Oliveria v. City of Jersey Vill.

• Docket Number: 4:21-CV-03564
• Decision Date: 02 November 2023
• Parties: KYLE OLIVERIA, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF JERSEY VILLAGE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

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KYLE OLIVERIA, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF JERSEY VILLAGE, Defendant.

No. 4:21-CV-03564

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division

November 2, 2023

MEMORANDUM & OPINION ^[1]

DENA HANOVICE PALERMO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pending before the Court is Defendant City of Jersey Village's Third Motion to Dismiss, seeking dismissal of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 42.^[2] In this § 1983 action,^[3] Plaintiff Kyle Oliveria claims that Jersey Village violated his Fourth Amendment constitutional right by failing to train its police force, including the police officers who responded to a domestic violence call at Plaintiff's girlfriend's apartment and arrested him without probable cause. Pl.'s Second Am. Compl., ECF No 41 at ¶¶ 44-71.

The Court has thoroughly considered Plaintiff's second amended complaint, the briefing, and the applicable law. Because the second amended complaint failed to plausibly allege that Jersey Village's purported failure to train or supervise constituted deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's constitutional rights or sufficiently establish a ratification theory of liability dismissal of Plaintiff's remaining claims is warranted. Moreover, because Plaintiff's latest complaint is his third attempt to adequately state his claims,^[4] the Court will not permit further amendment and dismisses with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND.

On October 29, 2019, Jersey Village Police Officers Arceneaux and Hall responded to a disturbance call at an apartment located in Jersey Village, Harris County, Texas. ECF No. 41 ¶ 12. A resident of the apartment complex called the police and reported that a couple was arguing loudly and involved in a fight. Id. Officers knocked on the apartment door. The resident of the apartment, Plaintiff's girlfriend, answered the door. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff and his girlfriend did not have any apparent injuries, nor did they complain of any. Id. ¶ 14.

Another member of the Jersey Village Police Department, Corporal Boughter, arrived on the scene. Id. ¶ 19. In the written report Boughter filed after the incident, he reported that he knocked loudly on the apartment door and threatened to get a warrant unless they opened the door.^[5] Id. Plaintiff also alleges that the report contained various false statements. Id.^[6]

At some point during the interaction, either some or all the officers interviewed Plaintiff's girlfriend outside of his presence. Id. ¶ 20. She advised that nothing occurred between them that required law enforcement involvement and provided a written statement to that effect. Id. The Officers were also made aware that Plaintiff and his girlfriend were both peace officers. Id. ¶ 14.

Plaintiff also alleges that the Officers were informed that the district attorney's office would not approve a state charge against him. Id. ¶ 23. Thereafter, the Officers “issue[d] a citation [to Plaintiff] for a municipal offense.” Id. Furthermore, “pursuant to their agreement and policy of [Jersey Village],” the Officers placed Plaintiff in handcuffs and took him to jail. Id. ¶ 24. The second amended complaint states that “no criminal charges were maintained or prosecuted.” Id. ¶ 43. Ultimately, all charges against Oliveria were dismissed. Id. ¶ 33.

The second amended complaint alleges that Jersey Village^[7] violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right by lacking a policy “or enforcement of any policy regarding unlawful seizures” and lacking “training in handling of domestic investigations.” Id. at ¶¶ 39-71. Plaintiff asserts that “[a]t the time of the seizure and use of excessive and improper threats and seizure, Plaintiff had not committed any offense in the presence of Defendant'[s] officers and no reasonable grounds existed for a reasonable officer to believe that Plaintiff had committed any offense. Defendant'[s] officers did not have a warrant to enter into a private residence wherein as an invitee he had a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. ¶ 61.

Plaintiff concludes that “the lack of training and supervision allowed [Jersey Village's] officers to ‘target' the plaintiff a Hispanic male peace officer knowing or having reason to know of the seriousness of the impact especially due to his employment as a county law enforcement officer.... Had the officers been properly trained and or supervised the matter would have been most likely resolved without the need for arresting the male without any evidence of wrongdoing other than unreliable witnesses that could have desired to cause harm.” Id. ¶ 70.

II. THE MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD.

Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). “Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) are viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted.” Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up); Duke Energy Int'l v. Napoli, 748 F.Supp.2d 656, 664-65 (S.D. Tex. 2010).

“Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The complaint must include more than mere “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (cleaned up). A complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter .. to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” King v. Baylor Univ., 46 F.4th 344, 355-56 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “[A] complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but it must provide the plaintiff's grounds for entitlement to relief- including factual allegations that when assumed to be true raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Ruiz v. Brennan, 851 F.3d 464, 468 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Taylor v. City of Shreveport, 798 F.3d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 2015)) (cleaned up).

The ultimate question “is whether the complaint states a valid claim when all well-pleaded facts are assumed true and are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Ironshore Eur. DAC v. Schiff Hardin, L.L.P., 912 F.3d 759, 763 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010)) (cleaned up).

III. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR MUNICIPAL LIABILITY.

Jersey Village argues that Plaintiff's claims asserting municipal liability (“Monell claims”) should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 42. Specifically, Jersey Village contends that Plaintiff failed to make plausible allegations that show: (1) “that [Jersey Village's] final policymaker (here alleged to be the City Manager) promulgated any official policy, or was deliberately indifferent to any unofficial custom, of false arrests or illegal entries by Jersey Village police;” (2) “any widespread longstanding custom of false arrests or illegal entries by Jersey Village police;” (3) “any specific training deficiency that was the moving force of the alleged violations in this single-incident case;” or (4) that the 911 caller's eyewitness account of the Plaintiff's altercation with his girlfriend did not adequately established “probable cause to arrest [Plaintiff] for assault by contact . . . or disorderly conduct.” ECF No. 42 at 10.

A. Plaintiff's Response is Insufficient.

Plaintiff's response is inadequate, consisting only of quoted caselaw without any analysis or argument. See ECF No. 47. “At the motion to dismiss stage, plaintiffs must defend their claims against the movant's arguments in order to preserve those claims.” Douglas v. Dorchester Properties Ltd., No. 3:22-CV-100-K-BN, 2023 WL 5156337, at *4 (N.D. Tex. May 17, 2023), report and recommendation adopted Douglas v. Dorchester Properties Ltd., No. 3:22-CV-100-K-BN, 2023 WL 5155287 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2023) (citing Black v. N. Panola Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 584, 588 n.1 (5th Cir. 2006) (although the plaintiff tried to establish a claim in her complaint, she abandoned that claim because she did not defend it in her response to the defendant's motion to dismiss and thus “fail[ed] to pursue this claim beyond her complaint [which] constituted abandonment”)); see also Draper v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. as Tr. for Saxon Asset Sec. Tr. 2007-3, Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2007-3, No. 3:18-cv-2904-L, 2019 WL 13240973, at *7-8 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2019) (plaintiff who presented no arguments in defense of her claims in her response to the defendant's motion to dismiss abandoned her claims); Reese v. Wells Fargo U.S. Holdings, Inc., No. 3:19-cv-799-S-BK, 2020 WL 874807, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2020) (plaintiff who failed to address the arguments from the defendant's motion to dismiss in their response abandoned their claims), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 870227 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2020).

Accordingly, for this reason alone, the Court may grant Jersey Village's motion to dismiss and dismiss Plaintiff's claims. Nonetheless, Plaintiff's second amended complaint fails to sufficiently state a Monell claim against Jersey Village.

Assuming without deciding that officers lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff,^[8]the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege that Jersey Village's purported failure to train or supervise constituted deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right and Plaintiff fails to establish the extreme circumstances required to allege a ratification theory...