Omar v. Harvey
| Decision Date | 13 February 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A. 05-2374 RMU.,Civ.A. 05-2374 RMU. |
| Citation | 416 F.Supp.2d 19 |
| Parties | Sandra K. OMAR et al., Petitioners, v. Francis J. HARVEY et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Susan L. Burke, Burke Pyle LLC, Philadelphia, PA, for Petitioners.
Edward H. White, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondents.
This matter is before the court on the petitioner's motion for a preliminary injunction. The petitioner is an American citizen seeking to enjoin his transfer from Camp Cropper, a detainee camp operated by the Multinational Force—Iraq, to the custody of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq ("CCCI"). Because this controversy presents serious, substantial and difficult questions that give rise to the petitioner's right to present proof to support his claims, because the likelihood the petitioner will suffer irreparable injury is high, and because the public interest strongly favors vigorous application of the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of United States citizens, the court grants the petitioner's motion for a preliminary injunction.
The petitioner is an American citizen held by the Multinational Force—Iraq ("MNF-I") since October 29, 2004. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Pet.") ¶ 2. The petitioner has not been charged with any crime.3 Id. On January 24, 2006, United States officials allegedly moved the petitioner from Camp Bucca to Abu Ghraib. Pet'r's Supplemental Br. in Supp. of Mot. for a TRO ( ) at 3. The petitioner is currently at Camp Cropper. Id. at 5. On February 2, 2006, the petitioner's attorneys received an e-mail from the respondents, United States military officials, stating that "a determination was previously made to refer his case to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq."4 Id. at 4.
Fearing the consequences of the petitioner's impending transfer to the custody of the CCCI, the petitioner's attorneys filed a motion for an ex parte temporary restraining order late in the evening of February 2, 2006. On February 3, 2006, the court granted that motion and issued a temporary restraining order valid until Monday, February 13, 2006. Pursuant to the court's order, the petitioner and the respondents submitted briefs addressing the factors for injunctive relief and the constitutional implications arising out of the exercise of judicial authority over the matter. Order Granting Ex Parte TRO (Feb. 3, 2006). The court now turns to the petitioner's motion for a preliminary injunction.
This court may issue interim injunctive relief only when the movant demonstrates:
(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) that it would suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) that an injunction would not substantially injure other interested parties, and (4) that the public interest would be furthered by the injunction.
Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1066 (D.C.Cir.1998) (quoting CityFed Fin. Corp. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 58 F.3d 738, 746 (D.C.Cir.1995)); see also World Duty Free Americas, Inc. v. Summers, 94 F.Supp.2d 61, 64 (D.D.C.2000). It is particularly important for the movant to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Cf. Benten v. Kessler, 505 U.S. 1084, 1085, 112 S.Ct. 2929, 120 L.Ed.2d 926 (1992) (per curiam). Indeed, absent a "substantial indication" of likely success on the merits, "there would be no justification for the court's intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial review." Am. Bankers Ass'n v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 38 F.Supp.2d 114, 140 (D.D.C.1999) (internal quotation omitted). In cases that raise questions "going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them fair ground ... for more deliberative investigation," however, courts should eschew an "exaggeratedly refined analysis of the merits at an early stage in the litigation." Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm'n v. Holiday Tours, 559 F.2d 841, 844 (D.C.Cir.1977). This is particularly true when the moving party seeks to maintain the status quo pending a final determination of the merits. Id.; see also Carabillo v. ULLICO Inc. Pension Plan and Trust, 355 F.Supp.2d 49, 53 (D.D.C. 2004).
The four factors should be balanced on a sliding scale, and a party can compensate for a lesser showing on one factor by making a very strong showing on another factor. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 406 F.3d 667 (D.C.Cir.2005) (citing City-Fed Fin. Corp., 58 F.3d at 747). "An injunction may be justified, for example, where there is a particularly strong likelihood of success on the merits even if there is a relatively slight showing of irreparable injury." CityFed Fin. Corp., 58 F.3d at 747.
Moreover, the other salient factor in the injunctive relief analysis is irreparable injury. A movant must "demonstrate at least `some injury" to warrant the granting of an injunction. CityFed Fin. Corp., 58 F.3d at 747 (quotation omitted). Indeed, if a party makes no showing of irreparable injury, the court may deny the motion for injunctive relief without considering the other factors. Id.
Because interim injunctive relief is an extraordinary form of judicial relief, courts should grant such relief sparingly. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972, 117 S.Ct. 1865, 138 L.Ed.2d 162 (1997). As the Supreme Court has said, lilt frequently is observed that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion." Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, although the trial court has the discretion to issue or deny a preliminary injunction, it is not a form of relief granted lightly. In addition, any injunction that the court issues must be carefully circumscribed and tailored to remedy the harm shown. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Yeutter, 918 F.2d 968, 977 (D.C.Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
As a legal matter, resolution of the petitioner's motion for a preliminary injunction and his underlying habeas petition centers on whether the petitioner is held in either physical or constructive custody of the respondents. The parties dispute whether the MNF-I, the entity that is technically holding the, petitioner in its custody, is an entity that is synonymous with, or a part of, the respondents, such that the petitioner is in the respondents' constructive custody. Concluding that the matter presents serious and difficult questions and that the risk of irreparable injury is high, the court rules that the petitioner meets the requirements for a preliminary injunction. The preliminary injunction factors are analyzed in turn below.
(1) Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The petitioner argues that he is likely to succeed on his underlying habeas petition because it is "well-established that prisoners held by the United States cannot be imprisoned without legal process." Pet'r's Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 16 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004)). The respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner cannot succeed on his underlying habeas petition because the court does not have jurisdiction to hear a habeas case when the respondents do not have custody of the petitioner. Resp'ts' Opp'n to Pet'r's Mot. for TRO ("Resp'ts' Opp'n") at 12. The respondents further argue that the court's involvement in this case violates the separation of powers5 between the judicial and executive branches of government. Id. at 21. The court addresses each of these arguments in turn.
The respondents describe the MNF-I as "an international coalition force, acting on behalf and at the request of a foreign government," and argue that they do not have custody of the petitioner. Id. at 3, 4. The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that, at the very least, he is in the constructive custody of the respondents. Pet'r's Reply at 4. Without resolving the factual dispute between the parties, the court determines that the case at bar "raise[s] questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them fair ground for litigation and thus for more deliberative investigation."6 Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d at 844.
A court's jurisdiction over a habeas petition rests on its jurisdiction over the petitioner's custodian. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 159 L.Ed.2d 513 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 478-79, 124 S.Ct. 2686, 159 L.Ed.2d 548 (2004). Where a court does not have actual jurisdiction over a habeas petitioner's custodian, a court may nonetheless have jurisdiction if the petitioner is held in the constructive custody of a respondent within the court's jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1) (); see also United States ex rel. Keefe v. Dulles, 222 F.2d 390, 392 (D.C.Cir. 1954) (); Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F.Supp.2d 28, 47 (D.D.C.2004) ().
In the instant case, the respondents argue that the petitioner cannot succeed on the merits of his underlying habeas petition because the court does not have jurisdiction over the entity that officially serves as the petitioner's custodian, the MNF-I. Resp'ts' Opp'n at 16. The respondents further assert that the "MNF-I...
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