Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, New York

• Citation: 217 F.Supp.2d 292
• Decision Date: 29 August 2002
• Docket Number: No. 70-CV-35.,70-CV-35.
• Parties: THE ONEIDA INDIAN NATION OF NEW YORK; the Oneida Indian Nation of Wisconsin; and the Oneida of the Thames, Plaintiffs, v. THE COUNTY OF ONEIDA, NEW YORK, and the County of Madison, New York, Defendants.
• Court: United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of New York

217 F.Supp.2d 292

THE ONEIDA INDIAN NATION OF NEW YORK; the Oneida Indian Nation of Wisconsin; and the Oneida of the Thames, Plaintiffs, v. THE COUNTY OF ONEIDA, NEW YORK, and the County of Madison, New York, Defendants.

No. 70-CV-35.

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

August 29, 2002.

Cravath Swaine Law Firm, New York City, Thomas D. Barr, of Counsel, Zuckerman Spaeder Law Firm, Attorneys for Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, Washington, D.C., William W. Taylor, of Counsel.

Arlinda Locklear, Jefferson, MD, for Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin.

Paul Weiss Law Firm, Attorneys for Plaintiff Oneida of The Thames Council, New York City, Carey R. Ramos, of Counsel.

Nixon Peabody Law Firm, Attorneys for County of Oneida, New York & County of Madison, New York, Rochester, NY, G. Robert Witmer, Jr., of Counsel.

AMENDED MEMORANDUM & DECISION & ORDER

MCCURN, Senior District Judge.

Introduction

Through a series of treaties between 1795 and 1846, the State "divest[ed] the Oneidas¹ of all but a few hundred acres[]" of their extensive land holdings in central New York. See Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Oneida County, 719 F.2d 525, 529 (2d Cir.1983) ("Oneida IV"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, on other grounds, 470 U.S. 226, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 84 L.Ed.2d 169 (1985) ("Oneida V"). On February 5, 1970, the Oneidas commenced the present action which is commonly referred to as the test case. This case was deemed the "test" case because it involves a mere 872 of the approximately 100,000 acres of the Oneida reservation which had been created by the 1795 treaty, and the Oneidas are seeking very limited damages—the fair rental value of that property for only two years—1968 and 1969.

During the course of more than 30 years of litigation, this case has twice been before the Supreme Court. In Oneida Indian Nation v. Oneida County, 414 U.S. 661, 94 S.Ct. 772, 39 L.Ed.2d 73 (1974) ("Oneida II"), the Supreme Court unanimously held that federal courts have jurisdiction over land claims because Indian title is a matter of federal law. Once that jurisdictional barrier was removed, in 1977 United States District Judge Edmund Port unequivocally held that the Oneidas had "established a claim for violation of the Non-intercourse Act[.]" Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida, 434 F.Supp. 527, 548 (N.D.N.Y.1977) ("Oneida III"). Reasoning that otherwise the Non-intercourse Act would "be rendered nugatory," Judge Port "concluded that the [Oneidas'] right of occupancy and possession to the land in question was not alienated[.]" Id. (footnote omitted). Thus, "[b]y the deed of 1795, the State acquired no rights against the [Oneidas]; consequently, its successors, the defendant counties, are in no better position." Id.

With liability resolved, in 1981, Judge Port held a separate damages hearing finding that Madison County was liable to the Oneidas for $9,060.00, which represents two years of damages for that County's unlawful occupancy of the Champlain Battleground Park ("the Park") and the land upon which a radio tower is situated. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum on the Good Faith Issue ("Pl.Memo."), exh. 1 thereto (Tr. (10/05/81)) ("Pl.exh. 1") at 172a. Judge Port further held that Oneida County was liable to the Oneidas for $7,634.00, which represented the two years of damages which the Oneidas sustained as a result of that County's unlawful occupation of the gravel pit. See id. at 173a. Judge Port also ordered the Counties to pay interest on those damages awards at a rate of six percent per annum from January 1, 1968, "adopting New York Law of Interest as it relates to claims and [j]udgments against counties[.]" Id. at 174a. In 1983, the Second Circuit affirmed on the issue of liability "but remand[ed] for further proceedings on the calculation of damages." See Oneida IV, 719 F.2d at 527.

The Supreme Court, in 1985, in its second Oneida opinion, affirmed the Counties' liability, expressly holding "that the Oneidas can maintain this action for violation of their possessory rights based on federal common law." Oneida V, 470 U.S. at 236, 105 S.Ct. at 1252. In Oneida V the Supreme Court removed many procedural barriers to this land claim litigation, further holding that the Oneidas' federal common law claims for violation of their possessory rights were not barred by the statute of limitations, laches, abatement, ratification or the doctrine of justiciability. See id. at 240-50, 105 S.Ct. at 1254-60. On remand from the Supreme Court, consistent with Oneida IV, the Second Circuit reaffirmed Judge Port's liability finding, and "remand[ed] for further proceedings to determine the good faith claims of the Counties as they bear on any set-off for improvements made on the property, and for recomputation of damages[.]" Doc. # 23 (Second Circuit Mandate (4/4/85) at 2).

Following remand, in June, 1985, the present action was reopened and reassigned to this court. In early 1986, pursuant to the court's directive, the parties submitted proposals as to how this matter should proceed on remand. After considering those proposals, the court ordered the parties to file memoranda of law and fact concerning, among other things, "the good faith claims of the defendant Counties and the legal standards to be applied by the court in making a decision relative thereto." Doc. # 28 (7/17/86 Order) at 2. At that time the court held in abeyance the presentation of any additional evidence. See id. In the fall of 1986, the parties filed those submissions but in early 1987 they requested a stay pending settlement negotiations, and the court granted that request.

After nearly a decade of unproductive settlement efforts, in 1998 the court lifted that stay and held a status conference. During that conference, the court allowed the parties to "supplement[]" their prior, 1986 submissions. See Doc. # 48 (Tr. 9/2/98) at 25. That has now been done, with the filing of additional memoranda of law and augmentation of the record with additional exhibits.

Background

Assuming familiarity with the lengthy and circuitous history of this historic litigation, the court sees no need for an exhaustive review of the same at this juncture.² However, because the present action is now before this court explicitly for "clarification of the issue of good faith[,]" vis-a-vis defendants' improvements to the subject property, and to recalculate the damages for highway lands, see Oneida IV, 719 F.2d at 542, it is necessary to review in some detail both Judge Port's 1981 decision on damages, as well as the damages aspect of Oneida IV.

I. Judge Port's Decision

In rendering his decision on damages, Judge Port opined that his 1977 Oneida III decision that the Counties were liable to the Oneidas, "was of much greater importance in the context of the entire [land claim] problem than the number of dollars that happened to be awarded." Pl. exh. 1 at 156a. While that may be so, after more than three decades of litigation the parties still are arguing about the amount of the damage award.

Part of the difficulty is that the 1793 Nonintercourse Act did not "establish a comprehensive remedial plan for dealing with violations of Indian property rights[;]" nor did it "address directly the problem of restoring unlawfully conveyed land to the Indians[.]" See Oneida V, 470 U.S. at 237 and 239, 105 S.Ct. at 1253 and 1254 (citation omitted). And even though the Supreme Court's two Oneida decisions opened federal courts to Indian land claims, those decisions gave no guidance in terms of the relief which should be awarded. Perhaps this lack of guidance is why the parties have taken "extreme positions" regarding damages in this case. Pl. exh. 1 at 159a.

In accordance with Oneida II, the parties agree that the court must apply the federal common law, but "[t]hey differed greatly[,]" and still do, as to how to fashion that common law. See id. The parties agree that "the principal objective ... should be the vindication of Federal preeminence in Indian affairs[.]" Id. at 160a. The Oneidas maintain that "vindication requires awarding the highest possible damages as rent computed on the basis of the occupied land with the improvements as they existed in 1968 and 1969[,]" and with the profits derived therefrom. See id. at 160a (emphasis added). The Counties' supposed bad faith is the fundamental premise supporting this claimed entitlement to such "large damages[.]" See id. at 166a. On the other end of the spectrum, the Counties' posit that vindication requires that the Oneidas recover "no relief whatsoever[.]" See id. at 160a (internal quotation marks omitted).

Quoting from Gilbert and Sullivan's "The Mikado," when fashioning the relief herein, Judge Port attempted to "`let the punishment fit the crime.'" See id. at 166a.³ In so doing, Judge Port recognized the limited power of district courts to "refashion[] what appears to be existing law by reason of contemporary times or conditions." Id. at 164a. "That luxury," Judge Port noted, "resides solely in the Supreme Court of the United States." Id.

Struggling admirably with the parties' divergent damage theories, Judge Port began his analysis by acknowledging the applicability of a federal common law, and further "recogniz[ing] that good faith is not a defense to a common-law action for damages for unlawful use and occupancy of land." Id. at 161a; and 164a (emphasis added). Judge Port was equally quick to point out though that "even under the oldest cases [the common-law recognized that] a good-faith occupier [of land] was permitted to offset the value of the improvements against the damages[.]" Id. at 166a (citing Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 21 U.S. 1, 5 L.Ed. 547 (1823)). The Oneidas maintained that because the State was not a good faith occupier of the land due to its violation of the Nonintercourse Act, then the Counties, as "successors in the chain of title to the State[,]" also could not be deemed good faith occupiers. See id....