Omaha & Republican Valley Railway Company v. Brady

• Decision Date: 16 January 1894
• Docket Number: 4437
• Parties: OMAHA & REPUBLICAN VALLEY RAILWAY COMPANY v. GEORGE E. BRADY
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

57 N.W. 767

39 Neb. 27

OMAHA & REPUBLICAN VALLEY RAILWAY COMPANY v. GEORGE E. BRADY

No. 4437

Supreme Court of Nebraska

January 16, 1894

ERROR from the district court of Madison county. Tried below before POWERS, J.

Affirmed.

J. M Thurston, W. R. Kelly, and E. P. Smith, for plaintiff in error:

When the evidence given at the trial, with all the inferences which the jury could justifiably draw from it, is insufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff, so that such verdict, if returned, must be set aside, the court is not bound to submit the case to the jury, but may direct a verdict for the defendant. (Schofield v. Chicago & St. P R. Co., 114 U.S. 618; Parks v. Ross, 11 How. [U. S.], 372; Richardson v. Boston, 19 How. [U. S.] 269; Randall v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 109 U.S. 478; Furlong v. Garrett, 44 Wis. 111; Jones v Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 49 Wis. 352; Seefeld v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 70 Wis. 216; Atchison & N. R. Co. v. Loree, 4 Neb. 446; State Bank of Crete v. Smith, 29 Neb. 434.)

There is no statute requiring a flagman, and the judiciary cannot establish police regulations on their own judgment where the legislature has apparently considered none essential. (Hass v. Grand Rapids & I. R. Co., 47 Mich. 401; Peck v. Michigan C. R. Co., 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cases [Mich.], 257.)

Slight want of ordinary care on plaintiff's part will defeat his recovery, however gross the defendant's negligence may have been, provided it was not willful and malicious. Under the testimony the court should have directed a verdict for the defendant. (Randall v. Northwestern Telegraph Co., 54 Wis. 142; Beach, Contributory Negligence, sec. 162; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Schmidt, 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cases [Ind.], 248; McQuillikin v. Central Pac. R. Co., 2 P. [Cal.], 46; Kelly v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 8 A. [Pa.], 856; Dunning v. Bond, 38 F. 813; Freeman v. Duluth, S. S. & A. R. Co., 41 N.W. [Mich.], 875; Rigler v. Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co., 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cases [N. Car.], 386; Salter v. Utica & B. R. R. Co., 75 N.Y. 273; Weyl v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 40 Minn. 353; Rhoades v. Chicago & G. T. R. Co., 58 Mich. 266; Thompson v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 33 Hun [N. Y.], 16; Heffinger v. Minneapolis, L. & M. R. Co., 45 N.W. [Minn.], 1131.) It is negligence to unnecessarily drive horses known to be easily frightened in the vicinity of trains emitting steam and making the usual noise incident to their operation. (Pittsburgh Southern R. Co. v. Taylor, 104 Pa. St., 306; Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Stinger, 78 Pa. St., 219; Cosgrove v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cases [N. Y.], 35; Rhoades v. Chicago & G. T. R. Co., 25 N.W. [Mich.], 182; Campbell v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 51 Hun [N. Y.], 642; Stringer v. Frost, 19 N.E. [Ind.], 331.)

The book should have been admitted in evidence. (Van Every v. Fitzgerald, 21 Neb. 41; Schuyler Nat. Bank v. Bollong, 24 Neb. 823; Field v. Farrington, 10 Wall. [U. S.], 141; Xenia Bank v. Stewart, 114 U.S. 230; Randall v. Northwestern Telegraph Co., 54 Wis. 143; Smith v. Schulenberg, 34 Wis. 41.)

The jury should in every case distinctly understand what are the exact facts upon which experts base their opinions. The admission of testimony founded partially upon their memory of plaintiff's evidence was erroneous. (Luning v. State, 2 Pinney [Wis.], 215; Bennett v. State, 57 Wis. 83; Hunt v. Lowell Gas Light Co., 8 Allen [Mass.], 169; Kempsey v. McGinniss, 21 Mich. 123; Woodbury v. Obear, 7 Gray [Mass.], 467; Kreuziger v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 73 Wis. 164; Heald v. Thing, 45 Me. 392; Cincinnati & Firemen's Mutual Ins. Co. v. May, 20 O., 224; O'Leary v. Iskey, 12 Neb. 136; Morrill v. Tegarden, 19 Neb. 536.)

The verdict should be set aside on account of remarks, unsustained by any testimony, made by the plaintiff's attorneys in addressing the jury, and calculated and intended to affect the verdict. (Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 292; Tucker v. Henniker, 41 N. H., 317; State v. Smith, 75 N. Car., 306; Ferguson v. State, 49 Ind. 33; Hennies v. Vogel, 7 Cent. L. J. [Ill.], 18; Coble v. Coble, 79 N. Car., 589; Long v. State, 56 Ind. 186; Rudolph v. Landwerlen, 92 Ind. 34; Hall v. Wolf, 61 Iowa 559; Whitsett v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 67 Iowa 130; Baker v. Madison, 62 Wis. 137; Hanawalt v. State, 64 Wis. 84; Sasse v. State, 68 Wis. 530; Commonwealth v. Scott, 123 Mass. 239; Hatch v. State, 8 Tex. App., 416; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Bragonier, 13 Brad. [Ill.], 467; Rickabus v. Gott, 51 Mich. 227; Bedford v. Penny, 25 N.W. [Mich.], 381; People v. Quick, 25 N.W. [Mich.], 302; Cleveland Paper Co. v. Banks, 15 Neb. 20; Bradshaw v. State, 19 Neb. 644; Jacques v. Bridgeport Horse R. Co., 41 Conn. 61; Galveston, Harrisburg & S. A. R. Co. v. Kutac, 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cases [Tex.], 470; Galveston, H. & H. R. Co. v. Cooper, 70 Tex. 67; McCormick v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 47 Iowa 345; Moore v. State, 17 O. St., 526; Baker v. City of Madison, 62 Wis. 147; State v. Balch, 31 Kan. 465; Bremer v. Green Bay R. Co., 61 Wis. 114; Henry v. Sioux City & P. R. Co., 66 Iowa 52; Bullis v. Drake, 20 Neb. 167; Bullard v. Boston & M. R. Co., 5 A. [N. H.], 838; Dougherty v. Welch, 53 Conn. 558; Kreuzinger v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 73 Wis. 162; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Roy, 102 U.S. 451.)

The agreement between the plaintiff and his counsel for payment by the former to the latter of one-half of the judgment as compensation is champertous and contrary to public policy. Any agreement to pay part of the sum recovered, whether by commission or otherwise, on consideration either of money advanced to maintain a suit, or services rendered, or information given, or evidence furnished, comes within the definition of champerty. (2 Parsons, Contracts [5th ed.], 766; Stanley v. Jones, 7 Bing. [Eng.], 369*; Thurston v. Percival, 1 Pick. [Mass.], 415; Boardman v. Thompson, 25 Iowa 487; Cord v. Southwell, 15 Wis. 231.)

When it appears from the evidence that a suit is prosecuted under a champertous agreement the court should at once dismiss it. (Barker v. Barker, 14 Wis. 154; Webb v. Armstrong, 5 Humph. [Tenn.], 379; Morrison v. Deadrick, 10 Humph. [Tenn.], 342; Hunt v. Lyle, 8 Yerg. [Tenn.], 142.)

There was no proof that the damage, past or prospective, was the probable result of the accident, but only the possible result. This will not do. There must be facts laid before the jury from which they may say, not that it is the possible, but the probable result. (White v. Milwaukee City R. Co., 61 Wis. 536; Abbot v. Tolliver, 71 Wis. 64; Strohm v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 96 N.Y. 305; Gibbons v. Wisconsin V. R. Co., 58 Wis. 341.)

Wigton & Whitham, contra:

The court did not err in overruling the motion to instruct the jury, at the close of plaintiff's testimony, to find for defendant. This the court may do only when plaintiff has failed to introduce evidence tending to sustain each material allegation of his petition; and, in determining whether plaintiff has so failed, let us remember, as this court has repeatedly held, that "by the interposition of the motion the defendant admitted not only the truth of the evidence, but the existence of all the facts which the evidence conduces to prove as well as inferences to be drawn from it. The only question is whether all the material facts alleged in the petition have been supported by some evidence, however slight. It matters not how slight this evidence may have been, if any was produced the motion should have been overruled, because it is the right of a party to have the weight and sufficiency of his testimony passed upon by the jury." Plaintiff not only produced some evidence, but established, beyond question, that defendant was negligent in not keeping in good repair good and sufficient crossings. That the letting off of steam without warning was the direct cause of plaintiff's team taking fright and running is positively sworn to. The questions of negligence and contributory negligence were for the jury. (Smith v. Sioux City & P. R. Co., 15 Neb. 586; Johnson v. Missouri P. R. Co., 18 Neb. 696; Byrd v. Blessing, 11 O. St., 362; 1 Thompson, Negligence, p. 24; Hart v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 9 N.W. [Ia.], 116; Hart v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 7 N.W. [Ia.], 347; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Barnett, 59 Pa. St., 259; Gordon v. Boston & M. R. Co., 58 N. H., 396; Toledo, W. & W. R. Co. v. Harmon, 47 Ill. 298; Manchester, S. J. & A. R. Co. v. Fullarton, 14 C. B. [Eng.], 53; Culp v. Atchison & N. R. Co. 17 Kan. 475; Andrews v. Mason City & Ft. D. R. Co., 42 N.W. [Ia.], 42; Walker v. Boston & M. R. Co., 13 A. [N. H.], 649; City of Plattsmouth v. Mitchell, 20 Neb. 231; Stringer v. Frost, 19 N.E. [Ind.], 331; Burnett v. Burlington & M. R. R. Co., 16 Neb. 336.)

The ruling upon the objections to the testimony of the experts was without error. (Hunt v. Lowell Gas Light Co., 8 Allen [Mass.], 169; Wright v. Hardy, 22 Wis. 348; Getchell v. Hill, 21 Minn. 464; Negroes v. Townshend, 9 Md., 445; Gates v. Fleischer, 30 N.W. [Wis.], 674.)

In the argument of a cause error will lie only from the action of the court, and not from the language of counsel. (Bradshaw v. State, 17 Neb. 152; McLain v. State, 18 Neb. 163; Bohanan v. State, 18 Neb. 79; Bullis v. Drake, 20 Neb. 172.)

The agreement between the plaintiff below and his attorneys is valid and not champertous. (Blaisdell v. Ahern, 11 N.E. [Mass.], 681; Courtright v. Burnes, 13 F. 323 note; Phillips v. South Park Com'rs, 10 N.E. [Ill. ], 230; Winslow v. Central I. R. Co., 32 N.W. [Ia.], 330; Aultman v. Waddle, 19 P. Kan. 730.) Even if it were champertous, the defendant, not being a party to the contract, and this not being an action on the contract, could not raise the question or be relieved of any liability in this action because of it. (Courtright v. Burnes,...