O’Neil v. Town of Woodbridge
| Decision Date | 07 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | NNHCV166060577S |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
| Parties | Scott O’NEIL v. TOWN OF WOODBRIDGE |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
The issue presented is whether the court should grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s one-count complaint on the grounds that there is no genuine issue of material fact that (1) the plaintiff cannot set forth a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) the Town had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for ending the plaintiff’s employment; and (3) the plaintiff failed to establish the defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons are a pretext for discriminatory animus. For the reasons set forth below the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.
On February 23, 2016, the plaintiff, Scott O’Neil (O’Neil) filed a one-count complaint against the defendant, Town of Woodbridge (the Town) for regarded as disabled discrimination in violation of General Statutes § 46a-60(a) et seq., the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA). The complaint alleges the following facts. The plaintiff has congenital nystagmus. On September 3, 2013, the defendant hired the plaintiff as a police officer, fully aware of the plaintiff’s condition. To become a police officer for the Town, the plaintiff successfully passed eye and medical examinations to enroll in the State Training Police Academy (the Academy); graduated from the Academy; was medically cleared to work as a police officer; became firearm qualified; passed the tactical driving class; and, underwent field training.
The complaint further alleges the following. Certain employees regard and/or perceive the plaintiff as being disabled and this mind set has negatively affected their judgment when evaluating the plaintiff’s abilities and job performance. Despite the plaintiff performing the essential functions of his job and passing all medical examinations including eye exams, in an attempt to dispel all concerns, the plaintiff underwent eye surgery in December 2014. Thereafter, the defendant made the decision to terminate the plaintiff’s employment, which became effective on March 31, 2015. At the time of the plaintiff’s termination, the defendant had no medical evidence that showed the plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of his job. Certain officers placed great emphasis on the plaintiff’s ability to read license plates on moving vehicles and were critical of the plaintiff’s performance in that regard. The defendant never informed the plaintiff that reading license plates of moving cars was an essential function of the job. The defendant has no written job description or any other document identifying and describing that an essential duty of a police officer is to be able to read license plates of moving cars at certain speeds, nor did the defendant provide the plaintiff with a written performance standard regarding the reading of license plates.
The complaint further alleges that the defendant, by and through its agents and/or employees, violated CFEPA on the basis of regarding the plaintiff as disabled in the following ways the Town interfered with the plaintiff’s privilege of employment; the Town treated O’Neil different when compared to similarly situated employees; the Town discriminated against O’Neil which adversely affected his status as an employee; the Town terminated O’Neil’s employment; the Town intentionally discriminated against O’Neil; and the Town refused to rescind its decision to terminate O’Neil’s employment. These actions allegedly exhibit ill will, malice, improper motive, and/or reckless indifference to the plaintiff’s civil rights and O’Neil has suffered damages including loss of income and benefits, and sustained emotional pain, suffering, embarrassment, mental anguish and impairment of his personal and professional reputation. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
The plaintiff filed charges against the Town with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO) on June 2, 2015, and subsequently received a release of jurisdiction from the CHRO on November 25, 2015.
The defendant filed an answer and special defense on April 15, 2016. On August 11, 2016, the plaintiff filed a reply, denying the defendant’s special defenses. On April 17, 2017, the defendant filed its motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s one-count complaint and a memorandum of law in support with exhibits. The plaintiff filed his memorandum in opposition with exhibits on August 8, 2017. The defendant filed a reply memorandum on August 22, 2017. On September 11, 2017, the plaintiff filed a surreply in opposition. The matter was heard at short calendar on September 11, 2017.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cefaratti v. Aranow, 321 Conn. 637, 645, 138 A.3d 837 (2016). " In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court’s function is not to decide issues of material fact ... but rather to determine whether any such issues exist." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) RMS Residential Properties, LLC v. Miller, 303 Conn 224, 233, 32 A.3d 307 (2011). " [I]ssue-finding, rather than issue-determination, is the key to the procedure." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DiMiceli v Cheshire, 162 Conn.App. 216, 222, 131 A.3d 771 (2016). " A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case ... The facts at issue are those alleged in the pleadings ... The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Recall Total Information Management, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 147 Conn.App. 450, 456, 83 A.3d 664 (2014), aff’d, 317 Conn. 46, 115 A.3d 458 (2015).
The defendant moves for entry of summary judgment based on three grounds. First, the defendant argues it is entitled to summary judgment as the plaintiff cannot set forth a prima facie case of regarded as disabled discrimination; the plaintiff was not qualified for the position of patrol officer as he could not perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodations, and the plaintiff was not terminated under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Second, the defendant argues that it had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating the plaintiff’s employment, namely his inability to ameliorate ongoing performance deficiencies. Finally, the defendant argues that the plaintiff has failed to establish that the defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons are a pretext for discriminatory animus. For these reasons, the defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s complaint because the plaintiff cannot set forth a prima facie case of regarded as disabled discrimination pursuant to CFEPA and that claims alleging disability discrimination are subject to the burden-shifting analysis outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).
The plaintiff, in his opposition, argues that genuine issues of material fact exist and that the defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The plaintiff argues that the sole question is whether a reasonable juror could conclude that the plaintiff would have been retained as a police officer if he were not regarded as disabled, and everything else remained the same. The plaintiff’s position is that an inference of discrimination can be made when the defendant subjected him to disparate treatment and treated him less favorably than a similar situated officer. The plaintiff also argues that this case does not fit neatly into the McDonnell Douglas framework because the defendant, by and through one of its training officers, Officer Monaco (Monaco), the defendant believed the plaintiff was disabled and that the alleged disability prevented the plaintiff from performing the police officer job. The plaintiff, in his memorandum of opposition, declares that for this reason he will not use the McDonnell Douglas framework and proceeds to use comparator evidence as the means to show an inference of discrimination, never mentioning the alternative test under Connecticut law, the mixed-motive/Price Waterhouse framework.
General Statutes § 46a-60 provides in relevant part: " (a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) For an employer, by the employer or the employer’s agent, except in the case of a bona fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual ... because of the individual’s race, color religious creed, age, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, national origin, ancestry, present or past history of mental disability, intellectual disability, learning disability or physical disability ..." In this case, the plaintiff’s CFEPA claims are based on disparate treatment. " [D]isparate treatment ... refers to those cases where certain individuals are treated differently than others ... The principal inquiry of a disparate treatment case is whether the plaintiff was subjected to different treatment because of his or her...
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