Olmanson v. Weits
| Decision Date | 16 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | Appeal No. 2021AP438 |
| Citation | 2022 WI App 7,970 N.W.2d 593 (Table) |
| Parties | Eric D. OLMANSON and Andrea L. Olmanson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Brenda WEITS, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
¶1 In this small claims action, Andrea and Eric Olmanson appeal the circuit court's dismissal of their only claims against Brenda Weits, one for eviction and one for trespass.2 Regarding the eviction claim, the court granted Weits's motion to dismiss on the grounds that property-owner Olmanson and property-occupant Weits never had a landlord-tenant relationship and that such a relationship is a necessary precondition to an eviction action pursued under WIS. STAT. § 799.40. Following the agreed premise by both parties that Weits was never a tenant of Olmanson, and applying controlling case law, I conclude that the court correctly determined that Olmanson could not pursue the eviction action. The court did not explicitly address the trespass claim and I conclude that the court improperly dismissed this claim based on the state of the record at the time of dismissal. Accordingly, I affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶2 In February 2021, Olmanson filed a small claims complaint for eviction and trespass against Weits.3 In pertinent part the complaint alleged the following. Olmanson hired Weits in December 2020 as a live-in caregiver for Andrea Olmanson's ailing mother, who lived in a condominium unit that Olmanson owned. However, Weits quickly realized that she could not care for the ailing mother, and on January 13, 2021, Weits gave Olmanson notice to terminate her employment. Several days later, Olmanson moved her mother into an assisted living facility. Olmanson gave Weits permission to stay in the unit until January 27. Weits did not vacate the unit by that date, and on February 1, Olmanson commenced this action. Olmanson alleged that Weits had never been Olmanson's "Tenant, Lessor, or Renter," but nevertheless sought Weits's "eviction," as well as compensation for lost rental income and punitive damages. Olmanson further alleged that Weits was a "trespasser to real estate" and "upon chattels" consisting of utilities for the unit, and further requested punitive damages based on allegedly intentional and malicious conduct.
¶3 Weits moved to dismiss Olmanson's complaint, arguing that an eviction action cannot be brought when no landlord-tenant relationship exists between the parties. In an affidavit supporting her motion to dismiss, Weits agreed with Olmanson's allegation in the complaint that she was never Olmanson's tenant. Weits further averred that she had vacated the unit on February 5. Because of the lack of a landlord-tenant relationship, Weits argued, the court lacked "personal jurisdiction" over her in this action. Weits further argued that the purported lack of "personal jurisdiction" meant that Olmanson failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
¶4 Olmanson opposed Weits's motion and argued in part that, because the motion relied on matters outside the pleadings (namely, the averments in Weits's affidavit), the motion had been converted into a motion for summary judgment. Olmanson further moved for partial summary judgment on the trespass claim, arguing that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to Weits's liability for trespass, leaving only damages to be tried.
¶5 At a hearing tentatively scheduled for a small claims trial, the circuit court heard arguments regarding Weits's motion to dismiss. However, neither of the parties nor the court addressed Olmanson's claim for trespass. Instead, as to the motion to dismiss, the parties focused exclusively on Weits's argument that Olmanson could not sustain an eviction action. The circuit court concluded that, regardless whether Weits's motion was construed as one to dismiss or for summary judgment, the court did not discern a basis for Olmanson "to proceed under an eviction action." Without referring to the trespass claim, the court granted Weits's motion to dismiss "the action," saying that the complaint "just fails to state a claim for ... lack of personal jurisdiction."
¶6 On appeal, Olmanson makes what I understand to be essentially three arguments: (1) the circuit court erred in determining that it lacked "personal jurisdiction" over Weits in this action; (2) the court erred in determining that eviction actions may be pursued only when a landlord-tenant relationship exists between the parties; and (3) the court should have granted Olmanson's motion for partial summary judgment on the trespass claim. In discussion below, I explain why I conclude that: the court had personal jurisdiction over Weits in this case; Olmanson failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for eviction under WIS. STAT. § 799.40(1), given the shared assumption of the parties that there was never a landlord-tenant relationship; and the circuit court erred in dismissing the trespass claim without providing any indication in the record that the court had considered a basis for dismissing that claim. I also explain why I deny Olmanson's argument that she is entitled to partial summary judgment on the trespass claim. This leaves for the circuit court to address all remaining issues on the trespass claim following remand.
¶7 I review de novo both motions to dismiss and motions to dismiss that are converted into motions for summary judgment. See Converting/BiophileLab'ys, Inc. v. Ludlow Composites Corp. , 2006 WI App 187, ¶13, 296 Wis. 2d 273, 722 N.W.2d 633.4 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint, see Casteel v. McCaughtry , 176 Wis. 2d 571, 578, 500 N.W.2d 277 (1993), while a motion for summary judgment tests whether the pleadings and the supporting materials submitted by the parties show that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether one party is entitled to relief as a matter of law, see WIS. STAT. § 802.08(2) - (3). In addressing motions to dismiss, courts "accept all facts pleaded as true," "derive all reasonable inferences from those facts," and "construe those facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Preston v. Meriter Hosp., Inc. , 2005 WI 122, ¶13, 284 Wis. 2d 264, 700 N.W.2d 158. In a motion for summary judgment, the court "view[s] the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party," and draws "all reasonable inferences" in favor of the non-moving party. See Affordable Erecting, Inc. v. Neosho Trompler, Inc. , 2006 WI 67, ¶19, 291 Wis. 2d 259, 715 N.W.2d 620.5
¶8 To repeat, Weits argues that a landlord-tenant relationship must exist for a plaintiff to bring a WIS. STAT. § 799.40(1) eviction claim. More specifically, however, Weits frames the effect of there not being such a relationship in terms of personal jurisdiction: she takes the position that if the defendant in a purported eviction action is not a tenant, This argument lacks legal support. As best I understand Weits's argument, she confuses a lack of personal jurisdiction with a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Compare Rasmussen v. General Motors Corp. , 2011 WI 52, ¶15 n.19, 335 Wis. 2d 1, 803 N.W.2d 623 (), with Meyers v. Bayer AG , 2006 WI App 102, ¶7, 293 Wis. 2d 770, 718 N.W.2d 251 (). As discussed below, Weits is correct that a landlord-tenant relationship must exist for a plaintiff to bring an eviction claim, and therefore a complaint under § 799.40(1) alleging that no such relationship exists fails to state a claim under which relief can be granted, subject to an exception that does not apply here. See WIS. STAT. §§ 802.02(1)(a), 802.06(2)(a)6. However, the absence of an allegation of a landlord-tenant relationship in the complaint under § 799.40(1) has no bearing on whether the circuit court had personal jurisdiction over Weits.
¶9 WISCONSIN STAT. § 801.05 gives the court personal jurisdiction over a defendant who "[i]s a natural person present within this state when served; or [i]s a natural person domiciled within this state." Sec. 801.05(1)(a)-(b) ; see also WIS. STAT. § 801.04(2) (). Weits does not dispute that she was present in Wisconsin when she was served the summons or that she was domiciled within Wisconsin at commencement of this action.
¶10 As noted, Olmanson alleged in the complaint that Weits was never her tenant and Weits explicitly agreed with this allegation in her affidavit. Further, Olmanson and Weits take the shared position on appeal that Weits was never a tenant of Olmanson. I proceed on that shared premise of the parties. I express no view as to whether, as a matter of fact or a matter of law, Olmanson could have shown that Weits was a tenant of Olmanson.
¶11 Proceeding on the parties’ shared premise that Weits was never Olmanson's tenant, the issue is whether Olmanson may nevertheless bring a claim under WIS. STAT. § 799.40(1) to evict Weits. "Actions for eviction as defined in [§] 799.40 regardless of the amount of rent claimed therein" are exclusively governed by Chapter 799 (). WIS. STAT. § 799.01(1) - (1)(a). Section 799.40(1) () further states that "[a] civil action of...
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