Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co.
| Decision Date | 22 December 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-621.,98-621. |
| Citation | 993 P.2d 11,1999 MT 328,297 Mont. 336 |
| Parties | Byron OLIVER and Camille Oliver, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. STIMSON LUMBER COMPANY, and Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation, an Oregon corporation, Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Lon J. Dale (argued), Milodragovich, Dale, Steinbrenner & Binney; Missoula, Montana, For Appellants.
L.D. Nybo (argued), Conklin, Nybo, Leveque & Lanning; Great Falls, Montana, Jon P. Stride (argued), Tonkon, Torp, Galen, Marmaduke & Booth; Portland, Oregon, William J. Mattix (argued), Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich; Billings, Montana, For Respondents.
¶ 1 Byron and Camille Oliver (Olivers) brought an action against Stimson Lumber Company (Stimson) and Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation (Liberty Northwest) for negligent and intentional spoliation of evidence, along with a request to void subrogation rights, in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and following two separate hearings, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
¶ 2 We restate the issues raised on appeal as follows:
¶ 3 1. Did the District Court err when it concluded that the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act barred the Olivers from bringing a claim for spoliation of evidence against Mr. Oliver's employer?
¶ 4 2. Should Montana adopt the torts of negligent and intentional spoliation of evidence as independent causes of action?
¶ 5 3. Did the District Court err in awarding summary judgment in favor of Liberty Northwest Corporation?
¶ 6 On appeal, the Olivers have not raised the issue of whether Stimson's subrogation rights should be impacted by its conduct and therefore, we will not address the issue in this appeal.
¶ 7 Byron Oliver was employed by Champion International Corporation (Champion) at its Bonner mill from 1974 until the time of its sale to Stimson Lumber Company in November 1993. Following the sale by Champion, Byron continued his employment at the Bonner mill as an employee of Stimson.
¶ 8 On May 9, 1994, Byron Oliver suffered a serious injury as the result of an industrial accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with Stimson. As such, Mr. Oliver's injury fell within the parameters of the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, entitling him to benefits.
¶ 9 The Olivers immediately hired an attorney to represent their interests with regard to the work-related injuries sustained by Byron. Shortly thereafter, the Olivers' counsel began investigating the possibility of a third-party action associated with the piece of equipment involved in Mr. Oliver's injury. As part of the investigation, the Olivers' counsel made a request for an inspection of the equipment involved in the injury. Stimson turned to its workers' compensation insurance carrier, Liberty Northwest, for advice regarding this request. A claims adjuster for Liberty Northwest contacted a local attorney, Larry Jones, who had previously represented Liberty Northwest and its insureds, and advised him of the request for an inspection. The claims adjuster requested Jones to be present at the inspection because Stimson personnel wanted Jones to explain the reason for the involvement of an attorney on behalf of the Olivers given that Mr.Oliver's injury was an accepted liability claim under the Workers' Compensation Act.
¶ 10 An inspection of the equipment took place on May 18, 1994. Counsel for the Olivers, the attorney for Liberty Northwest and Stimson, the claims adjuster from Liberty Northwest, a loss prevention employee from Liberty Northwest, and various Stimson employees were present during the inspection. In addition, nearly everyone who participated in the inspection understood that the purpose of this inspection was so that counsel for the Olivers could decide whether there was any basis for a third-party lawsuit. Photographs and a videotape of the equipment and Mr.Oliver's work area were taken by the Olivers' counsel during this inspection.
¶ 11 After the inspection, on May 20, 1994, counsel for the Olivers wrote a letter to Larry Jones, the attorney for Liberty Northwest and Stimson, requesting information concerning the equipment's components, copies of design drawings, wiring diagrams, a description of the assembly of the equipment and the as-built plans for the equipment. On May 23, 1994, Jones sent a letter to the claims adjuster at Liberty Northwest enclosing the request from counsel for the Olivers. In this letter, Jones directed the claims adjuster to forward the request from the Olivers' counsel to the human resource manager at Stimson's Bonner mill so that they could then discuss how much information Stimson wanted to provide voluntarily. In addition, Jones explained in this letter the nature of the third-party claims counsel for the Olivers was interested in pursuing on behalf of the Olivers.
¶ 12 On May 25, 1994, Jones responded to the request by the Olivers' counsel by stating that he had forwarded it to the claims adjuster for transmittal to Stimson personnel for review. In the meantime, counsel for the Olivers sent a letter to Jones on May 24, 1994, asking for a commitment from Stimson that the equipment involved in the injury remain intact to allow an expert to examine it. Counsel for the Olivers also reiterated their request for a copy of the as-built plans for the equipment.
¶ 13 On June 13, 1994, Jones forwarded the May 24, 1994, letter from the Olivers' counsel to the claims adjuster at Liberty Northwest, recommending that the claims adjuster handle this request directly by talking with the human resource manager at Stimson's Bonner mill. On that same date, Jones sent a letter to the Olivers' counsel advising that he had sent the May 24, 1994, letter to Liberty Northwest for transmittal to Stimson for consideration.
¶ 14 On June 22, 1994, the human resource manager for Stimson initiated a conference call involving Jones and the director of human resources at Stimson's corporate office in Portland. During this conference call, the requests contained in the letters from the Olivers' counsel dated May 20 and 24, 1994, were discussed to determine how much information Stimson wanted to supply to the Olivers voluntarily.
¶ 15 On June 24, 1994, Jones responded to the requests for information contained in the May 20 and 24, 1994, letters from the Olivers' counsel. This letter did not specifically address the Olivers' request for preservation of the equipment and its components, contained in the May 24, 1994, letter from the Olivers' counsel. However, this letter stated that Stimson management had decided that it was unable to accommodate their request at this time due to the amount of time Stimson personnel would be required to spend away from their employment duties to provide the information. The Olivers' counsel responded by offering to pick up the information, have it copied and returned to Stimson and to pay for any reasonable employee costs involved. On July 13,1994, Jones forwarded this offer on to Liberty Northwest and Stimson for consideration.
¶ 16 Frustrated by the lack of response from Stimson regarding the information requested, the Olivers' counsel wrote to Jones on October 24, 1994, advising that if the previously requested information was not received within ten days, they would initiate a third-party action against Stimson and proceed to depose Stimson personnel and subpoena production of the requested information. On October 26, 1994, Jones forwarded this letter directly to the human resource manager at Stimson's Bonner mill, requesting that the manager contact him to discuss how to proceed.
¶ 17 On December 8, 1994, counsel for the Olivers filed a petition pursuant to Rule 27, M.R.Civ.P., to obtain prelitigation discovery with respect to the Olivers' potential third-party claims. Upon deposing Stimson personnel in March 1995 pursuant to a court order, counsel for the Olivers learned that the equipment involved in Mr. Oliver's injury had been completely rewired and the programmable logic controller as well as other components had been replaced and discarded over Labor Day weekend in September 1994.
¶ 18 As a result of this discovery, the Olivers filed a complaint against Stimson on July 17, 1996, for intentional and negligent spoliation of evidence and to void any subrogation rights Stimson might have. The Olivers later amended their complaint to include Liberty Northwest as a Defendant. After a period of discovery, the parties moved for summary judgment.
¶ 19 Following two separate hearings on the motions, the District Court entered an opinion and order granting the Defendants' motions for summary judgment on all claims. In its opinion, the District Court determined that the Defendants' conduct, under any interpretation, simply could not support a claim for intentional spoliation of evidence. The court further concluded that it need not reach the question of whether to recognize the tort of negligent spoliation since the Olivers were unable to develop a factual basis to establish any duty on the part of the Defendants to preserve the equipment.
¶ 20 The Olivers appeal from the District Court's decision.
¶ 21 Our standard of review in appeals from summary judgment rulings is de novo. See Motarie v. Northern Mont. Joint Refuse Disposal Dist. (1995), 274 Mont. 239, 242, 907 P.2d 154, 156
(citing Mead v. M.S.B., Inc. (1994), 264 Mont. 465, 470, 872 P.2d 782, 785). When we review a district court's grant of summary judgment, we apply the same evaluation as the district court based on Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P. See Bruner v. Yellowstone County (1995), 272 Mont. 261, 264, 900 P.2d 901, 903. In ...
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