Olseth v. Larsen

• Decision Date: 27 March 2007
• Docket Number: No. 20051180.,20051180.
• Citation: Olseth v. Larsen, 158 P.3d 532, 2007 UT 29 (Utah 2007)
• Parties: Bertina Rae OLSETH, an individual, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Matthew D. LARSEN, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

158 P.3d 532

2007 UT 29

Bertina Rae OLSETH, an individual, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.Matthew D. LARSEN, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 20051180.

Supreme Court of Utah.

March 27, 2007.

D. Bruce Oliver, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

J. Wesley Robinson, Salt Lake City, for defendant.

DURRANT, Justice:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1This case is before us on certification of a question of state law from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.The question to be addressed is this: "Is the statute of limitations tolled under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 when a person against whom a claim has accrued has left the state of Utah and has no agent within the state of Utah upon whom service of process can be made instead, but the person is amenable to service pursuant to Utah's long-arm statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24?"

¶ 2We hold that Utah Code section 78-12-35("Utah's tolling statute")does toll the applicable statute of limitations when a person against whom a claim has accrued has left the state of Utah and has no agent within the state upon whom service of process can be made, even where the person was at all times amenable to service pursuant to Utah's long-arm statute.The plain language of the tolling statute, our well-settled precedent, and appropriate deference to the Legislature lead to this result.

BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On May 15, 1998, Bertina Rae Olseth, having been left handcuffed and unattended in Officer Matthew D. Larson's police vehicle with the engine running, attempted to steal that vehicle.Larson shot Olseth while attempting to recover his vehicle.On May 15, 2000, Olseth filed her first action in this matter in federal district court against Salt Lake City Corporation("the City"), Salt Lake City Police Department, and various police officers in their official capacities, including Larson.Olseth's complaint alleged civil rights violations resulting from her arrest and the injuries she sustained when she was shot by Larson.The only cause of action pled in Olseth's complaint relevant to this case was for an alleged 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation based on her allegation of unlawful use of deadly force.

¶ 4 The federal district court dismissed Olseth's first complaint on May 15, 2002, for failure to prosecute.On October 11, 2002, Olseth filed her second complaint, adding new causes of action against essentially the same parties but naming Larson for the first time in his individual capacity.The City moved for dismissal of all causes of action and parties.On June 6, 2003, the court partially granted the City's motion, allowing only the "loss of limb or member" cause of action to remain against the City and Larson.

¶ 5 On May 2, 2003, Olseth filed an Amended Motion for Alternate Means of Service and a Second Motion for Enlargement of Time.Because Larson was then an out-of-state defendant and Olseth was unable to locate him, her motion requested alternative service of process by publication or mail and an enlargement of time to effect service.The district court granted this motion on June 6, 2003.

¶ 6 Upon the stipulation of the parties, Olseth amended her second complaint on September 17, 2003.Olseth's amended complaint named Larson in his individual capacity as the sole defendant and asserted a cause of action against him under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of her constitutional rights.

¶ 7 Larson moved for summary judgment, arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because he was not sued as an individual until Olseth filed her second complaint on October 11, 2002, more than four years after the incident complained of occurred.Larson argued that, because Olseth sued him for the first time in his individual capacity beyond the applicable four-year statute of limitations period, her complaint must be dismissed.

¶ 8The district court granted Larson's motion for summary judgment but allowed Olseth ten days to research the statute of limitations issue further and petition the court for reconsideration.

¶ 9 Olseth timely filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment but failed to address the controlling authority of the case.The district court denied Olseth's motion, and she appealed the district court's ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

¶ 10 On December 16, 2005, the Tenth Circuit ruled in Larson's favor on one issue and certified the current issue to us.We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(1).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 11 On certification from the federal court, we"answer the legal questions presented" without "resolv[ing] the underlying dispute."¹

ANALYSIS

¶ 12 The only question before us is whether Utah Code section 78-12-35 tolls the applicable statute of limitations when a person against whom a claim has accrued has left the state of Utah and has no agent within the state upon whom service of process can be made, but the person was at all times amenable to service pursuant to Utah's long-arm statute.

¶ 13 Utah's tolling statute was designed to address a problem that existed in the jurisdictional era of Pennoyer v. Neff,² that is to say, an era where personal jurisdiction was difficult to obtain over out-of-state defendants.But in the era ushered in by International Shoe,³ obtaining such jurisdiction is no longer so difficult.Basically, the tolling statute was designed to address a problem that no longer exists and the statute is, in that sense, an anachronism.Despite the fact that the tolling statute is anachronistic, however, it is clear, and it provides that a statute is tolled during that period where a defendant is absent from the state.

¶ 14 In this opinion, we will first discuss the creation and history of Utah's tolling statute, framing the proper context in which to analyze the certified question.Second, we will discuss the plain-language application of the tolling statute.Third, we will discuss our prior case law interpreting the tolling statute.Finally, we will discuss the appropriate deference to the Legislature in deciding the question presented to us.

¶ 15 Ultimately, we hold that Utah Code section 78-12-35does toll the applicable statute of limitations when a person against whom a claim has accrued has left the state of Utah and has no agent within the state upon whom service of process can be made, even where the person was at all times amenable to service pursuant to Utah's longarm statute.

I.THE HISTORY OF UTAH'S TOLLING STATUTE

¶ 16Utah Code section 78-12-35 does not differ materially from its original version enacted in 1872.⁴The current tolling statute reads as follows:

Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the state, the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter after his return to the state.If after a cause of action accrues he departs from the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.⁵

¶ 17 In his briefs, Larson aptly describes the circumstances surrounding the creation and operation of Utah's tolling statute.When Utah's tolling statute was created, the ability to obtain personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state resident (or nonresident) was severely limited by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.⁶Given this restraint, the tolling statute served the important purpose of preventing the statute of limitations from expiring on valid claims when the defendant was out of state and obtaining personal jurisdiction was not possible.

¶ 18 In the early 1900s, the jurisdictional reach of the states' courts began to expand, and by 1945, the United States Supreme Court, in International Shoe, adopted a more flexible standard for asserting personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants.⁷This new standard required only that a defendant have "minimum contacts" with the forum state such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction did not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."⁸As a result of International Shoe, states began enacting long-arm statutes, which were comprehensive jurisdictional statutes based upon a defendant's conduct in or contact with the forum state.These long-arm statutes expanded the jurisdictional reach of state courts, allowing such courts to exert personal jurisdiction to the outer limits of the Due Process Clause.

¶ 19 Utah's long-arm statute was enacted in 1969.⁹It allows Utah's courts to exert personal jurisdiction over any person, whether or not a resident of Utah, if that person committed any of the acts enumerated in the statute.¹⁰The long-arm provisions apply "so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution."¹¹The provisions allow service of process pursuant to rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on any party outside the state.¹²

¶ 20 Larson argues that Utah's tolling statute must be interpreted in light of this history and purpose and in relation to other statutes.He argues that when the purpose of the tolling statute conflicts with its literal meaning, the purpose must be given effect.He explains that the purpose of the tolling statute is to prevent valid claims from expiring because personal jurisdiction over a defendant cannot be obtained due to the defendant's absence from the state.He argues that, in light of this purpose, the language in the tolling statute referring to a defendant who is "out of the state" should describe a defendant who is beyond the personal jurisdiction and process of Utah courts and not merely a defendant who is physically "absent" from the state.Larson contends that this interpretation harmonizes the tolling statute with the purposes of Utah's long-arm statute, the substitute service of process provisions of rule 4, and the applicable statute of limitations, which are all designed...