Orange Unified School Dist. v. Rancho Santiago Community College Dist.

• Decision Date: 27 March 1997
• Docket Number: No. B095944,B095944
• Citation: 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 778,54 Cal.App.4th 750
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 117 Ed. Law Rep. 682, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3084, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5347 ORANGE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. RANCHO SANTIAGO COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 778

62 Cal.Rptr.2d 778

54 Cal.App.4th 750, 117 Ed. Law Rep. 682,

97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3084,

97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5347

ORANGE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. RANCHO SANTIAGO COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. B095944.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

March 27, 1997.

Ruiz & Schapiro, Celia M. Ruiz, Priscilla S. Carson and William M. Quinn, Jr., San Francisco, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff, Tichy & Mathiason, Richard J. Currier, El Cajon, and Susan J. Boyle, San Diego, for Defendant and Respondent Rancho Santiago Community College District.

Parker, Covert & Chidester, Spencer E. Covert and Michael Y. Toy, Tustin, for Respondent

North Orange County Community College District.

Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, Silvia M. Diaz, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Dana T. Cartozian, Deputy Attorney General, for Defendants and Respondents Board of Governors of California Community Colleges and Chancellor of California Community Colleges.

Joseph R. Symkowick, General Counsel, and Michael E. Hersher, Deputy General Counsel, for Respondent California Department of Education.

Liebert, Cassidy & Frierson and Mary L. Dowell, Los Angeles, for Respondent Mount San Antonio Community College District.

No appearance for State Board of Education, Superintendent of Public Instruction, State Controller, Department of Finance and Director of Finance.

SPENCER, Presiding Justice.

INTRODUCTION

Six unified school districts appeal from an order of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrers of three community college districts and granted a judgment on the pleadings to the Chancellor and the Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges. ¹ We affirm.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On July 27, 1994, appellants filed a second amended petition for a writ of mandate in which they sought an order directing the community college respondents to not operate adult education programs in violation of Education Code sections 8530 through 8533 during the 1994-1995 academic year and beyond, to not seek funding apportionments for programs operated in contravention of the mutual agreement requirements of the law and to transfer the programs described by Education Code sections 8530 and 8531 to appellants, along with the funding for those programs. Appellants also sought to compel the Chancellor and the Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges to cease budgetary calculations and certifications based on the community college respondents offering of these courses. Finally, they sought to compel these respondents and the state Board of Education to resolve differences among the parties in reaching mutual agreements.

Appellants allege they offer adult education programs as provided for in Education Code sections 8530 through 8531. They have an exclusive right to offer adult basic education and high school diploma programs and a qualified right to provide adult vocational training and continuing education. Appellants allege they cannot obtain funding for additional courses due to "[s]tate-funding caps on new programs." They could obtain funding through the community colleges' transfer of existing programs and the concomitant funding. Appellants further allege there are no existing mutual agreements with the community college respondents that cover their adult education programs. While there were agreements in the past, those agreements have terminated.

In 1994, legal counsel for the Chancellor of the California Community Colleges and for the state Department of Education rendered opinions interpreting Education Code sections 8530 through 8538. These opinions supported appellants' view of the matter.

On November 18, 1994, before ruling on the demurrers, the trial court ordered the state boards to attempt a resolution of the dispute. Mediation efforts failed, after which the matter returned to the court. On March 30, 1995, the court sustained without leave to amend the community college respondents' demurrers. Two months later, the Chancellor and Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges moved for judgment on the pleadings. In their view, the court's ruling on the demurrers resolved all questions concerning their legal obligations. The remaining state respondents joined in the motion. The court granted the motion and dismissed from the action "all remaining respondents."

CONTENTIONS

I

Petitioners contend the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrers of the community college districts.

II

Appellants additionally contend the trial court erred in granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings of the Chancellor and the Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges.

DISCUSSION

Preliminarily, we consider whether the appeal is timely insofar as it challenges the sustaining of the demurrers. The trial court sustained the community college respondents' demurrers without leave to amend but did not, at that time, dismiss the action as to these respondents. Thereafter, the court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings of the Chancellor and the Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges. At the same time, the court dismissed from the action "all remaining respondents." Appellants timely appealed from this order.

The community college respondents argue that the appeal is not timely as to the order sustaining the demurrers, in that the order implicitly dismissed them from the action. The later order dismissing "all remaining respondents," they assert, applied only to the state respondents.

The problem with the community college respondents' argument is that an order sustaining a demurrer is not appealable. It may be reviewed only on appeal from a subsequent order of dismissal. (I.J. Weinrot & Son, Inc. v. Jackson (1985) 40 Cal.3d 327, 331, 220 Cal.Rptr. 103, 708 P.2d 682; Hill v. City of Long Beach (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1684, 1695, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 125.) While this court may save a premature appeal by deeming an order sustaining a demurrer to incorporate a judgment of dismissal (Nowlon v. Koram Ins. Center, Inc. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1440-1441, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 683), we will not use this device to defeat an appeal. There is only one order dismissing parties from this action, the order of July 12, 1995, granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing from the matter "all remaining respondents." It matters not that the state respondents requested this dismissal; inasmuch as the community college districts still were respondents at that point, the order applied to them. In short, appellants' appeal is timely as to the sustaining of the demurrers.

I

Appellants contend the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrers of the community college districts. We disagree.

In determining the merits of a demurrer, all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those which arise by reasonable implication, but not conclusions of fact or law, are deemed admitted by the demurring party. (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 638, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 152, 871 P.2d 204; Interinsurance Exchange v. Narula (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1143, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 752.) On appeal, we do not review the validity of the trial court's reasoning but only the propriety of the ruling itself. (Lee v. Bank of America (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 914, 919, 267 Cal.Rptr. 387; Mayflower Ins. Co. v. Pellegrino (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1326, 1332, 261 Cal.Rptr. 224.)

The question presented here is purely one of law. It is a matter of statutory interpretation only.

Statutes must be construed with reference to the entire statutory scheme of which they are a part (People v. Comingore (1977) 20 Cal.3d 142, 147, 141 Cal.Rptr. 542, 570 P.2d 723) so as to harmonize their effect in conformity with legislative intent (Landrum v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 1, 12, 177 Cal.Rptr. 325, 634 P.2d 352; California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 844, 157 Cal.Rptr. 676, 598 P.2d 836). Insofar as it is possible to do so, seemingly conflicting or inconsistent statutes will be harmonized so as to give effect to each. (See Fuentes v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 1, 7, 128 Cal.Rptr. 673, 547 P.2d 449.) When, however, conflicting statutes cannot be reconciled, the later enactments supersede the earlier ones. (City of Petaluma v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 284, 288, 282 P.2d 43; cf. People v. McCaskey (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 411, 415, 216 Cal.Rptr. 54.)

In interpreting a statute, a fundamental rule is that the court must " 'ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.' [Citations.] In determining the intent, the court 'turns first to the words themselves for the answer.' [Citation.] [p] The words must be read in context, ' "keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear." ' [Citation.] In ascertaining the legislative intent, courts should consider not only the words used, but 'the object in view, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history [and] public policy....' [Citation.]" (People v. Aston (1985) 39 Cal.3d 481, 489, 216 Cal.Rptr. 771, 703 P.2d 111.) Finally, the courts will accord great weight to an administrative agency's construction of pertinent statutes, generally departing from such a construction only if it clearly is erroneous or unauthorized. (Simplicity Pattern Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1980) 27 Cal.3d 900, 905, 167 Cal.Rptr. 366, 615 P.2d 555; Culligan Water Conditioning v. State Bd. of Equalization (1976) 17 Cal.3d 86, 93, 130 Cal.Rptr. 321, 550 P.2d 593.)

Appellants based their petition for a writ of mandate and request for declaratory relief on the language of a small constellation of Education Code provisions, sections 8510 through 8538. Education Code sections 8500 through 8538 comprise the...