Onukogu v. N.J. State Judiciary Essex Vicinage
| Docket Number | A-3536-20 |
| Decision Date | 01 May 2023 |
| Parties | CHIDI ONUKOGU, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY STATE JUDICIARY ESSEX VICINAGE, CAROL LYEW-GILES, ERROL CAMPBELL, ORETHA ONIYAMA, and AMY DEPAUL, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
Argued October 26, 2022
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division Middlesex County, Docket No. L-0413-18.
Theodore Campbell argued the cause for appellant (Law Offices of Theodore Campbell, attorneys; Theodore Campbell, of counsel and on the brief).
James M. Duttera, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Eric Intriago, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Before Judges Accurso, Vernoia and Firko.
In this employment disability discrimination and retaliation case plaintiff Chidi Onukogu appeals from an October 28, 2020 order granting partial summary judgment to defendants New Jersey State Judiciary, Essex Vicinage, Carol Lyew-Giles, Errol Campbell, Oretha Oniyama, and Amy DePaul. Plaintiff also appeals from a July 2, 2021 order granting defendants' motion for reconsideration of that portion of the October 28, 2020 order denying their motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims in the complaint and granting defendants summary judgment on those claims. Based on our de novo review of the record, the parties' arguments, and the applicable legal principles, we affirm the orders, albeit for reasons different than those of the motion court.
Prior to addressing the facts relied on by the parties in support of their arguments on appeal, we note that "[w]e review de novo the trial court's grant of summary judgment, applying the same standard as the trial court." Abboud v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 450 N.J.Super. 400, 406 (App. Div. 2017). This standard mandates the grant of summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories[,] and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c).
In our review of a summary judgment record, we limit our determination of the undisputed facts to those properly presented in accordance with Rule 4:46-2. Under the Rule:
"[A] party opposing a motion for summary judgment [must] 'file a responding statement either admitting or disputing each of the facts in the movant's statement.'" Ibid. (quoting R. 4:46-2(b)). "[A]ll material facts in the movant's statement which are sufficiently supported will be deemed admitted for purposes of the motion only, unless specifically disputed by citation conforming to the requirements of paragraph (a) demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue as to the fact." R. 4:46-2(b).
Rule 4:46-2's requirements are "critical" and "entail[] a relatively undemanding burden . . . ." Housel v. Theodoridis, 314 N.J.Super. 597, 604 (App. Div. 1998). They were "designed to 'focus [a court's] . . . attention on the areas of actual dispute' and [to] 'facilitate the court's review' of the motion." Claypotch, 360 N.J.Super. at 488 (quoting Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1.1 on R. 4:46-2 (2003)). As such, a court must decide a motion for summary judgment based only upon the "factual assertions . . . that were . . . properly included in the motion[s] [for] and [in opposition to] . . . summary judgment" pursuant to Rule 4:46-2. Kenney v. Meadowview Nursing & Convalescent Ctr., 308 N.J.Super. 565, 573 (App. Div. 1998); see also Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 549 (2011) (Rivera-Soto, J., dissenting) (). Thus, we will consider only "those [properly included] factual assertions" on appeal and rely solely on the undisputed facts established by the parties' Rule 4:46-2 statements. See Kenney, 308 N.J.Super. at 573.
We have considered the Rule 4:46-2 statements of the parties and find the following facts are undisputed.[1] Because this appeal requires our review of a summary judgment award, we consider the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the party opposing the summary judgment motion. Richter v. Oakland Bd. of Educ., 246 N.J. 507, 515 (2021). Plaintiff's Employment and Disciplinary History Prior to 2015
In 2000, plaintiff began his employment with the Judiciary in the Essex Vicinage. The Judiciary terminated plaintiff's employment effective January 27, 2017. During the entire tenure of his employment, plaintiff worked as a Financial Specialist 1 for the Essex Vicinage. In 2003, plaintiff signed an annual performance advisory received from his then-supervisor, defendant Errol Campbell. In his comments to the advisory, plaintiff in part thanked Campbell "for helping [him] in the areas [he] needed improvement."
In 2005, plaintiff's subsequent direct supervisor, Michelle Okuzu, provided plaintiff with a performance assessment advisory that in part noted that plaintiff lacked an understanding of the Essex Vicinage's and Administrative Office of the Court's policies and procedures. Plaintiff responded in part by claiming he was subject to unspecified harassment, harsh supervision, and mistreatment under Okuzu. The performance assessment advisory also stated, "it was discussed and agreed that this would be [plaintiff's] last chance since if this assignment did not work out, [plaintiff] would be removed from the Finance Division" and that plaintiff "understood the ramifications of not working to his capacity under his current title[.]"
In January 2014, plaintiff received a Preliminary Notice of Major Disciplinary Action (PNDA) charging he violated judicial policies and directives by failing to report to his supervisor that he received a notice to appear in court in connection with his then-pending divorce case. Plaintiff explained his failure to report the scheduled court appearance to his supervisor, stating and claiming his failure to report the court appearance was "obviously due to the divorce . . . ."
Represented by his collective negotiations unit's shop steward, plaintiff resolved the charge in the PNDA. In February 2014, plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement and release with the Judiciary, accepting a one-day suspension and agreeing the "suspension may be used in the future by the Vicinage for purposes of progressive discipline."
In April 2015, plaintiff scheduled a vacation to Nigeria, with a designated date of May 6, 2015 for his return to work. Plaintiff later testified at his deposition that, on May 5 2015, while on his way to the airport in Nigeria for his return flight home, he was hit by a bus and rendered unconscious. Plaintiff claimed he was rushed to a hospital where he regained consciousness on May 12 or 13, called his then-supervisor, Jack Dunne, and told Dunne "I'm down" but could not otherwise speak because he "lost [his] voice . . . ." Plaintiff further testified that, after the call with Dunne, he lost consciousness again and did not "regain [his] full strength . . . until about seven weeks later[,]" in the last week of June or first week in July. That is when plaintiff first contacted the Essex Vicinage's human resources representatives to advise them of what had occurred.
Defendant Oniyama was plaintiff's human resources manager at the Essex Vicinage.[2] In July 2015, Oniyama's office issued a PNDA charging plaintiff with job abandonment because he did not return to work as scheduled from his approved vacation, he remained absent from work, and he had not been in contact with the Judiciary either directly or through his emergency contact since failing to return to work when scheduled.
Following the issuance of the July 2015 PNDA, plaintiff's collective negotiations unit's representative contacted plaintiff about the disciplinary charge, but plaintiff testified he again lapsed into a coma for several weeks. Later, while still in Nigeria, plaintiff submitted to the Essex Vicinage a medical note dated August 19, 2015, written by his doctor in Nigeria, and a temporary disability form, as proof of his medical condition. The Judiciary then granted plaintiff medical leave retroactive from May 5, 2015, until October 30, 2015.
On October 28, 2015, plaintiff produced a second note from his doctor in Nigeria requesting extended medical leave. The note stated: In a letter, the Essex Vicinage's human resources representatives denied plaintiff's request for extended...
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