Olsen v. Karwoski

• Decision Date: 24 January 1979
• Docket Number: No. 77-749,77-749
• Citation: 386 N.E.2d 444,25 Ill.Dec. 173,68 Ill.App.3d 1031
• Parties: , 25 Ill.Dec. 173 Robert OLSEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dr. Agnes KARWOSKI, a/k/a Agnes L. Olsen, Dr. Theodore Dulin and Dr. Yang Cog Chun, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 444

386 N.E.2d 444

68 Ill.App.3d 1031, 25 Ill.Dec. 173

Robert OLSEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dr. Agnes KARWOSKI, a/k/a Agnes L. Olsen, Dr. Theodore Dulin and Dr. Yang Cog Chun, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 77-749.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

Jan. 24, 1979.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 15, 1979.

Joshua Sachs, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.

Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, Chicago (Maurice J. Garvey and Kay L. Schichtel, Chicago, of counsel), for defendant-appellee Dr. Agnes Karwoski.

Clausen, Miller, Gorman, Caffrey & Witous, Chicago (James T. Ferrini and Stephen D. Marcus, Chicago, of counsel), for defendant-appellee Dr. Theodore Dulin.

Lord, Bissell & Brook, Chicago (Williams P. Dorr, Hugh C. Griffin, Chicago and Cynthia Giacchetti, Chicago, of counsel), for defendant-appellee Dr. Yang Cog Chun.

SIMON, Presiding Justice:

This is an action for damages plaintiff Robert Olsen claimed he suffered when he was twice involuntarily admitted to mental hospitals for emergency hospitalization. The circuit court judge granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Theodore Dulin and Dr. Yang Cog Chun, defendants in this action, and also dismissed all charges against the plaintiff's former wife, defendant Dr. Agnes Karwoski. The plaintiff appeals from those orders.

In October 1974, the plaintiff was twice involuntarily admitted to mental hospitals for emergency hospitalization. The first admission took place on the evening of October 11, 1974, when he was brought to Mt. Sinai Hospital (Mt. Sinai) in Chicago by the Darien police. This admission was pursuant to the Illinois Mental Health Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 911/2, par. 7-1), which authorizes emergency hospitalization for any person who "is or is asserted to be * * * in need of mental treatment and in such a condition that immediate hospitalization is necessary for the protection of such person or others * * *." To establish that this condition exists, the Mental Health Code requires both a petition stating the reasons for the admission and an accompanying certificate of a physician setting forth the reasons why the person allegedly in need of mental treatment should be hospitalized. The physician's certificate is to be based on his personal examination of the person within 72 hours prior to the admission.

Dr. Karwoski, who at the time was the plaintiff's wife, signed the petition. The medical certificate was signed by Dr. Dulin at Dr. Karwoski's request. In this certificate, dated October 11, 1974, Dr. Dulin attested that he had personally examined the plaintiff within the prior 72 hours. The plaintiff disputes Dr. Dulin's statement, claiming that Dr. Dulin had not examined him on October 11, 1974, at any time thereafter, or for several years prior to that date. Dr. Dulin has not denied the plaintiff's assertion.

Shortly after being admitted to Mt. Sinai, the plaintiff was examined by Dr. Chun, a staff psychiatrist, who diagnosed the plaintiff's condition as suicidal and homicidal. Dr. Chun certified that the plaintiff was in need of mental treatment, but despite Dr. Chun's findings and certificate, the plaintiff was released later the same evening. Nothing in the record explains why the plaintiff was released within such a short time after his admission to Mt. Sinai Hospital.

Four days later, on the evening of October 15, 1974, the plaintiff was again admitted for emergency hospitalization, this time at Tinley Park Mental Health Center (Tinley Park), where he was brought by Chicago police. The plaintiff alleges that he was not examined by any physician within the 72 hours preceding his admission to Tinley Park, as required by paragraph 7-1 of the Mental Health Code. The plaintiff further charges that the certificates signed by Dr. Dulin and Dr. Chun on October 11 were altered by either or both of them, or by someone acting at their direction, to make the certificates appear to have been prepared on October 14, within 72 hours of the plaintiff's admission to Tinley Park. The plaintiff was released from Tinley Park shortly after his admission to that hospital. Again, the record does not explain why.

The complaint alleges (i) that the three defendants conspired to have him hospitalized through abuse of process and falsely arrested and imprisoned, and to maliciously prosecute him; (ii) that Dr. Chun caused him to be falsely arrested and imprisoned, and caused his hospitalization at Tinley Park through abuse of process; (iii) that Dr. Karwoski and Dr. Dulin caused the plaintiff to be falsely arrested and imprisoned, maliciously prosecuted him, and also caused him to be hospitalized at Mt. Sinai and also at Tinley Park through abuse of process.

We first address the question of whether Dr. Karwoski's motion to dismiss her from the proceeding was properly allowed. After the plaintiff instituted this proceeding, she and the plaintiff were divorced. The divorce decree entered by agreement of the parties specifically referred to this action in the following provision:

"E. That the Plaintiff shall dismiss the Defendant with prejudice from his personal lawsuit in the case of Robert Olsen vs. Agnes L. Karwoski a/k/a Agnes L. Olsen, Dr. Theodore Dulin and Dr. Yang Kog Chun (sic), Case No. 75 L. 21082."

Plaintiff contends that the circuit court judge who presided in this case improperly dismissed the plaintiff's action against Dr. Karwoski because that judge lacked jurisdiction to enforce this provision of the divorce decree. The plaintiff's theory is that the provisions of a divorce decree cannot be enforced by a circuit court judge sitting in the law division of the court.

Circuit courts are tribunals of general jurisdiction where all judges are invested with equal authority regardless of which division of the court they may be assigned to at a particular time. Thus, a law division judge in the circuit court of Cook County can enforce a decree or order entered by a judge sitting in another division. (See Ill.Const.1970, art. VI, § 9; Fins, Illinois Courts Derive Their Jurisdiction From The Constitution And Their Authority Is No Longer Dependent Upon Statutes or Pleadings, Ill. State B. Ass'n Judicial Ad. Newsletter No. 1 (1977).) This court recently pointed out in Lescher v. Barker (1978), 57 Ill.App.3d 776, 15 Ill.Dec. 535, 373 N.E.2d 1007, that the judge of a circuit court organized in divisions has equal authority with that of every other judge of the court:

"As divisions of the same constitutional court of general jurisdiction, each division of the circuit court has equal and concurrent subject matter jurisdiction * * *. Section 9 of the Judicial Article of 1964 and 1970 provides: 'Circuit Courts shall have original jurisdiction of All justiciable matters * * *.' " (Emphasis added.) Lescher, at 778, 15 Ill.Dec. 538, 373 N.E.2d 1009.

Therefore, the trial judge assigned to the law division was authorized to enforce, and properly applied, the provision in the divorce decree relating to this action.

The plaintiff also argues that the application of the divorce decree to this case should be postponed until Dr. Karwoski has complied with her obligations under that decree. The plaintiff, however, has failed to set forth any breaches by Dr. Karwoski of her obligations and responsibilities. Moreover, the divorce decree does not condition the plaintiff's dismissal of this case upon compliance by his former wife with any other part of the decree. Thus, the circuit court judge did not err in dismissing the action against Dr. Karwoski.

Dr. Dulin's motion for summary judgment was supported by his own affidavit. He stated in his motion and affidavit that he is a practicing psychiatrist, and had treated the plaintiff for brief periods in 1961 and 1962, in 1964 and in 1970 and 1971. At the request of Dr. Karwoski, he also observed the plaintiff in social settings. He learned that the plaintiff had broken into his wife's home in September 1974, and Dr. Karwoski at the time told him she feared her husband would physically harm her. The plaintiff's actions, as described to him by others, indicated the plaintiff could well be undergoing a psychotic breakdown. He was apprehensive that the plaintiff could inflict bodily harm on his wife or himself and that the plaintiff represented a paranoid personality with incipient psychosis. He agreed to sign a certificate so that the plaintiff could be apprehended and brought to a hospital for evaluation. The plaintiff filed a counter-affidavit denying that he ever had a physician-patient relationship with Dr. Dulin, denying that he broke into his wife's home, and denying that Dr. Dulin saw him, spoke to him or examined him on the date Dr. Dulin signed his certificate or shortly prior thereto. Although Dr. Chun did not file a written motion for summary judgment or affidavits, the order granting summary judgment in favor of both doctors stated that Dr. Chun had orally joined in Dr. Dulin's motion.

The determination of the propriety of these summary judgments requires reference to accepted principles of law applicable to that type of judgment. Disposition of an action by summary judgment is proper only where the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on file establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Farmers Auto Ins. Assn. v. Hamilton (1976), 64 Ill.2d 138, 141, 355 N.E.2d 1; Econo Lease, Inc. v. Noffsinger (1976), 63 Ill.2d 390, 393, 349 N.E.2d 1.) The right of the movant to summary judgment must be free from doubt, and any evidence in support of the motion must be strictly construed against the moving party. (Doran v. Pullman Standard Car Manufacturing Co. (1977), 45 Ill.App.3d 981, 986, 4 Ill.Dec. 504, 360 N.E.2d 440.) Summary judgment should be granted with caution so as not to preempt a litigant from presenting the factual basis of his case to the factfinder. Peltz v. Chicago Transit...