Olson v. Lesch

Decision Date27 May 2020
Docket NumberA18-1694
Citation943 N.W.2d 648
Parties Lyndsey OLSON, Respondent, v. John LESCH, Appellant.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court
OPINION

GILDEA, Chief Justice.

The question presented in this case is whether legislative immunity protects the statements made in a letter State Representative John Lesch sent to the mayor of Saint Paul. Respondent Lyndsey Olson, Saint Paul City Attorney, sued Lesch for defamation per se based on statements in the letter. Lesch moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting legislative immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause of the Minnesota Constitution, Minn. Const. art. IV, § 10, and under the legislative immunity provision in Minn. Stat. § 540.13 (2018). The district court denied Lesch’s motion to dismiss based on legislative immunity, and the court of appeals affirmed. Because neither Article IV, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution nor Minn. Stat. § 540.13 extends legislative immunity to Lesch’s letter, we affirm.

FACTS

On January 3, 2018, appellant John Lesch sent a letter to the new mayor of Saint Paul, Mayor Melvin Carter. Lesch serves as the state representative for Minnesota District 66B, which includes part of the City of Saint Paul. The letter is written on Lesch’s official letterhead from the Minnesota House of Representatives, but the letter is marked "**PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL**."

In the letter, Lesch writes about a variety of topics. He begins by congratulating Mayor Carter "on a very well-organized inaugural ceremony," and then generally references "the upcoming legislative session" and "lobbying" issues. The letter does not discuss these issues with any specificity.

Lesch then "express[es] reservations about two primary issues." The first issue concerns "the hiring process of [Mayor Carter’s] department heads." Regarding that topic, Lesch writes that, "[a]s a de facto lead on data practices in the legislature," he is "often asked if government practices conform with the spirit and the letter of our sunshine laws." He recounts that the former mayor had asked him "to deal with certain legislative data practices issues" in the past, and he "offer[s] the same counsel" to Mayor Carter. While the letter generally references "sunshine laws" and "data practices," the letter makes no specific reference to actual, pending, or anticipated legislation.

The second issue discussed in the letter concerns the Saint Paul City Attorney’s Office. This issue takes up the bulk of the text in the three-page letter. Lesch begins his discussion of this issue by noting that he served in the office for almost 15 years and explaining that he has "a great love for the office." He comments that the office’s decisions are often subject to great public scrutiny and then he says that he was "surprised" by the Mayor’s "choice for City Attorney." Lesch contends that Olson has a "track record of integrity questions and management problems" and suggests that Olson is not the right person for such an important position. He then recounts his personal experience acting as defense counsel for individuals charged with crimes for participating in demonstrations on Interstate Highway 94. And Lesch then requests four types of information specifically about Olson.

Finally, Lesch closes the letter writing, "Mayor Carter, this is a personal letter from me to you. I have not copied it to any member of the press or even to the Saint Paul Delegation, as I am hoping we can resolve it internally."

Based on statements Lesch made in his letter about her, Olson brought a defamation suit against Lesch. The complaint alleges that Lesch "knowingly, intentionally and maliciously made false and defamatory" statements about Olson in the letter.1

The complaint contends that the allegations made in the letter against Olson were investigated and "determined to be unsubstantiated," and that she "has no record of misconduct or any adverse personnel action in the Minnesota National Guard." Instead, the complaint alleges that Olson has "received many notable recognitions and awards, including a Bronze Star Medal[.]"

Lesch moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12.02(a) and (e) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. He asserted, among other arguments, that his statements in the letter are communications that are protected by legislative immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause of the Minnesota Constitution and under Minn. Stat. § 540.13. Lesch stressed that his letter was written on official letterhead, he addressed lobbying efforts in the first portion of the letter, and he sought certain disclosures from Mayor Carter.

The district court denied Lesch’s motion to dismiss. The district court concluded that the allegedly defamatory statements in the letter are not protected by legislative immunity. The district court noted that Lesch was not claiming that "there was business pending before the House, or one of its committees, relating to Mayor Carter, Saint Paul, or [Olson]." And the district court stated that there was no suggestion that Lesch was inquiring into Olson’s "appointment as Saint Paul City Attorney by reason of any pending legislative business[.]"

Lesch appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss based on the denial of legislative immunity.2 The court of appeals affirmed. Olson v. Lesch , 931 N.W.2d 832, 834 (Minn. App. 2019). The court of appeals concluded that "Lesch’s letter was not essential to the legislative process." Id. at 841. The court viewed Lesch’s letter as "analogous to common activities commonly performed by legislators that are personal or political in nature rather than legislative. " Id. at 839. The court also concluded that corresponding with members of the executive branch—like the mayor of Saint Paul—"does not fall within the scope of protected legislative activity." Id. at 840. For these reasons, the court concluded that Lesch’s allegedly defamatory statements are not entitled to legislative immunity under either the Minnesota Constitution or Minn. Stat. § 540.13. Olson , 931 N.W.2d at 841.

We granted Lesch’s petition for review.

ANALYSIS

We must decide whether the Speech or Debate Clause of the Minnesota Constitution or Minn. Stat. § 540.13 grants legislative immunity to Lesch for the statements made in his letter to Mayor Carter. Whether immunity applies is "a legal question that we review de novo." Kariniemi v. City of Rockford , 882 N.W.2d 593, 599 (Minn. 2016). To determine whether immunity applies in this case, we must interpret a constitutional provision and a statutory provision, and these interpretive questions are also subject to review de novo. Cruz-Guzman v. State , 916 N.W.2d 1, 7, 13 (Minn. 2018).3

I.

We first turn to the Speech or Debate Clause of the Minnesota Constitution, Minn. Const. art. IV, § 10, and examine whether this provision immunizes Lesch’s letter.4 Lesch argues that his letter is a legislative act that the Speech or Debate Clause protects. The Speech or Debate Clause of the Minnesota Constitution provides:

The members of each house in all cases except treason, felony and breach of the peace, shall be privileged from arrest during the session of their respective houses and in going to or returning from the same. For any speech or debate in either house they shall not be questioned in any other place.

Minn. Const. art. IV, § 10 (emphasis added).

We have explained that "[t]he Minnesota Constitution grants absolute privilege from defamation liability to members of the State Senate and House of Representatives in the discharge of their official duties." Zutz v. Nelson , 788 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Minn. 2010). We have applied the Speech or Debate Clause on relatively few occasions. For example, we held that the Speech or Debate Clause does not "immunize the Legislature" from claims that legislators violated a duty under other clauses of the Minnesota Constitution. Cruz-Guzman , 916 N.W.2d at 13. But we have never directly addressed the scope of legislative activities that are protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.

For that reason, we turn to federal case law for guidance. The language of Minnesota’s Speech or Debate Clause is almost identical to the language of the Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution.5 The U.S. Constitution provides:

The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.

U.S. Const. art. 1, § 6, cl. 1 (emphasis added). Because this language is nearly identical to the Minnesota provision, as stated above, federal case law interpreting the federal provision is helpful to our interpretation of the Minnesota provision. See State v. Harris , 590 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn. 1999) ("A decision of the Supreme Court interpreting a provision of the U.S. Constitution that is identical to a provision of the Minnesota Constitution is of persuasive authority to this court.").

The U.S. Supreme Court has directly interpreted the Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution several times. Hutchinson v. Proxmire , 443 U.S. 111, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979) ; United States v. Helstoski , 442 U.S. 477, 99 S.Ct. 2432, 61 L.Ed.2d 12 (1979) ; Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund , 421 U.S. 491, 95 S.Ct. 1813, 44 L.Ed.2d 324 (1975) ; Doe v. McMillan , 412 U.S. 306, 93 S.Ct. 2018, 36 L.Ed.2d 912 (1973) ; Gravel v. United States , 408 U.S. 606, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972) ; United States v. Brewster , 408 U.S. 501, 92 S.Ct. 2531, 33 L.Ed.2d 507 (1972) ; Dombrowski v. Eastland , 387 U.S. 82, 87 S.Ct. 1425, 18 L.Ed.2d 577 (1967) ; United States v. Johnson , 383 U.S. 169, 86 S.Ct. 749, 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966) ; Tenney v. Brandhove , 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed....

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