Ooms v. Ooms

• Decision Date: 01 November 1972
• Citation: 164 Conn. 48,316 A.2d 783
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Katrina OOMS et al. v. Theodora OOMS et al.

Page 783

316 A.2d 783

164 Conn. 48

Katrina OOMS et al. v. Theodora OOMS et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Nov. 1, 1972.

William J. Egan, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, was Basil R. Duncan, New Haven, for appellants (plaintiffs).

John C. Flanagan, New Haven, for appellee (named defendant).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and RYAN, SHAPIRO, LOISELLE and MacDONALD, JJ.

MacDONALD, Associate Justice.

This was an action by the named plaintiff, an unemancipated minor, and her father to recover damages for injuries suffered when she was struck by a motor vehicle while crossing a street. One of the defendants, the named defendant, was the named plaintiff's mother who, it was claimed, caused the child's injuries by reason of her negligent operation of the family car in which the named plaintiff had been riding as a passenger immediately prior to the accident. As a special defense the defendant mother pleaded the doctrine of parental immunity and moved for summary judgment alleging that the named plaintiff's injuries did not result from her negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle and that, consequently, § 52-572c of the General Statutes, which abrogates immunity suits between parent and unemancipated child in motor vehicle negligence actions, did not apply.

The basic facts, as set forth in the pleadings, are undisputed and indicate that on July 28, 1968, the named plaintiff, then almost four years of age and residing with her parents, was riding as a passenger on the right front seat of an automobile operated by her mother, the named defendant, in a northerly direction on West Prospect Street, a public highway in the city of New Haven; that the named defendant stopped her automobile in a traveled lane of the highway and permitted the named plaintiff to leave the automobile and cross the highway alone; that while the named plaintiff was crossing the highway she was struck by another motor vehicle being operated in a southerly direction on said highway, thereby suffering the injuries complained of. These facts were substantially confirmed by the affidavit filed by the named defendant in support of her motion for summary judgment and by the defendant's answer to the complaint and were not placed in issue by the counter affidavit filed in behalf of the plaintiffs.

In appealing from summary judgment rendered on the named defendant's motion, the plaintiffs contend, inter alia, that the doctrine of parental immunity for negligence is obsolete in our present-day society and should be totally abrogated. This doctrine was discussed and reaffirmed in Begley v. Kohl & Madden Printing Ink Co., 157 Conn. 445, p. 449, 254 A.2d 907, p. 910, where we stated: 'For a long period of time, it has been the law in this state that an unemancipated minor cannot maintain an action for negligence against his parent. Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 82, 145 A. 753. . . . (p. 450, 254 A.2d p. 910) To permit such actions is against sound public policy.' In reaffirming the doctrine we restated...