One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Stamford

• Citation: 337 Conn. 806,256 A.3d 151
• Decision Date: 25 January 2021
• Docket Number: SC 20393
• Parties: ONE ELMCROFT STAMFORD, LLC v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF the CITY OF STAMFORD et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut

337 Conn. 806

256 A.3d 151

ONE ELMCROFT STAMFORD, LLC

v.ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF the CITY OF STAMFORD et al.

SC 20393

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 21, 2020

Officially released January 25, 2021^*

Gerald M. Fox III, Stamford, Fairfield County, for the appellants (defendant Pasquale Pisano et al.).

Jeffrey P. Nichols, Milford, with whom were Amy E. Souchuns and, on the brief, John W. Knuff, Milford, for the appellee (plaintiff).

William Tong, attorney general, Clare E. Kindall, solicitor general, and Jane R. Rosenberg, assistant attorney general, filed a brief for the state of Connecticut as amicus curiae.

Robinson, C. J., and D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.

KAHN, J.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the suitability analysis mandated by General Statutes (Rev. to 2003) § 14-55¹ is still required in order to obtain a certificate of approval of the location for a used car dealership, notwithstanding the fact that subsequent revisions of the General Statutes list that provision as having been repealed. The plaintiff, One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC, filed an administrative appeal challenging the decision of the defendant Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Stamford to grant a certificate of approval of the location for a used car dealership run by the defendants Pasquale Pisano and Pisano Brothers Automotive, Inc.² After the trial court rendered judgment denying the administrative appeal, the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed the trial court's judgment. See One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals , 192 Conn. App. 275, 277–78, 217 A.3d 1015 (2019). The defendants, following our grant of certification, now appeal to this court. On appeal, the defendants claim that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that § 14-55 continues to carry the force of law. In response, the plaintiff contends that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that § 14-55 was not repealed by a sequence of contradictory public acts relating to that statute that were passed by the legislature in 2003. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that § 14-55 has been repealed and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

We begin with a brief review of the various statutes and public acts passed by our legislature that are relevant to our consideration of this appeal. General Statutes (Rev. to 2003) § 14-54 provides in relevant part: "Any person who desires to obtain a license for dealing in or repairing motor vehicles shall first obtain ... a certificate of approval of the location for which such license is desired from the selectmen or town manager of the town, the mayor of the city or the warden of the borough, wherein the business is located or is proposed to be located, except in any city or town having a zoning commission and a board of appeals, in which case such certificate shall be obtained from the board of appeals. ..."

Standards related to the issuance of such certificates were originally outlined by the legislature in § 14-55. General Statutes (Rev. to 2003) § 14-55 provides in relevant part: "In any town, city or borough the local authorities referred to in section 14-54 shall, upon receipt of an application for a certificate of approval referred to in said section, assign the same for hearing within sixty-five days of the receipt of such application. ... No such certificate shall be issued until the application has been approved and such location has been found suitable for the business intended , with due consideration to its location in reference to schools , churches , theaters , traffic conditions , width of highway and effect on public travel ." (Emphasis added.)

Two public acts passed by the General Assembly during the 2003 legislative session relating to § 14-55 are at issue. First, No. 03-184, § 10, of the 2003 Public Acts (P.A. 03-184), which passed the second house of the legislature on June 2, 2003, expressly repealed § 14-55 without providing a replacement.³ Second, No. 03-265, § 9, of the 2003 Public Acts (P.A. 03-265), which passed the second house of the legislature only two days later, purported to amend § 14-55 by appending two new sentences to the previously existing language.⁴

Neither P.A. 03-184 nor P.A. 03-265 referred to the other, and both were assigned an effective date of October 1, 2003.⁵ The legislature passed no further public acts with respect to § 14-55 after 2003.⁶

In 2005, the Legislative Commissioners’ Office, pursuant to the legislative directive set forth in General Statutes § 2-56 (g), completed a biennial revision of our state's laws that cited the public acts previously described in this opinion and expressly listed § 14-55 as repealed. This revision was ultimately ratified by the legislature. See General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 14-55 ; see also Public Acts 2005, No. 05-12, § 1 (P.A. 05-12) ("Volumes 1 to 13, inclusive, of the general statutes of Connecticut, revised to 1958, consolidated, codified, arranged and revised to January 1, 2005, by the legislative commissioners under the provisions of subsection (g) of section 2-56 of the general statutes and published under the title ‘The General Statutes of Connecticut, Revision of 1958, Revised to January 1, 2005’, including the consolidation, codification, arrangement and revision of the public acts of the state from 1959 through 2004, inclusive, are adopted , ratified , confirmed and enacted ." (Emphasis added.)).⁷

Against this legislative backdrop, we turn to the following relevant facts and procedural history relating to this particular case. On June 1, 2016, the defendants filed an application with the Department of Motor Vehicles seeking a license to operate a used car dealership at 86 Elmcroft Road in the city of Stamford. On July 14, 2016, Pisano also filed an application with the board seeking a certificate of approval of the location for the dealership as required by statute. See General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 14-54, as amended by Public Acts 2016, No. 16-55, § 4. The board held a public hearing on September 14, 2016. Although two neighboring residents appeared at the hearing to voice their opposition to the request, the plaintiff, a commercial entity that owns an adjacent parcel, did not appear before the board to oppose the application. After that hearing, the board voted unanimously to approve that application with various conditions.⁸

The plaintiff subsequently commenced this administrative appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 14-57 and pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183 of the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, claiming, inter alia, that the board improperly failed to conduct the suitability analysis mandated by § 14-55 in granting a certificate for the approval of the location. After briefing and oral argument from the parties, the trial court issued a memorandum of decision, denying the plaintiff's appeal. Although the trial court agreed with the plaintiff that the board was required to consider the suitability factors set forth in § 14-55, it concluded, after its own examination of the record, that the board had given due consideration to the suitability of the defendants’ proposed use. The plaintiff subsequently appealed from the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court, claiming, inter alia, that the board had failed to conduct the suitability analysis mandated by § 14-55 and that the trial court had improperly searched beyond the board's stated findings to cure that deficiency. One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals , supra, 192 Conn. App. at 278, 217 A.3d 1015.

The Appellate Court first looked to General Statutes § 2-30b (a) to resolve the conflict between P.A. 03-184 and P.A. 03-265. Id., at 285–87, 217 A.3d 1015. Section 2-30b (a) provides in relevant part: "When two or more acts passed at the same session of the General Assembly amend the same section of the general statutes, or the same section of a public or special act, and reference to the earlier adopted act is not made in the act passed later, each amendment shall be effective except in the case of irreconcilable conflict, in which case the act which was passed last in the second house of the General Assembly shall be deemed to have repealed the irreconcilable provision contained in the earlier act ...." Citing State v. Kozlowski , 199 Conn. 667, 676, 509 A.2d 20 (1986), the Appellate Court concluded that § 2-30b "applies to all acts which expressly change existing legislation ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals , supra, 192 Conn. App. at 287, 217 A.3d 1015. The Appellate Court concluded that, pursuant to § 2-30b, P.A. 03-184 and P.A. 03-265 were irreconcilable amendments to the same statute and that P.A. 03-265 should be given effect because it was passed by the second house of the General Assembly two days after P.A. 03-184. Id.

After reaching this conclusion, the Appellate Court turned to the question of whether the board had given "due consideration to [the proposed] location in reference to schools, churches, theaters, traffic conditions, width of highway and effect on public travel" as required by § 14-55. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 292, 217 A.3d 1015. The Appellate Court answered that question in the negative, concluding that, "[a]lthough the board heard evidence that, to some extent, could pertain to suitability, and also issued several conditions of approval that accommodate[d] potential concerns within the neighborhood, the board issued no findings as to the suitability factors enumerated under § 14-55."⁹ Id., at 293, 217 A.3d 1015. As a result, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case with direction to sustain the plaintiff's appeal. Id., at 293, 296, 217 A.3d 1015. We thereafter granted the defendants’ petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that...