Olson v. State Indus. Acc. Commission

• Decision Date: 15 June 1960
• Citation: 352 P.2d 1096,222 Or. 407
• Parties: Margaret OLSON, widow of Bennie C. Olson, deceased, Respondent, v. STATE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION of the State of Oregon, Appellant.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Page 1096

352 P.2d 1096

222 Or. 407

Margaret OLSON, widow of Bennie C. Olson, deceased, Respondent, v. STATE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION of the State of Oregon Appellant.

Supreme Court of Oregon, Department 2.

Argued and Submitted March 17, 1960.

Decided June 15, 1960.

Gerald C. Knapp, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Robert Y. Thornton, Atty. Gen., and Ray H. Lafky, Asst. Atty. Gen.

Brice L. Smith, Portland, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

Before McALLISTER, C. J. and PERRY, O'CONNELL, and DUNCAN, JJ.

PERRY, Justice.

Bennie C. Olson was employed as a powderman and jackhammer operator by the Western Logging Co., a division of the Inman-Poulsen Timber Corporation. On the morning of December 30, 1957, although not feeling well, Olson went with his fellow-workers to the worksite. The motor on the compressor (which was mounted on a truck) used by Olson in operating the jackhammer would not function and a mechanic was called to put it in order. During the morning, while the mechanic was working upon the motor, Mr. Olson appeared to be in physical distress and complained of feeling 'awful.' At approximately 11:30 a. m., learning that the mechanic had the motor in running condition, Olson left the crew truck where he had been reclining most of the morning, stating he felt better and would try to work. He then walked approximately 100 feet, climbed upon the bed of the truck upon which was mounted the motor and compressor, engaged the hand lever clutch which caused the motor to operate the compressor, and the motor began to falter. The mechanic, wondering why the clutch was not then disengaged by Olson, noticed Olson appeared to be in a 'blacked out' condition. The mechanic called two other workmen and Mr. Olson was removed from the truck to the ground. He did not regain consciousness and expired almost immediately. The medical diagnosis of the cause of death was coronary occlusion.

Margaret Olson, widow of Bennie C. Olson and plaintiff herein, filed her claim with the State Industrial Accident Commission. The claim was rejected because 'there is no reasonable medical connection between the condition causing the death of the deceased which was cardiac in origin and the incident of December 30, 1957.'

After exhausting her remedies before the commission without favorable result, plaintiff commenced this action in the Circuit Court of Multnomah County, which was tried before the court without a jury. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant appeals upon the ground that there is no substantial evidence to support the findings of the trial court.

The defendant bases its contention--that the record fails to establish the deceased sustained an accidental injury arising out of his employment--upon its interpretation of the 1957 amendments to the Workmen's Compensation Act.

ORS 656.202(1) formerly read:

'If any workman, while subject to ORS 656.002 to 656.590 and in the service of an employer who is thus bound to contribute to the Industrial Accident Fund sustains a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment caused by violent or external means, he or his beneficiaries, if the injury results in death, shall receive compensation as provided in ORS 656.202 to 656.238.'

By Oregon Laws 1957, ch. 718, ORS 656.202(1) was amended and now reads:

'If any workman, while subject to ORS 656.002 to 656.590 and in the service of an employer who is thus bound to contribute to the Industrial Accident Fund sustains an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, he or his beneficiaries, if the injury results in death, shall receive compensation as provided in ORS 656.202 to 656.206 and 656.208 to 656.234.'

And ORS 656.002(19) further provided by definition:

'An injury is accidental if the result is an accident, whether or not due to accidental means.'

This is a case of first impression under the changes effected by the 1957 amendments.

It is quite clear that the language used in amending ORS 656.202(1) was intended to enlarge the operation of the statute. The removal of the words 'caused by violent or external means' undoubtedly had as its purpose the bringing within the coverage of the act those workmen who, though doing an intentional act required by their employment, suffered an unintended injury because of some physiological weakness, but were excluded from the coverage of the act because the injury suffered was not caused by an external force. Burrows v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 209 Or. 352, 306 P.2d 395; Gottfried v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 168 Or. 65, 120 P.2d 970; Chalfant v. Arens et al., 167 Or. 649, 120 P.2d 219; Dondeneau v. State Industrial Acc. Com., 119 Or. 357, 249 P. 820, 50 A.L.R. 1129.

It should be noted also that prior to amendment ORS 656.202(1) employed this phrase 'sustains a personal injury by accident,' while as amended it reads 'sustains an accidental injury.' While this change is noted, in our opinion, these phrases are equivalent, they mean exactly the same thing.

An accident may, in general, be defined as 'an unlooked-for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed.' Fenton v. J. Thorley & Co., Ltd., (1903) AC 443, 448. See also Clover, Clayton & Co., Limited, v. Hughes, (1910) AC 242, 3 BWCC 775.

Prior to the 1957 amendment, in construing the word 'accident,' which was undefined, but qualified by the words 'violent or external means,' this court said:

'The word 'accident,' as used in the statute, is taken in its popular and ordinary sense. It denotes or includes any unexpected personal injury resulting to the workman in the course of his employment from any unlooked for mishap or occurrence. Speaking generally, an accident means any unintended and unexpected loss or hurt apart from its cause; and, if the cause is not known, the loss or hurt itself would certainly be called an accident. It is also used to denote both the cause and effect. If the result is such as follows from ordinary means voluntarily employed, in a not unusual or unexpected way, it can not be called a result effected by accidental means. Mut. Acc. Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100, 9 S.Ct. 755, 33 L.Ed. 60; Fenton v. Thorley, (1903) A.C. 443; Boyd, Workmen's Compensation, § 446.' Blair v. State Ind. Acc. Comm., 133 Or. 450, 454, 288 P. 204, 206.

It is to be noted, while the definition of 'accident' as used is broad enough to include both cause and effect, the sentence used and the citations set forth in Blair v. State Ind. Acc. Com., supra, leave no doubt but that the court intended to point out that to bring the workman within the act as then written the cause which produced the inquiry must be accidental. This is demonstrated in the opinion of this court in Demagalski v. State Ind. Acc. Comm., 151 Or. 251, 254, 47 P.2d 947, 948, where we stated:

'* * * this court is committed to the line of cases which hold that where an unusual or unexpected result occurs by reason of the doing by insured of an intentional act, where no mischance, slip, or mishap occurs in doing the act itself, the ensuing injury or death is not caused through accidental means; that it must appear that the means used was accidental, and it is not enough that the result may be unusual, unexpected, or unforeseen.'

The legislature in 1957 in amending the act and defining an accidental injury as:

'An injury is accidental if the result is an accident, whether or not due to accidental means.' ORS 656.002(9).

clearly intended to set aside the previous rule--that the cause of the injury must be accidental--and provide that any workman who undesignedly and unexpectedly suffered a hurt, without reference to whether the cause of the injury itself was accidental, was to be included within the orbit of the act, insofar as the act requires the injury to be by accident.

In a case such as the one before us, where the injury is caused by an internal as opposed to an external physical injury, the defendant contends, even though the result to the individual workman may be classified as accidental, usual exertion in the performance of routine duties which operate in a normal manner upon the physical powers of an individual do not meet the test of 'accidental injury' required in the act.

It is true the majority of the courts in this country bring into the definition of 'accident' the thought that some occurrence of an unusual nature must occur so that it can be said there has been an accident, but it appears to us that the reasoning of those courts cannot be applied under the definition used in our present statute, because the 'unusual occurrence' theory must logically be treated as a cause of the accident. Under the present statute there is no requirement that the injury itself be due to an accidental cause; it is sufficient, if, looking back from the injury, it can be said the workman suffered an accident.

In our opinion, the clear wording of the definition of an injury as 'accidental' as used in the amended statute is intended to dispose of this very problem which has been created in many courts in an attempt to draw difficult distinctions between usual and unusual strains placed upon the physical powers of the workman at his labors to discover an accidental cause. See 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law 516, Injury from usual exertion or exposure § 38.

Under the interpretation we place upon the present statute, we believe there can be little question but that the accidental element in the present statute was satisfied. Bennie C. Olson did not intend his sudden death, it was not expected nor designed, but was an unlooked for and unexpected event. There is no evidence the deceased had any prior knowledge that he was suffering from a heart condition which would cause him to suffer death from the slightest labor performed.

There is no question but that the injury arose in the course of the deceased's...