Omni Outdoor Advertising of Missouri, Inc. v. City of Topeka, 59501
Decision Date | 27 March 1987 |
Docket Number | No. 59501,59501 |
Citation | 734 P.2d 1133,241 Kan. 132 |
Parties | OMNI OUTDOOR ADVERTISING OF MISSOURI, INC., Appellant, v. CITY OF TOPEKA, Appellee. |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. A trial court may consolidate a hearing on an application for a temporary injunction under K.S.A. 60-905 with a hearing on the merits of an injunction action, providing that the parties are given adequate, clear, and unambiguous notice of the consolidation, and no prejudice results.
2. In an action for a permanent injunction and other relief, when a hearing on an application for a temporary injunction was consolidated with trial on the merits without notice to the parties, prejudice and reversible error resulted.
T.L. Green, of Green and Howland, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Steven F. Kearney, of the same firm, and Dan Biles, of Gates & Clyde, Chartered, of Overland Park, were with him on the brief, for appellant.
Elsbeth D. Schafer, Asst. City Atty., argued the cause and was on the brief, for appellee.
This is an action for injunctive and declaratory relief, commenced by the plaintiff Omni Outdoor Advertising of Missouri, Inc., against the defendant, City of Topeka, arising out of the enactment on October 22, 1985, and the enforcement by the City of an ordinance regulating billboards. After a hearing on Omni's application for a temporary injunction, the trial court denied not only the temporary injunction sought, but denied plaintiff's prayer for declaratory and injunctive relief, and entered judgment against Omni on the merits. Omni appeals.
It first contends that the trial court erred in determining the action on its merits following a hearing on Omni's application for a temporary injunction. It argues that it was not provided with a trial on the merits of the action, and that this amounts to a denial of procedural due process. We will address only this issue, since we deem it dispositive of the appeal.
Omni is a Missouri corporation authorized to do business in Kansas. It is in the business of locating sites for, constructing, and selling advertising space on outdoor billboards. In 1985, it researched the existing Topeka City ordinances and the City's outdoor advertising market to evaluate the potential success of new outdoor advertising business in the area. Thereafter, it began to lease sites and to apply for sign permits under the then-existing Topeka billboard ordinance. In September and October 1985, Omni paid the required fees and the City issued to it permits for approximately 39 billboard locations. On October 15, the Mayor introduced a new billboard ordinance and the City Council enacted the new ordinance on October 22, 1985. The new ordinance repealed the earlier ordinance under which Omni's permits were issued. The new ordinance became effective upon publication on October 30, 1985.
The new ordinance contains the following provision:
"Permits which have been issued prior to the effective date of this ordinance shall become null and void after sixty days from the effective date of this ordinance unless work is commenced towards the completion of the structural elements of the sign." (Emphasis supplied.)
On November 5, 1985, the City notified Omni by letter that its existing permits would be void pursuant to the new ordinance if "substantial structural work is not completed within 60 days of the passage of the ordinance." On January 3, 1986, the City notified Omni by letter that 36 of its permits were cancelled. Omni contacted the City by phone and was advised that the City had inspected the site locations and was cancelling permits for all sites where the pipe to support the sign was not in place. Omni contends that this was the first notice it had that the City construed the language of the ordinance, "unless work is commenced towards the completion of the structural elements of the sign," to mean unless the pipe to support the sign has been installed. Omni immediately applied for an extension of time as allowed by the ordinance, but that request was summarily denied.
On January 14, 1986, the City issued a notice to Omni that it was in violation of the city code for constructing billboards without a valid permit, and on the same day the City filed suit against Omni in the municipal court of Topeka and secured an ex parte injunction enjoining Omni from further construction. The merits of that lawsuit are not before us.
On February 13, 1986, Omni commenced this action, alleging various constitutional infirmities in the ordinance and the enforcement thereof, and seeking declaratory relief and a temporary and permanent injunction. It filed an application for a restraining order pursuant to K.S.A. 60-903. Before proceeding further, we set forth the applicable statutes, K.S.A. 60-901, -902, -903, and -905:
Since we will refer later in this opinion to the federal rule governing the issuance of temporary injunctions (called preliminary injunctions), we quote it here for convenience. Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 65 reads:
Following a hearing on the motion for a restraining order at which time counsel for both parties appeared, the trial court granted a restraining order without bond until further order of the court. The order granting the restraining order concluded with the following language:
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff shall not be required to post a bond pending hearing on the corresponding temporary injunction." (Emphasis supplied.)
The matter was set for hearing. On March 13, 1986, the City filed its memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's request for preliminary injunctive relief. On March 14, plaintiff filed its memorandum in support of temporary injunction. The hearing was held on March 14. At the outset, the trial court announced: "We've called Omni Outdoor Advertising against the City, 86-CV-213, for hearing on the Application for Temporary and Permanent Injunctive Relief filed by the plaintiff." Both parties appeared by counsel. The only evidence before the court was a joint stipulation of the parties, detailing the city code, the new ordinance, letters exchanged between the parties, and the like; an affidavit of plaintiff's vice-president, Daniel L. Hardin; and copies of the motion for injunctive relief filed by the City in Municipal Court, and the order issued by that court. Throughout the hearing, counsel for the plaintiff and for the City referred to the hearing as one for preliminary injunction, and made statements such as: "by the time we get to the trial of the merits on this case" or "between now and the time for the permanent injunction hearing." Clearly, counsel did not catch the trial cour...
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