Onondaga Landfill Systems, Inc. v. Williams

• Decision Date: 29 January 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-CV-1637.,84-CV-1637.
• Citation: 624 F. Supp. 25
• Parties: ONONDAGA LANDFILL SYSTEMS, INC., Joseph R. Tripoli and Mary E. Tripoli, Plaintiffs, v. Henry G. WILLIAMS, Individually, and as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, and Richard J. Brickwedde, Individually, and as Regional Attorney for the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

624 F. Supp. 25

ONONDAGA LANDFILL SYSTEMS, INC., Joseph R. Tripoli and Mary E. Tripoli, Plaintiffs, v. Henry G. WILLIAMS, Individually, and as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, and Richard J. Brickwedde, Individually, and as Regional Attorney for the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, Defendants.

No. 84-CV-1637.

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

January 29, 1985.

Obold Burstein & McGowan (Alan S. Burstein, Robert A. Barrer, Syracuse, N.Y., of counsel), for plaintiffs.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., Environmental Protection Bureau of State of New York (Douglas L. Ward, Asst. Atty. Gen., Albany, N.Y., of counsel), for defendants.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

McCURN, District Judge.

Presently before the court is defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint and plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. For the reasons discussed below, the court grants dismissal and denies summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Onondaga Landfill Systems, Inc. (OLSI), Joseph R. Tripoli, and Mary E. Tripoli are the owners and operators of a sanitary landfill in Onondaga, New York. They purchased the landfill from a previous owner and began operations in 1977. In December, 1978, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) held a public hearing on OLSI's permit applications to operate and expand the landfill. The Administrative Law Judge found that OLSI's operations did not satisfy the requirements of 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 360.8 and expressed particular concern that the landfill posed a threat to the groundwater. By order dated August 31, 1979, the Commissioner of the DEC denied OLSI's permit applications and ordered the landfill closed. The Commissioner found that the landfill site was "fundamentally unsuited" for a sanitary landfill and the operation was not "reasonably capable of ... full compliance with 6 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 360." On May 27, 1981, the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court, Fourth Department, affirmed the Commissioner's decision. Onondaga Landfill Systems, Inc. v. Flacke, 81 A.D.2d 1024, 440 N.Y.S.2d 135 (4th Dep't 1981). The New York Court of Appeals subsequently denied OLSI permission to appeal.

In July, 1981, the DEC brought an action in New York State Supreme Court to enforce the Commissioner's August, 1979, order. On July 26, 1982, Supreme Court Judge John Balio ordered the plaintiffs' landfill closed on or before October 31, 1985. Until that time, plaintiffs are permitted to operate the facility. The State court has retained jurisdiction over the landfill and has appointed a receiver to oversee the landfill's operation and closure.

Judge Balio's order provides in pertinent part:

ORDERED, that the receiver shall have the authority and responsibility to supervise defendant's compliance with 6 NYCRR Part 360 for interim landfill operations and shall have the further authority subject to approval of the Court, to employ an engineer to render expert assistance on environmental issues and advise the receiver on policy matters, particularly with respect to the development, submission, and implementation of a closure plan; and it is further

ORDERED, that the defendant OLSI and its President, JOSEPH TRIPOLI, shall continue to own, possess, and operate subject landfill, provided however, that said defendant, its officers and employees shall abide by all supervisory directives of the receiver concerning operation in compliance with 6 NYCRR Part 360 and such other powers and directives hereinafter set forth; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Commissioner and his employees, aside from routine field inspections, shall communicate directly with the receiver and/or his designee, concerning compliance with environmental regulations; and it is further ...

ORDERED, that the receiver shall report not less infrequently than monthly to the Court on the general status of landfill operations, closure plan preparation, closure, and receivership activities; ....

In July, 1984, the DEC began inspecting plaintiffs' landfill on a "twice daily" basis pursuant to New York Environmental Conservation Law (ECL) § 3-0301(2)(g)¹ and 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 360.1(j)². Plaintiffs claim that the DEC's inspections constituted permanent monitoring resulting in a violation of their constitutional rights. According to plaintiffs, the DEC's inspector arrived daily in the morning, left for lunch, and returned in the afternoon. Prior to July, 1984, the DEC inspected the landfill for approximately one hour, once or twice a month. Plaintiffs contend that this is the normal rate of inspection at other area landfills.

On November 5, 1984, plaintiff Joseph Tripoli ordered the DEC's inspector to leave the landfill and not return. The DEC applied to the New York State Supreme Court for a search warrant but later withdrew its application. The parties subsequently stipulated to once-a-week inspections.

Plaintiffs filed their federal complaint against the DEC's Commissioner and Regional Attorney on November 26, 1984. The complaint alleges that ECL § 3-0301(2)(g) and 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 360.1(j) are unconstitutional on their face and as applied. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment and damages.

On January 3, 1985, the state defendants and the Town of Onondaga, plaintiff-intervenors in the state action, applied to New York State Supreme Court Judge Balio for an order to show cause enjoining plaintiffs from interfering with the DEC's inspections of the landfill and awarding civil penalties against plaintiffs for violating 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 360.1(j). The order is returnable in the State Supreme Court on February 1, 1985. As a result, the validity of the statute and regulation at issue in the present action is now also pending before the state court.

In this federal action, the state defendants have moved for dismissal. Plaintiffs have cross moved for partial summary judgment on the facial constitutionality of both ECL § 3-0301(2)(g) and 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 360.1(j). For convenience, the court will hereafter refer to both the statute and regulation in question as "the statute", but will mean both.

ABSTENTION

The state defendants argue that this court should dismiss plaintiffs' federal action on grounds of abstention. Recent United States Supreme Court and Second Circuit decisions reveal that abstention is not favored and is the exception rather than the rule. See e.g. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984); Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976); Giardina v. Fontana, 733 F.2d 1047 (1984). In Colorado River Water Conservation District the Supreme Court stated:

Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule. `The doctrine of abstention, under which a District Court may decline to exercise or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it. Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justified under this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the state court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest.' County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89, 79 S.Ct. 1060, 1063, 3 L.Ed.2d 1163, 1166 (1959). `It was never a doctrine of equity that a federal court should exercise its judicial discretion to dismiss a suit merely because a State court could entertain it'. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n. v. Southern R. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 361, 71 S.Ct. 762, 774, 95 L.Ed. 1002, 1015 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result).

Colorado River Water Conservation District, 424 U.S. at 813-14, 96 S.Ct. at 1244.

The Supreme Court has identified three categories of cases where abstention is appropriate:

Roughly, the three categories of abstention are: (1) avoiding a federal constitutional issue by seeking a state determination of state law; (2) deferring to state resolution of difficult state law questions that involve important public policy or where federal review would be disruptive of state regulation or administration; and (3) declining to restrain state criminal proceedings, collection of state taxes and the like. See Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. at 814-16, 96 S.Ct. at 1244-45.

Giardina, 733 F.2d at 1052 n. 1. Federal courts in the Eastern District of New York and the District of Maryland have noted that:

The various abstention doctrines are more distinct in theory than in actual practice. They overlap and mix together to form the basis for abstention in particular cases. This is especially true in cases challenging in federal court state attempts to implement local land use policy.

Northeast Mines, Inc. v. Town of Smithtown, 584 F.Supp. 112, 113 (E.D.N.Y.1984), quoting Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F.Supp. 455, 461 (D.Md.1978). In the court's opinion this action is the exceptional case where abstention is appropriate. In fact, all three categories of abstention are applicable.

PULLMAN ABSTENTION

The first category of abstention was established in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941). The Supreme Court has explained that:

Federal courts should abstain from decision when difficult and unsettled questions of state law must be resolved before a substantial federal constitutional question can be decided. By abstaining in such cases, federal courts will avoid both unnecessary adjudication of federal questions and `needless friction with state policies....'

Hawaii Housing Authority, 467 U.S. at ___, 104 S.Ct. at 2327, interpreting Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500, 61 S.Ct. 643, 645, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941). Pullman abstention is appropriate where: (1) a state statute is unclear or an issue of...