herlong noted that "Title VII holds agents of employers liable as employers themselves for discrimination in the workplace." Id. at 936 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b)). Judge Herlong stated, "This imposition of liability on an employer's agent is 'an...
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