Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc.
Decision Date | 03 February 1986 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. F 85-397. |
Citation | 627 F. Supp. 1317 |
Parties | Martha OLSON, Plaintiff, v. PAINE, WEBBER, JACKSON & CURTIS, INC., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Martin T. Fletcher, Rothberg, Gallmeyer, Fruechtenicht & Logan, Fort Wayne, Ind., for plaintiff.
J. Timothy McCaulay, Helmke, Beams, Boyer & Wagner, Fort Wayne, Ind., for defendant.
This matter is before the court on defendant's Motion to Stay Proceedings and to Compel Arbitration filed on November 8, 1985. The motion has been fully briefed and a hearing on this matter was held on December 10, 1985. In a telephone conference held on December 12, 1985, plaintiff's counsel contended that there existed further discrepancies in the form of agreement that plaintiff signed vis-a-vis the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's regulation, 17 C.F.R. § 180.3, as amended in 1983. Plaintiff's counsel was therefore given five days to bring those discrepancies to the court's attention. No such brief was filed. For the following reasons, defendant's motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration will be granted.
The undisputed facts in this case are as follows. In 1984 plaintiff Martha Olson (Olson) established an account with the defendant Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. (Paine Webber) for the trading of commodities. Paine Webber is a corporation engaged as a commodity broker and is a futures commission merchant as defined by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Regulations and the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). 17 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1985); 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1980 and Supp.1985).
On January 25, 1984, Olson signed both a Client Commodity Agreement and an agreement that required that any dispute between defendant and Olson be resolved by binding arbitration. The arbitration agreement contained the words "you need not sign this agreement to open an account ...".
During the morning of June 5, 1984, Olson placed an order for the purchase of two (2) silver contracts at a price of $932.00 with Stan Ford (Ford), an account executive for Paine Webber. This order was filled during the afternoon of June 5, 1984, the same day the order was placed.
It is disputed whether Olson, at the time she placed her order with Ford, told him that she wanted the silver contracts bought before noon on June 5, 1984, and if this was not done the order was to be cancelled.
Since Olson planned to be out of town for several days, she called Ford around noon on June 5, 1984, to see if he had purchased the silver contracts. At this time, Ford told Olson that her order had not yet been filled. It was not until June 9, 1984, that Olson learned from her brother that Ford had purchased the silver contracts on the afternoon of June 5, 1984.
Olson promptly called Ford to tell him that the contract had been filled against her instructions. Both Ford and the office manager of Paine Webber told Olson that they were unaware of any restriction that Olson had placed on her order of June 5, 1984. She was also told that she would have to "pay for" the filled order and suffer the consequences.
Since Olson failed to pay for the silver contracts and meet a margin call, Paine Webber proceeded to exercise its right of liquidation. As a result of this sale Olson lost approximately $17,000 to $18,000. During this time period the market price of the silver future contract declined from $932.00 to $870.00. Defendant's net loss on the transaction was offset against positive cash deposits Olson had with Paine Webber, and a debit balance of about $400.00 remained in Olson's account.
On September 24, 1984, Olson commenced this present action against Paine Webber. Olson alleges four causes of action. Count I alleges a violation of both the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 180.3. The second claim alleges a breach of fiduciary duty. Counts III and IV in effect allege that certain unauthorized trades in the plaintiff's commodities account constitute a breach of contract and constitute a failure to exercise reasonable care.
On November 8, 1985, Paine Webber moved the court to stay proceedings and compel arbitration under the predispute arbitration agreement.
The issue before the court is whether the predispute arbitration agreement form that Paine Webber provided Olson with, and Olson voluntarily signed, sufficiently complies with the CFTC's Regulation § 180.3 to form a valid agreement to arbitrate disputes that arise between the parties.
In 1983 the CFTC added two entirely new sections to the existing § 180.3. New § (b)(4) requires that "the customer will have the opportunity to elect a qualified forum for conducting the arbitration proceeding." The second addition to § 180.3, new § (b)(5), directs that the "agreement must acknowledge that the futures commission merchant, ... will pay any incremental fees which may be assessed by a qualified forum for provision of a mixed panel ...".
The arbitration agreement form that Paine Webber provided to Olson did not contain the information required by §§ (b)(4) and (b)(5) of the 1983 amendment to § 180.3. Apparently Paine Webber failed to update the form of its arbitration agreement to conform to these new requirements.
For an arbitration agreement to be valid it must comply with the regulations adopted by the CFTC under the authority of the federal statutes. Regulation § 180.3 provides in pertinent parts:
Olson argues that the arbitration agreement does not conform to the Commodity Futures Trade Commission's Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 180.3, as these regulations existed as of the date of the signing of the agreement, and therefore, the predispute arbitration agreement is void. Paine Webber, on the other hand, advances four arguments in support of its motion to stay the proceedings and to compel arbitration of all claims raised by Olson:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc.
...and then enforced it by granting Paine Webber's motion to stay proceedings in the district court and by ordering arbitration. 627 F.Supp. 1317. The arbitration has not been conducted, however. Olson has appealed to this court, and Paine Webber has not pressed for arbitration before the appe......
-
Mursch v. Van Dorn Co.
... ... Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 66 Wis.2d 53, 224 N.W.2d 389 (1974). In ... ...