Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. v. Quintanilla

Decision Date17 October 2022
Docket Number05-19-01331-CV
PartiesONCOR ELECTRIC DELIVERY COMPANY LLC, Appellant v. VICTOR QUINTANILLA, OSCAR INTERIANO ROSALES, ANDACCIDENT FUND INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Appellees
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Before Justices Schenck, Osborne, and Partida-Kipness

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LESLIE OSBORNE, JUSTICE

A jury found appellant Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC (Oncor) negligent in connection with an incident where two excavation workers were electrocuted when a guy wire anchored in the location of a hole that the workers were excavating suddenly became energized. The workers sued Oncor, contending that Oncor was negligent by installing an insulator on the guy wire that was too short to prevent the guy wire from becoming energized when it sagged onto an electrified jumper. Oncor asserted, among other things, that the workers' claims were barred by Chapter 752 of the Texas Health and Safety Code because the workers were responsible for the work and failed to provide notice to and make mutual safety arrangements with Oncor before beginning the work. At trial, however, the jury made findings adverse to Oncor on its alleged Chapter 752 defense.

In five issues, Oncor challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence that Oncor was negligent; (2) whether the evidence conclusively established Oncor's alleged Chapter 752 defense, or whether the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's adverse findings on the defense; (3) whether the trial court erred by refusing to submit a general contractor's negligence and proportionate responsibility to the jury; (4) whether the trial court erred by refusing to include a certain instruction in the jury charge relating to Oncor's alleged Chapter 752 defense; and (5) whether the workers' counsel engaged in incurable improper jury argument. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

We draw the following facts from the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.

In July 2016, appellees Victor Quintanilla (Victor) and Oscar Interiano Rosales (Oscar) were working as excavation workers for Alvarenga Underground Construction, LLC (Alvarenga) when they sustained severe personal injuries from an electric shock. Alvarenga installs underground utilities such as fiber-optic and telephone cable. At the time of the incident Victor and Oscar were digging a hole for a road bore for utility services to cross under a road in a road-widening project.

Alvarenga was working as a subcontractor for Henkels &amp McCoy, Inc. (HMI). HMI had been hired as the general contractor by Frontier.[1]

The pit the men were digging was near a utility pole containing high voltage overhead lines. The pole was stabilized by a system of guy anchors in the ground that pulled tension on the guy wires attached to the top of the utility pole. The guy wire at issue was secured by a guy anchor that was located within the location of the pit that Victor and Oscar were digging. As Victor and Oscar dug the hole, they slowly removed dirt around the guy anchor, and the guy wire sagged down onto an electrified jumper coming around the utility pole. While Victor and Oscar were in the hole, the guy wire became energized, resulting in severe injuries to both men.

Oncor claimed ownership of the guy wire and guy anchor but not the utility pole. Oncor had constructed the guy-wire system in approximately 1986 to 1987. The two-foot insulator that Oncor installed on the guy wire, however, was too short to prevent the guy wire from becoming energized if the guy wire sagged and came into contact with the electrified jumper coming around the pole.

Victor and Oscar sued Oncor for negligence and gross negligence, alleging, inter alia, that Oncor owed the public, including Victor and Oscar, a duty to properly design and erect its equipment and that the insulator for the guy wire did not meet relevant design standards because it did not adequately protect against the guy wire's becoming energized.[2]

Oncor answered, asserting, inter alia, that it was entitled to statutory indemnification for all liability under § 752.008 of the Texas Health and Safety Code. It also alleged that Victor's and Oscar's damages were caused by their own negligence or the negligence of other third parties. Oncor moved to designate HMI and Alvarenga as responsible third parties, and the trial court granted both motions.

The case was tried to a jury. At the close of Victor and Oscar's case, Oncor moved for a directed verdict on appellees' gross-negligence and negligence claims and on certain elements of Oncor's alleged indemnity affirmative defense under Chapter 752. The trial court granted a directed verdict on appellees' gross-negligence claims but denied the remainder of the motion. After the close of all evidence, Oncor again moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied.[3]

At the charge conference, the trial court overruled Oncor's objections to (1) the charge's omission of HMI from the negligence and proportionate-responsibility questions and (2) the omission of certain instructions from a question purportedly pertaining to Oncor's indemnity defense under Chapter 752.

The jury returned a verdict finding Victor, Oscar, Alvarenga, and Oncor each negligent and apportioned responsibility as follows: Victor 2%; Oscar 1%; Alvarenga 49%; and Oncor 48%. The jury also made findings adverse to Oncor on its alleged indemnity defense under Chapter 752.

The trial court denied Oncor's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV motion). The trial court signed a final judgment against Oncor awarding Victor and Oscar damages and prejudgment interest totaling $532,072.72 and $870,861.08, respectively, plus postjudgment interest and court costs.[4] Oncor timely filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

On appeal, Oncor asserts the following five issues, some of which include subparts:

(1) There was factually and legally insufficient evidence of Oncor's negligence.
(2) Oncor proved as a matter of law that Victor's and Oscar's claims were barred by the doctrine of circular indemnity under Chapter 752 of the Texas Health and Safety Code in that Oncor proved Victor and Oscar (a) were responsible for the work and (b) were performing a function or activity that caused any part of a tool, equipment, machine, or material to be brought within six feet of a high voltage overhead line. Alternatively, the jury's answers to these two issues were so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that they were clearly wrong and unjust.
(3) The trial court erred by failing to include HMI, a responsible third party and the project's contractor, on the verdict form for determinations of negligence and proportionate responsibility.
(4) The trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that a person brings material within six feet of a high voltage overhead line for purposes of Chapter 752 if the person causes a material already within six feet of a high voltage overhead line to make physical contact with the high voltage overhead line or to come closer to the line.
(5) Appellees' counsel engaged in incurable jury argument by (a) misstating the law regarding a material already within six feet of an overhead line under Chapter 752 and (b) providing an invalid basis, not supported by the evidence, upon which the jury could have held Oncor liable for negligence.

For the reasons discussed below, we resolve all issues against Oncor.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support an adverse finding on which it did not have the burden of proof at trial, it must demonstrate there is no evidence to support the adverse finding. Exxon Corp. v Emerald Oil & Gas Co., L.C., 348 S.W.3d 194, 215 (Tex. 2011). In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005). We must credit favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder could and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Id. at 827. "The final test for legal sufficiency must always be whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review." Id.

A complaint that the evidence is legally insufficient will be sustained when (1) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (2) the court is barred by rules of law or evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital fact. Id. at 810. "Anything more than a scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding." Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng'rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex. 1998). There is more than a scintilla of evidence "when the evidence as a whole rises to a level enabling reasonable and fair-minded people to have different conclusions." Waste Mgmt. of Tex., Inc. v. Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc., 434 S.W.3d 142, 156 (Tex. 2014).

When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which it had the burden of proof, it must demonstrate on appeal that the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of the issue. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam). When reviewing a "matter of law" challenge, we must first examine the...

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