Ollig v. Eagles

• Citation: 347 Mich. 49,78 N.W.2d 553
• Decision Date: 01 October 1956
• Docket Number: No. 59,59
• Parties: Joseph OLLIG, Individually and as administrator of the estate of Selma Ollig, deceased, Plantiff and Appellant, v. Lester A. EAGLES, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

Page 553

78 N.W.2d 553

347 Mich. 49

Joseph OLLIG, Individually and as administrator of the estate of Selma Ollig, deceased, Plantiff and Appellant, v. Lester A. EAGLES, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 59.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Oct. 1, 1956.

LaBarge, Kramer, Hudnut & Cashen, Roseville, for plaintiff-appellant. James H. Hudnut, Roseville, of counsel.

Leo B. Lange, Detroit, for defendant-appellee. Meyer Weisenfeld, Detroit, of counsel.

Before the Entire Bench.

EDWARDS, Justice.

This suit is a chancery action brought by a man who built a house on land he mistakenly believed to belong to his wife, but which, on her death, proved to belong to another. The latter, knowing he had title, had silently watched and even assisted in the building.

The builder seeks title or compensation. The owner contends that the law allows no recovery for such a mistake. The trial judge below denied relief, saying, this is 'a strange case.'

With this observation we can agree. Such mistakes have, however, tortured judges from the dawn of legal history. A Roman jurist, faced perhaps with a similar problem, gave us this adage: 'For this by nature is equitable, that no one be made richer through another's loss.' ¹ Combinations of human cupidity and stupidity have frequently confronted the courts with cases where strict application of legal rules would unjustly enrich one at the expense of another. Such cases gave rise to the rules of equity which we here seek to apply.

Let us now turn to the facts in this case.

Joseph Ollig, individually and as administrator of the estate of Selma Ollig, his wife, who died on September 25, 1945, filed a bill of complaint praying that a certain quit-claim deed from his wife to defendant Lester A. Eagles, dated April 5, 1944, be set aside and that an accounting between himself individually and the estate of his deceased wife and defendant Lester A. Eagles be ordered. At the conclusion of the proofs and argument the trial judge dismissed the bill of complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had not made out a case, and it is from this decision that the current appeal is taken.

In 1939 Eagles began rooming and boarding with Mr. and Mrs. Ollig who then lived on Pelkey Avenue in Detroit. He paid them for room and board $11 per week. In 1943 Eagles located a piece of farm property on Schoenherr Road, and after he and Mr. Ollig looked it over the defendant Eagles bought it in his own name on land contract. It is undisputed that subsequently Eagles made all the payments on this land contract.

After Eagles bought the land in the fashion indicated above, Ollig began the construction of a house and various out buildings upon the land, and in the spring of 1944 the Olligs moved from Pelkey Avenue in Detroit to the Schoenherr Road property in Macomb County and set up housekeeping therein. Eagles likewise moved onto this property, but apparently lived separately from the Olligs in a house trailer.

Ollig, the only witness called for the plaintiff, testified that he paid for all the materials used in building the house and that Eagles only contributed in a minor way to the labor involved therein. Ollig further testified that at the time Eagles purchased the property there was an oral agreement between the parties that the payments Eagles made on the land contract would be in lieu of paying room and board. Ollig claimed that Eagles continued to board with them after moving onto Schoenherr Road although it may be inferred that he did not pay the Olligs anything after the move.

Ollig testified further than in April 1944 for the first time he learned that neither he nor his wife were named as purchasers in the land contract and that he ceased work until he could get some 'security'. He further testified that one day in April, while he was at work, Mrs. Ollig and Eagles went to see Mr. Leo B. Lange, Eagles' attorney, and there Eagles executed an assignment of the land contract to Mrs. Ollig. Ollig testified he was told he was not named in that assignment because he was not present. Ollig implied in all his testimony that he understood this assignment as fulfillment of a prior oral agreement for title to be placed in him and his wife. He denied ever seeing or hearing of any quit-claim deed from Mrs. Ollig to Eagles until the beginning of the present suit.

Mr. and Mrs. Lange were the only witnesses called by the defendant Eagles. They testified that on April 4, 1944, Eagles and Mrs. Ollig came to see Mr. Lange. Mrs. Lange apparently was present at the conference. Eagles told Lange he wanted to make a will, that he was an orphan and that he wanted Mrs. Ollig, whom he called 'Mom', to have whatever he had. After some discussion, according to the Langes' testimony, a question about cost of court proceedings to probate the will was raised, and Lange advised Eagles that he could make out an assignment of his land contract to Mrs. Ollig and take a quit-claim deed back from her for his protection. In this event, Lange counseled, if Eagles died Mrs. Ollig would take his interest in the land contract, whereas if Mrs. Ollig died first he could record the quit-claim deed from her and render the assignment a nullity.

In pursuance of these discussions, the Langes testified, an assignment of Eagles' interest in the land contract was drawn, dated April 4, 1944, and signed by Eagles and witnessed by the Langes. A will was also drafted, as was a quit-claim deed pertaining to the same property from Mrs. Ollig back to Eagles. The will and quitclaim deed were apparently both signed on April 5, 1944, and both were witnessed by the Langes. Neither is included in the record on appeal, but at oral argument the quit-claim deed, which was in evidence in the court below, was presented by stipulation of counsel as an exhibit in the proceedings on appeal.

Defendant Eagles did not take the stand, but just before the defense closed its case Eagles' attorney offered a stipulation, which was accepted, that he defendant Eagles would not be called to the stand because he was practically deaf, but if he were to be called he would testify that he roomed and boarded with the Olligs on Pelkey Avenue, but that after they moved to the Schoenherr Road property he lived in a trailer and ate out. The stipulation further stated that if called Eagles would admit that the Olligs put materials into the property to the extent of $1,715.06. And further it was stipulated that defendant Eagles would testify that there was an oral understanding between the parties that Mrs. Ollig could live in the house as long as she lived, and her husband with her incidental thereto, but upon her death Ollig was to vacate.

Mrs. Ollig died on September 25, 1945. Shortly after her death Eagles recorded the quit-claim deed. Eagles continued to live in the trailer and Ollig in the house on the same piece of property for about a year and a half until they quarreled, whereupon each ordered the other off the property, and the ensuing dispute led to the filing of this lawsuit.

The trial judge found that the quit-claim deed which plaintiff sought to set aside was properly executed and delivered and that the written instruments, namely, the assignment of the land contract by Eagles to Mrs. Ollig, and the quit-claim deed from her back to him, themselves constituted the understanding between the parties and refuted any claim of oral contract. The trial judge further found that there was no proof of fraud in relation to the execution of these instruments.

With the trial judge's finding of fact and conclusions of law pertaining to this issue, this Court agrees, there being ample evidence in the record to sustain them. This issue represents basically an attempt to establish title to land by proof of an oral contract in direct conflict with a written instrument of conveyance.

It is fundamental that in the absence of fraud such an attempt must fail. C.L.1948, § 566.108, Stat.Ann. § 26.908.

At trial plaintiff sought a reference for an accounting which was denied by the trial judge. No showing of any very complicated accounts between these parties was made; and the trial judge was within his discretion in refusing such a reference, and in having the proofs taken before him.

The trial judge at the conclusion of proofs, however, likewise found that plaintiff had failed to sustain the burden of proof generally and ordered his bill of complaint dismissed--thereby resolving all issues raised in this litigation in favor of the defendant.

This Court believes the record justifies dismissal of the bill of complaint as to plaintiff in his capacity as administrator of his wife's estate. The trial judge found that her dealings with defendant were represented by the written instruments and that no proof of fraud in their execution had been produced; and the record justifies his holding. Further, it is obvious that Mrs. Ollig, individually, under the arrangement contemplated by the written instruments, had good consideration for whatever she put into the property in the expectation of acquiring the land and buildings in the event of defendant's death and that she acted with full knowledge of the facts.

This Court believes, however, that plaintiff's claim in his individual capacity stands upon another footing. This being a chancery case it is heard before the Supreme Court on the record de novo, and in this instance, aside from the general dismissal, without the benefit of any specific findings of fact from the trial judge. As we read this distinctly inadequate record it appears undisputed that plaintiff (with the assistance of his wife to an unascertained degree) built a house upon defendant's land. It appears undisputed that he did so in good faith and in reliance upon an assignment of a land contract to his wife and in complete ignorance of her unrecorded quit-claim deed back to the defendant. From this record it likewise appears that defendant, having full knowledge of his own legal...