Olson v. Brown

• Decision Date: 25 July 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 4:09-CV-6 JD
• Parties: JEFFREY MARK OLSON, on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TRACY BROWN, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Tippecanoe County, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

JEFFREY MARK OLSON, on his own behalf

and on behalf of a class of those similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.TRACY BROWN, in his official capacity as

Sheriff of Tippecanoe County, Defendant.

Case No. 4:09-CV-6 JD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA HAMMOND DIVISION AT LAFAYETTE

ENTERED: July 25, 2012

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by the Defendant Tracy Brown, Sheriff of Tippecanoe County. Sheriff Brown originally filed this motion in March 2009, see DE 19, and Judge Allen Sharp granted the motion in a June 22, 2009 Memorandum Opinion and Order, holding that the case was moot because the putative class representative, Jeffrey Mark Olson, was no longer an inmate. The Seventh Circuit subsequently reversed that decision in Olson v. Brown, 594 F.3d 577, 584 (7th Cir. 2010),¹ and this case was later reassigned to the undersigned. The parties submitted new briefs on this motion at the Court's request. See DE 61, 62.

Sheriff Brown asked the Court to rule on this motion before ruling on the Motion for Class Certification, while Mr. Olson wanted it the other way around (or simultaneous rulings). In its recent ruling granting the motion to certify the class, the Court noted that it

has resolved to determine, first, whether class certification is proper, and second, whether a judgment on the pleadings is proper, consistent with the directives of theUnited States Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit. See Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974); Thomas v. City of Peoria, 580 F.3d 633, 635 (7th Cir. 2009) ("First ruling on the merits of the federal claims, and then denying class certification on the basis of that ruling, puts the cart before the horse.") (collecting cases). Employing this process further comports with the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that "this case would be moot if Olson had brought his claims individually . . . [because he] sought injunctive relief and is no longer subject to the conditions that formed the basis of his complaint." Olson v. Brown, 594 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2010). "If the district court certifies the class, the case can proceed to the merits for the certified class of plaintiffs." Id. at 584.

See DE 69 at 1-2. Having resolved the motion for class certification, the Court now turns to the motion for judgment on the pleadings.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 2, 2009, Mr. Olson filed a "verified class action complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief" pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Indiana law, against Sheriff Brown in his official capacity, seeking to enjoin the practices of the Tippecanoe County Jail. See DE 1. Mr. Olson sued on his behalf² and on behalf of "any and all persons currently confined, or who will in the future be confined, in the Tippecanoe County Jail," see DE 1 at ¶ 6, although this Court found it appropriate to certify a more limited subclass of prisoners for some claims. The complaint alleges four areas in which the jail is violating the Indiana county jail standards promulgated by the Indiana Department of Corrections pursuant to Indiana Code § 11-12-4-2: (1) inadequate grievance procedures in violation 210 I.A.C. 3-1-15(h); (2) inadequate law libraryaccess in violation of 210 I.A.C. 3-1-15(a); (3) opening of mail from the courts outside of an inmate's presence in violation of 210 I.A.C. 3-1-16(c); and (4) opening of mail from legal organizations and attorneys outside of an inmate's presence also in violation of 210 I.A.C. 3-1-16(c). See DE 60 at 2-3. The complaint also alleges that the handling of court and legal mail violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. On January 20, 2009, Sheriff Brown removed the case from Tippecanoe County State Court to this Court based upon federal question jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction. See DE 4.

By way of background, Mr. Olson was sentenced on or about November 1, 2003, to ten years in the Indiana Department of Corrections. While pending transfer to a different facility, he was held at the Tippecanoe County Jail from August 29, 2008 to January 15, 2009.³ See DE 60 at 2. While incarcerated at the jail, he received mail correspondence both from various courts and attorneys which was opened by jail staff outside of his presence, even though the outside of each envelope was marked either with the return address of a court or with the phrase "legal mail." See DE 1 at ¶¶ 14, 16, 18-19. Mr. Olson submitted grievances to jail staff following incidences occurring on September 8 and October 17, 2008, in which envelopes from court were opened outside of his presence that contained documents involving lawsuits in which Mr. Olson was representing himself. See DE 1 at ¶¶ 15, 17; DE 1-2 at p. 1, 3. When the jail staff did not respond to either grievance, Mr. Olson filed grievances concerning the failure to respond and appealed the original grievances. See DE 1 at ¶¶ 15, 17; DE 1-2 at p. 2, 4. The jail neverresponded to Mr. Olson's grievances. Id.

On September 18, 2008, Mr. Olson requested that he be permitted to visit the law library in order to conduct legal research concerning pending legal proceedings for which he was representing himself . See DE 1 at ¶ 20. Mr. Olson's request was denied, and despite subsequent requests to visit the law library, he was never permitted to do so. Id. On September 18, Mr. Olson submitted a grievance concerning his not being given access to the law library. See DE 1 at ¶ 21; DE 1-2 at p. 5]. The jail staff did not respond, and Mr. Olson submitted a grievance concerning the failure to respond and he appealed the original grievance [DE 1 at ¶ 21; DE 1-2 at p. 6]. No response was given. Id.

According to the complaint, Mr. Olson submitted at least twenty-one grievances and grievance appeals to the jail staff between his arrival at the jail on August 29, 2008, and the filing of the complaint. See DE 1 at ¶ 22. The jail never responded to any of them. Id. Mr. Olson filed grievances over the conduct which he opposes,⁴ and maintained a journal recounting the precise language of each grievance and each grievance appeal. See DE 1 at ¶ 12. Moreover, on October 25, 2008, Mr. Olson submitted a grievance to the jail staff concerning the failure to respond to grievances. See DE 1 at ¶ 23; DE 1-2 at p. 7. The jail staff did not respond to this grievance, and on November 7, 2008, Mr. Olson submitted an appeal of the grievance that received no response. See DE 1 at ¶ 23; DE 8. Once again, the jail did not respond to the grievance. Id.

The repeated lack of response to grievances and appealed grievances occurred, despitethe fact that the jail employs a grievance policy to address inmate concerns [DE 1 at ¶ 13]. Once an inmate files a grievance, the jail is responsible for responding to the grievance within seven days. Id. If the inmate does not agree with the decision, he or she may appeal the decision. Id. The jail then has fifteen days to respond to the appeal. Id. According to the complaint, the failure to respond to grievances, the denial of law library access and the opening of legal mail were not isolated problems unique to Mr. Olson but emblematic of policies or practices of the county jail that violate the Indiana jail standards.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The Court reviews a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), the same standard that applies to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See R.J. Corman Derailment Serv., LLC v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 335 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003). The Court will only grant a Rule 12(c) motion when, after accepting facts alleged in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any facts to support a claim for relief." Guise v. BWM Mortg., LLC, 377 F.3d 795, 798 (7th Cir. 2004). There are, however, some limits to the factual allegations the Court may accept as true: there must be sufficient facts plead to provide notice to the defendants of the claims; the facts must not be "so sketchy and implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice to defendants of the plaintiff's claim"; and the Court "should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements." Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) (outlining pleading requirements after Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009)).

B. Federal Constitutional Claims

In its previous order certifying this case as a class action, the Court outlined the federal legal theories at play in this case and certified a class action for claims that the prison mail-handling policy violates the free speech rights of the entire class (with respect to all "legal mail" including court mail) and the right to access the courts of a subclass comprised of only those prisoners who have now or may in the future have non-frivolous legal claims (solely with respect to attorney mail). Regarding the First Amendment claim, "[t]he Supreme Court has recognized that prisoners do have protected First Amendment interests in both sending and receiving mail." Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Thornburgh v. Abott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989) and Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)). This is true for both legal and non-legal mail. Id. These rights, however, are subject to curtailments "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Id. (citing Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 409). In the case of non-legal mail, it is firmly established that "prison security 'is a sufficient important governmental interest to justify limitations on a prisoner's first amendment rights,'" and that prison officials may therefore inspect incoming or outgoing non-legal mail for contraband. Id. (quoting Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299, 1304 (7th Cir. 1986).

While Courts have also routinely approved of prison...