Olson Prop. Invs. v. Alexander
| Decision Date | 20 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-CV-2104 (PJS/HB) |
| Parties | OLSON PROPERTY INVESTMENTS, LLC, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL ALEXANDER and PHERIZIA DAVIS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Christopher Kalla and Douglass Turner, HANBERY & TURNER P.A., for plaintiff.
Laura Jelinek and Lisa Hollingsworth, SOUTHERN MINNESOTA REGIONAL LEGAL SERVICES, for defendants.
Plaintiff Olson Property Investments, LLC (“Olson”) rents an apartment in Farmington, Minnesota to defendants Michael Alexander and Patrizia Davis[1] (“Tenants”). On September 13, 2021, Olson initiated an eviction action against Tenants in Dakota County District Court. Tenants removed the action to federal court on September 23, 2021. Notice Rem. [ECF No. 1]. The matter is now before the Court on Olson's motion to remand. ECF No. 7.
This routine state-court eviction action does not appear to belong in federal court. The parties are not diverse, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and none of Olson's claims arise under federal law, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Tenants nevertheless argue that, because they intend to defend this eviction action by relying on federal civil-rights laws, removal of this action is authorized by the Supreme Court's decision in Georgia v Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966). For the reasons that follow, the Court disagrees and remands this case to state court.
The dispute between Olson and Tenants began in the spring of 2020, when Tenants complained to Olson about repairs that were needed in their apartment and about the fact that the child of a neighbor had used racist epithets in speaking to Alexander. Def. Memo. at 2-3 [ECF No. 16]. In response to these concerns, Olson's agent, Stephanie Reis, allegedly told Tenants “if they were unhappy that they should move.” Id. at 3.
Tensions between Olson and Tenants continued to build, and on May 30, 2020, Olson notified Tenants that it would not renew their lease for another term and instructed them to vacate the apartment when their lease expired on July 31, 2020. Ev. Compl. ¶ 4.1 [ECF No. 1-2]; Def. Memo at 3. Tenants refused to vacate, citing the COVID-19-related eviction moratorium that was then in effect. Def. Memo. at 4.
According to Olson, Tenants have repeatedly harassed their neighbors (causing at least one to move away) and repeatedly harassed two of Olson's agents (Stephanie Reis and Taryl Olson). See generally Ev. Compl. To protect against Tenants' harassment, Olson obtained two restraining orders against Alexander. Id. ¶ 4.6. Olson also filed an eviction action against Tenants in the Dakota County District Court in August 2020. Def. Memo. at 4.
Due to the pandemic, the Dakota County District Court did not hold a hearing on Olson's eviction complaint until March 2021, at which time the court granted Tenants' motion to dismiss (apparently agreeing that their eviction was barred by the eviction moratorium). Def. Memo. at 5. Shortly thereafter, Tenants filed a lawsuit against Olson, alleging violations of federal and state civil-rights statutes, and Olson removed that lawsuit to this Court on March 31, 2021. Id. at 6; see also Alexander v. Olson Prop. Inves., LLC, 21-CV-0902 (PJS/HB) (D. Minn. filed Mar. 31, 2021). Finally, Olson initiated the present (second) eviction action against Tenants in Dakota County District Court on September 13, 2021, and Tenants removed the action to this Court on September 23, 2021. See Notice Rem. Olson has now moved to remand the eviction action to state court.
“[F]ederal courts are courts of limited, not general, jurisdiction.” Alumax Mill Prods., Inc. v. Cong. Fin. Corp., 912 F.2d 996, 1002 (8th Cir. 1990). “[W]hen a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a removed case, it must remand it to state court . . . .” Dalton v. JJSC Props., LLC, 967 F.3d 909, 914 (8th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted); see also Water's Edge Habitat, Inc. v. Pulipati, 837 F.Supp. 501, 505 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) ().
As noted, this Court does not have diversity jurisdiction (as all of the parties are citizens of Minnesota) or federal-question jurisdiction (as none of Olson's claims rest on federal law). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. But Tenants nevertheless argue that this Court has jurisdiction over this eviction action under the civil-rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1443. According to the “Rachel test”-named after the Supreme Court's decision in Georgia v. Rachel-a case is removable under § 1443(1) if two things are true: “First, it must appear that the right allegedly denied the removal petitioner arises under a federal law ‘providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality.'” Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 219 (1975) (quoting Rachel, 384 U.S. at 792). Second, the removal petitioner must show that he or she will be unable to enforce his or her federal rights if required to defend them in state court.
The second prong of the Rachel test usually “requires that the ‘denial be manifest in a formal expression of state law,' such as a state legislative or constitutional provision.” Id. (quoting Rachel, 384 U.S. at 803). The second prong may also be met “in the rare situations where it can be clearly predicted . . . that those rights will inevitably be denied by the very act of bringing the defendant to trial in the state court.” Id. at 220 (quoting City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 828 (1966)); see also Pulipati, 837 F.Supp. at 506 ().
Tenants contend-and Olson does not dispute-that they satisfy the first prong of the Rachel test because the rights that they intend to assert in defense of the eviction action arise under the federal Fair Housing Act, which provides for the protection of “civil rights stated in terms of racial equality.” Rachel, 384 U.S. at 792. The Court will assume that Tenants are correct. See Pulipati, 837 F.Supp. at 505 ().
Tenants offer two explanations for how they meet the second prong of the Rachel test. First, Tenants argue that they “cannot enforce the[ir] rights asserted under the Fair Housing Act” if forced to litigate in state court. Def. Memo. at 11. Tenants concede that they can assert their rights under the Fair Housing Act in defending against the eviction action-and that the state court will rule on their defenses-but Tenants complain that Minnesota does not permit formal discovery or the assertion of counterclaims in eviction proceedings.[2] As far as the Court can tell, however, no court has ever held that the second prong of the Rachel test is met simply because a state court does not provide all of the procedures available in federal court. Specifically, the Court is unaware of any court that has found that a defendant is not able to enforce his or her federal rights in state court because of the absence of or limits on discovery or because the defendant cannot file counterclaims. Cf. Wells Fargo Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Vann, No. 13-CV-01148-YGR, 2013 WL 1856711, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2013) (). To the contrary, numerous federal courts-including the United States Supreme Court, see, e.g., Peacock, 384 U.S. 808-have found state-court criminal actions not to be removable under § 1443, and they have done so even though state criminal actions have little formal discovery (compared to federal civil actions) and even though defendants in criminal actions cannot file counterclaims.
Second, Tenants argue that Olson's very act of filing this eviction action violates Tenants' civil rights. According to Tenants, Def. Memo at 10.
Even if it were true that the only reason Olson brought this eviction action was to “harass or intimidate” Tenants, that would not be enough to satisfy Rachel's second prong. If it were, any tenant faced with an eviction action could simply claim that the action was filed for a discriminatory or retaliatory purpose, remove the action to federal court, and, through that removal, delay his eviction by months. The federal courts would be buried under a mountain of routine eviction actions. Fortunately, the law is not as Tenants would have it. For a removal petitioner to meet the second prong of the Rachel test, she must establish more than that the state-court action was commenced against her for discriminatory or retaliatory reasons; she must establish that she has the right under a particular federal statute to not even litigate the question of whether the state-court action was filed for discriminatory or retaliatory reasons. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, it is extraordinarily rare for federal law to give a defendant immunity from even having to appear in a state court to defend an action. See Peacock, 384 U.S. at 828.
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