Olsen v. Hoffmann
| Decision Date | 03 August 1928 |
| Docket Number | 26,779 |
| Citation | 221 N.W. 10,175 Minn. 287 |
| Parties | HERMAN OLSEN v. JOSEPH G. HOFFMANN |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Defendant appealed from an order of the district court for Brown county, Gislason, J. denying his motion for a new trial. Affirmed.
When burden is on holder of note to prove he holds it in due course.
1. Every holder of promissory notes is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due course; but when the title of any person who has negotiated them was defective (fraudulently procured) the burden is on the holder to prove that he or some person under whom he claims to have acquired the title is a holder in due course.
When unimpeached testimony of credible witness should be accepted as true.
2. It is the duty of the trier of fact to accept as true the positive, unimpeached testimony of a credible witness unless the same is inherently improbable or rendered so by the facts and circumstances disclosed upon the record. The mere fact that a witness is interested as a party to the action does not permit him to be discredited.
What constitutes notice of fraud in inception of note.
3. To constitute notice of fraud in the inception of a promissory note it must be made to appear that the person to whom it is negotiated must have had actual knowledge thereof or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the paper amounted to bad faith.
Subject to exceptions in special cases, purchaser of negotiable paper need not make inquiry as to maker.
4. The general rule is that the purchaser of negotiable paper need not make inquiry or investigation as to the maker; but this rule has its exceptions under special circumstances.
Memorandum after special indorsement was surplusage.
5. Following a special indorsement on the back transferring a six per cent promissory note were the words, "To draw seven per cent from 3-5-1920." Held, this memorandum was surplusage without legal significance as between the indorsee and the marker; and was not of such character as to put the indorsee upon inquiry.
Burden of proof which rests on transferee.
6. The transferee of negotiable paper need only to sustain the burden of proof which the law imposes upon him.
Sale of one's own securities does not make seller the agent of buyer.
7. Where one person authorizes another to buy securities and sends him the money therefor and such other person does not buy securities but keeps the money and sends his own securities which are accepted and retained, it is held that the relation of principal and agent is not involved in the investment.
When purchaser of commercial paper is regarded as bona fide holder.
8. Where one purchases commercial paper in good faith, in the usual course of business, before maturity, for value and without notice of any facts affecting the validity of the paper, he is entitled to the advantages which the commercial law confers upon a bona fide holder.
Bills and Notes, 8 C.J. p. 464 n. 15; p. 499 n. 8; p. 504 n. 25; p. 983 n. 43; p. 1048 n. 13.
Evidence, 23 C.J. p. 48 n. 38, 41.
See note in 29 L.R.A.(N.S.) 351; 44 L.R.A.(N.S.) 395; L.R.A. 1918F, 1149; 3 R.C.L. 1072; 1 R.C.L. Supp. 973; 4 R.C.L. Supp. 234; 6 R.C.L. Supp. 219.
Albert Hauser, for appellant.
Davis & Berg, for respondent.
Appeal from an order denying defendant's motion for a new trial.
Plaintiff sues to recover on four $500 promissory notes. One England was a banker at Lamberton. On March 5, 1920, he sold a 160-acre farm to defendant under a contract for deed which contained a provision that if after two years from the date thereof defendant did not want the land England would take it back and pay back the money which defendant had paid. England took, with the contract that he got from defendant, notes including the ones here involved for deferred payments. Two years later defendant exercised his privilege under the contract and surrendered the land to England, who told him he had used the notes as collateral but that he would get them and return them. This was never done.
Plaintiff is a farmer and lives in Wisconsin. He and England were raised in the same community and were friends. England visited Wisconsin from time to time. He told plaintiff that if he had any money to invest to send it to him to be invested in safe and good securities. On March 16, 1920, plaintiff, trusting England to do as he agreed, sent England $2,000 for such purpose, and England sent plaintiff four of the notes so given with said contract. England indorsed and guaranteed the notes. He paid one year's interest on the notes.
Plaintiff knew nothing about defendant, made no inquiry concerning him, and did not write to him until the fall of 1926 when he for the first time learned the facts.
Defendant's offer of proof to establish his claim that England procured the notes through fraud was excluded. For the purpose of this case we will assume that the notes were so procured.
The trial court directed a verdict for plaintiff.
1. Every holder of promissory notes is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due course; but when notes are procured by fraud the burden is on the holder to prove that he or some person under whom he claims to have acquired the title is a holder in due course. G.S. 1923, § 7102; Goedhard v. Folstad, 156 Minn. 453, 195 N.W. 281; McWethy v. Norby, 143 Minn. 386, 173 N.W. 803.
2. Defendant contends that it was for the jury and not the court to determine upon the record before us whether plaintiff has sustained this burden of proof.
Plaintiff's case rests alone upon his own testimony and his exhibits. He bought these notes without any regard to the maker's integrity or financial condition. He made no investigation concerning the maker. His confidence and trust were in England, who guaranteed the notes. He naturally is an interested witness in the case. He and England were friends.
From this state of facts and circumstances it is urged that the court was required to submit to the jury the question as to whether plaintiff had sustained the burden of proof, particularly involving the elements of interest of the plaintiff as a witness, good faith, value, and want of notice of the fraud. It is true that ordinarily the credibility of interested witnesses and generally the interest or want of interest of a witness are for the consideration of the trier of fact. But these general rules are subject to another well established rule, namely, that clear, positive, direct and undisputed testimony, not improbable or contradictory, given by an unimpeached witness, cannot be rejected or disregarded by either court or jury, unless the evidence discloses facts and circumstances which furnish a reasonable ground for so doing. Such testimony can be rejected only when doubt is cast upon its truthfulness by contradictory or discrediting facts and circumstances. The testimony of a witness may be disregarded if it contains inherent inprobabilities or contradictions which, alone or in connection with the other circumstances in evidence, furnish a reasonable ground for concluding that the testimony is not true. Goedhard v. Folstad, 156 Minn. 453, 195 N.W. 281; Babich v. Oliver I. Min. Co. 157 Minn. 122, 195 N.W. 784, 202 N.W. 904; Benson v. County of Marshall, 163 Minn. 309, 204 N.W. 40; Campbell v. C.N. Ry. Co. 124 Minn. 245, 144 N.W. 772; Hawkins v. Sauby, 48 Minn. 69, 50 N.W. 1015; Campbell v. Nelson, 175 Minn. 51, 200 N.W. 401; Lampi v. James H. Brown Co. 165 Minn. 169, 205 N.W. 953; Miller v. Aetna Ins. Co. 168 Minn. 145, 209 N.W. 887; Muetzel v. Muetzel, 169 Minn. 360, 211 N.W. 320. See also First Nat. Bank v. Klimenhagen, 159 Minn. 469, 199 N.W. 91.
It is argued that the jury might have found a verdict for the defendant; that the jury may have concluded that plaintiff, being a friend of England, was merely a means of collecting and that because thereof he made no investigation. If so, such verdict would be based upon speculation and conjecture and rest wholly in the minds of the jurors and would not be supported by the record. The law will not permit a credible witness to be discredited by the trier of fact merely because such witness is a party to the action. None of the cases go so far as to hold that the interest of a witness in the outcome of the action, standing alone and without any inherent weakness or other facts and circumstances shown tending to weaken, contradict or impeach his testimony, is sufficient to permit the jury to reject it.
3. To constitute notice of the fraud involved it must be made to appear that the person to whom the paper is negotiated must have had actual knowledge thereof or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the paper must have amounted to bad faith. G.S. 1923, § 7099; Allen v. Cooling, 161 Minn. 10, 200 N.W. 849.
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