Olson v. Lesch, A18-1694
| Decision Date | 01 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | A18-1694 |
| Parties | Lyndsey OLSON, Respondent, v. John LESCH, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Lisa M. Lamm Bachman, Tessa A. Mansfield, Foley & Mansfield, PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Marshall H. Tanick, Teresa J. Ayling, Meyer Njus Tanick, PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
Appellant John Lesch challenges the district court’s determination that he is not entitled to legislative immunity from respondent Lyndsey Olson’s defamation suit stemming from a letter Lesch wrote to the mayor of St. Paul. We conclude that the letter is not an act within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. Accordingly, we affirm.
Appellant John Lesch is the state representative for house district 66B, which includes part of Ramsey County. Respondent Lyndsey Olson is the current St. Paul City Attorney and has a background in the Minnesota National Guard.
This case arises from a letter that Lesch sent to the newly elected mayor of St. Paul in early January 2018. In that letter, Lesch congratulated the mayor on a well organized inauguration ceremony. Lesch then noted his experience with previous city administrations regarding lobbying and indicated his interest in beginning a conversation with the mayor’s lobbying team before the legislative session began. He then expressed reservations about the mayor’s hiring process for department heads.
After noting general apprehension about the mayor’s hiring process, Lesch focused on the mayor’s appointment of Olson as St. Paul City Attorney. Lesch wrote that he was surprised by the mayor’s selection, and that if he had known Olson was being considered for the position, he "would have registered grave concerns over her fit for the office." The letter continued to outline Lesch’s concerns, which included his assertion that his "own experience with Ms. Olson in the Minnesota National Guard revealed her to be a prosecutor who would sacrifice justice in pursuit of a political win—even going so far as to commit misconduct to do so," and that the Minnesota National Guard investigated Olson for running a "toxic working environment." Lesch stated his "great concern" over "an in-coming City Attorney with a preexisting track record of integrity questions and management problems" and expressed his vested interest in the success of the St. Paul City Attorney’s office as a former member of that office. Lesch then closed his letter by requesting that the mayor disclose several documents related to the hiring of Olson, including any information about investigations of Olson by the Minnesota National Guard and Olson’s disciplinary record.
Based on Lesch’s statements in his letter to the mayor, Olson filed a lawsuit against Lesch for defamation per se. Lesch filed a motion to dismiss the action, based in part on his argument that he is entitled to legislative immunity under Minnesota Statutes section 540.13 and the speech or debate clause of the Minnesota Constitution. The district court concluded that Lesch was not entitled to immunity and denied his motion to dismiss. Lesch appeals.1
Is Lesch entitled to legislative immunity?
Lesch contends that he is entitled to immunity from Olson’s suit pursuant to both Minnesota Statutes section 540.13 and the speech or debate clause of the Minnesota Constitution, which provides that, "[f]or any speech or debate in either house they shall not be questioned in any other place." Minn. Const. art. IV, § 10. We review the question of applicability of immunity de novo. Kariniemi v. City of Rockford , 882 N.W.2d 593, 599 (Minn. 2016).
In order to determine whether Lesch is entitled to immunity, we begin by first considering the background and purpose of legislative immunity. In doing so, we turn to federal caselaw for guidance, as the speech or debate clause in the Minnesota Constitution mirrors the speech or debate clause found in the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 6 (); see also Kahn v. Griffin , 701 N.W.2d 815, 824 (Minn. 2005) (). With that backdrop in mind, we analyze whether Lesch’s letter is a legislative act within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity such that he is immune from Olson’s suit. Because we conclude that the letter is not a legislative act, Lesch is not entitled to either statutory immunity or immunity under the speech or debate clause.
We begin our analysis by considering the historical purpose of legislative immunity. Prior to the adoption of the United States Constitution, "the instigation of criminal charges against critical or disfavored legislators by the executive in a judicial forum was the chief fear prompting the long struggle for parliamentary privilege in England." United States v. Johnson , 383 U.S. 169, 182, 86 S. Ct. 749, 756, 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966). Consistent with our system of separation of powers, then, the purpose of the speech or debate clause is to protect legislators from intimidation by the executive branch and "accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary." Id. at 180-81, 86 S. Ct. at 755.
In interpreting the protections offered by the speech or debate clause, courts are to construe the clause broadly. Kilbourn v. Thompson , 103 U.S. 168, 204, 26 L.Ed. 377 (1880). And while the essence of protected activity is—as the name suggests—speech or debate on the floor of the legislature, courts have determined that immunity under the speech or debate clause extends to matters other than "pure speech or debate in either [h]ouse." Gravel v. United States , 408 U.S. 606, 625, 92 S. Ct. 2614, 2627, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972). Indeed, immunity applies to actions that are within the "sphere of legitimate legislative activity." Tenney v. Brandhove , 341 U.S. 367, 376, 71 S. Ct. 783, 788, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951). And once a court determines that a legislator’s activities are within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity, immunity provided by the speech or debate clause is absolute. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund , 421 U.S. 491, 501, 95 S. Ct. 1813, 1820, 44 L.Ed.2d 324 (1975).
Although immunity under the speech or debate clause is broadly construed, "[l]egislative acts are not all-encompassing." Gravel , 408 U.S. at 625, 92 S. Ct. at 2627. From caselaw, a spectrum has emerged ranging from acts clearly warranting immunity to those falling outside the scope of protection. For example, legislative acts encompass actions like introducing and voting for a bill, distributing committee reports to other representatives, and providing official committee hearing reports to news reporting and publishing agencies. United States v. Helstoski , 442 U.S. 477, 489, 99 S. Ct. 2432, 2439, 61 L.Ed.2d 12 (1979) ; Doe v. McMillan , 412 U.S. 306, 312, 93 S. Ct. 2018, 2024, 36 L.Ed.2d 912 (1973) ; Green v. DeCamp , 612 F.2d 368, 372 (8th Cir. 1980). But legislative immunity does not extend to the transmittal of allegedly defamatory statements in press releases and newsletters, efforts by members of Congress to influence the executive branch, or attempts to influence the Department of Justice in enforcing the laws. Hutchinson v. Proxmire , 443 U.S. 111, 130, 99 S. Ct. 2675, 2686, 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979) ; Doe , 412 U.S. at 313-14, 93 S. Ct. at 2025 ; Johnson , 383 U.S. at 172, 86 S. Ct. at 751.
With this guidance provided by analogous federal law in mind, we turn our attention to Minnesota law. To discern whether Lesch is entitled to legislative immunity, we first examine statutory immunity under Minnesota Statutes section 540.13 and conclude that, while the class of people protected by the statute is broader than the class of people protected by the speech or debate clause, the scope of protected activity is the same under both the statute and the speech or debate clause. Accordingly, we then direct our attention to the question central to our analysis under the speech or debate clause: whether Lesch’s actions fall within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.
In addition to the legislative immunity conferred by the speech or debate clause in the United States Constitution and similar provisions found in state constitutions, federal and state statutes can confer immunity to legislators. Lesch contends he is entitled to immunity under Minnesota Statutes section 540.13, which states:
No member, officer, or employee of either branch of the legislature shall be liable in a civil action on account of any act done in pursuance of legislative duties.
We address this argument first because this court "avoid[s] reaching constitutional questions if there is another way to resolve the case." Ninetieth Minn. State Senate v. Dayton , 903 N.W.2d 609, 624 (Minn. 2017).
Because applicability of this statute presents a question of first impression, we begin by interpreting the statute, a question of law that we review de novo. Cocchiarella v. Driggs , 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016). The purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine the legislature’s intent. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018). In interpreting a statute, we begin by examining its plain language to determine whether it is ambiguous. Am. Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl , 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000). And if the statute’s meaning is clear and unambiguous, we apply its plain language. Brua v. Minn. Joint Underwriting Ass'n , 778 N.W.2d 294, 300 (Minn. 2010).
Our interpretation of this statute must answer two questions: who the statute applies to and the scope of protected activity. Beginning with who the statute applies to,...
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