Oppel v. Giles, NNHCV165036426

• Decision Date: 03 January 2019
• Docket Number: NNHCV165036426
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Kent OPPEL et al. v. Carlton GILES, Chairman of Board of Pardons and Parole

Kent OPPEL et al. v. Carlton GILES, Chairman of Board of Pardons and Parole

No. NNHCV165036426

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New Haven, New Haven

January 3, 2019

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

OZALIS, J.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The parties in this action are the plaintiffs Kent H. Oppel (Oppel) and Joseph Savanelli (Savanelli) and the defendant Carlton Giles, Chairman of the Connecticut Board of Pardons and Parole (Giles).

On January 29, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a three-count complaint against the defendant, alleging that the Connecticut Board of Pardons and Parole (the Board) violated General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), when it created fifteen standard conditions of parole, each one of which constitutes a "regulation" for purposes of the UAPA, without following the rule-making procedures required pursuant to the UAPA. Compl., ¶ 17. The plaintiffs further allege that each of the standard conditions of parole interfere with or impair, or threaten to interfere with or impair, their right to remain at liberty on parole in violation of General Statutes § 4-167(b), the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution as well as the Constitution of Connecticut, article first, § § 8, 20. Compl., ¶ 18. The plaintiffs further allege that the standard conditions of parole each interfere with or impair, or threaten to interfere with or impair, the plaintiffs’ legal right or privilege to retain sentence reduction credit earned in accordance with General Statutes § 18-7 and/or § 18-7(a) in violation of General Statutes § 4-167(b), the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution as well as the Constitution of Connecticut, article first, § § 8, 20. Compl., ¶ 19.

The plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment declaring that "(a) The Connecticut Board of Pardons and Parole is an ‘agency’ as ‘defined under § 4-166(1) of the Connecticut General Statutes in that it is ‘authorized by law’ to [adopt] ‘such rules and regulations’ as it deems necessary for the release of inmates on parole pursuant to § 54-126 of the Connecticut General Statutes; (b) the Board has exercised its discretionary authority to adopt such rules and regulations as it deems necessary for the release of inmates on parole in the form of a Parole Agreement specifying fifteen standard conditions of parole having the force of law at future administrative proceeding; (c) the Parole Agreement in general, and each standard condition of parole in particular is a ‘regulation’ [as] defined under § 4-166(15) of the Connecticut General Statutes in that it is a statement of general applicability, without regard to its designation that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy having the force of law at future administrative proceedings held to determine whether the plaintiff has violated one or more of the standard conditions of parole; and (d) the Parole Agreement in general, and the fifteen standard conditions of parole in particular, has been formulated, adopted, and approved by the Board in violation of the rule-making procedure mandated under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act and, therefore, said fifteen standard conditions of parole are, as a matter of law, unenforceable against the plaintiff(s) and may not be invoked by the Board, its agent(s) or employee(s) for any purpose." Pl.’s Complaint pp. 4-5.

On May 24, 2016, the plaintiffs filed the present motion for summary judgment as to Counts One, Two, and Three of the Complaint, asserting that because there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in dispute, "they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law as to the applicability of the UAPA to the Board and whether the Board has formulated, adopted, and approved regulations in the form of conditions of parole in violation of the UAPA rule-making requirements." Pls.’ Mot. pp. 8-9. The plaintiffs argue that the parole conditions constitute regulations because they will have a substantial impact on the rights and obligations of individuals regulated by the agency. Pls.’ Mot. p. 6. Further, they argue that said conditions are regulations because they are substantive rules that establish standards of conduct with the force of law. Pls.’ Mot. p. 7.

On August 7, 2018, the defendant filed an objection to the motion for summary judgment, arguing that a number of genuine issues of material facts remain in dispute, related to, and including, the issue of whether or not the plaintiffs are aggrieved, and thus whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.

Argument was held on this Motion for Summary Judgment and the objection thereto on October 1, 2018.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

"Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ... The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried ... However, since litigants ordinarily have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by a jury ... the moving party for summary judgment is held to a strict standard ... of demonstrating his entitlement to summary judgment." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534-35, 51 A.3d 367 (2012). "[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way ... [A] summary disposition ... should be on evidence which a jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve and which would require a directed verdict for the moving party ... [A] directed verdict may be rendered only where, on the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the trier of fact could not reasonably reach any other conclusion than that embodied in the verdict as directed." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 815, 830 A.2d 752 (2003). "The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law ... and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact ... A material fact ... [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809, 821, 116 A.3d 1195 (2015).

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

As a preliminary matter, this court must address whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the action. The defendant raises the issue of lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the objection to the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the defendant argues that certain material facts exist, including but not limited to, whether the plaintiffs are aggrieved, whether the plaintiffs have suffered any actual injury from the alleged harm, and whether or not the alleged harm is too remote and speculative as to deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. It is well established that where a party raises the issue of lack of jurisdiction, the court has to "fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420, 429, 541 A.2d 1216 (1988).

The Appellate Court has stated that the fact a "plaintiff has no liberty interest that would allow him to file a habeas petition ... does not prevent him from pursuing a request for a declaratory judgment pursuant to General Statutes § 4-175." Vincenzo v. Chairman, Board of Parole, 64 Conn.App. 258, 263, 779 A.2d 843 (2001). In Vincenzo, after a parole revocation proceeding, a prisoner filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment (1) that the board of parole was an agency within the meaning of the UAPA; (2) that the conditions of parole contained within the parole agreement were board regulations; and (3) that the regulations were invalid because the board did not enact them in accordance with the rule-making procedures of the UAPA. Id., 259. The court in Vincenzo, while not expressing an opinion as to whether the prisoner had met the requirements for bringing a declaratory judgment action pursuant to General Statutes § 4-175; see Vincenzo v. Chairman, supra, 263, n.2 (noting that this court expresses "no opinion as to whether those conditions have been met in this case"); ruled that a declaratory judgment claim brought pursuant to § 4-175 could be raised "[a]s long as a request for a declaratory ruling has first been filed ... and as long as the conditions enumerated in § 4-175 for the filing of a declaratory judgment action have been met." Id., 263.

General Statutes § 4-175(a) provides, in relevant part, that where "a provision of the general statutes, a regulation or a final decision, or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or privileges of the plaintiff, and if an agency (1) does not take an action required by subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of subsection (e) of section 4-176, ^[1] within sixty days of the filing of a petition for a declaratory ruling, (2) decides not to issue a declaratory ruling under subdivision (4) or (5) of subsection (e) of said section 4-176, ^[2] or (3) is deemed to have decided not to issue a declaratory ruling under subsection (i) of said section 4-176, ^[3] the petitioner may seek in the Superior Court a...