Orban v. State Automobile Association

Decision Date20 November 1956
Docket NumberNo. 1874.,1874.
Citation127 A.2d 143
PartiesNatalie ORBAN, Appellant, v. The STATE AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Appellee.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

John S. Mears, Washington, D. C., with whom Bond L. Holford and Donald J. Caulfield, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellant.

William E. Stewart, Jr., Washington, D. C, with whom Richard W. Galiher and William J. Donnelly, Jr., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee

Before ROVER, Chief Judge, and HOOD and QUINN, Associate Judges.

QUINN, Associate Judge.

Natalie Orban, appellant here, sued one Rucker in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in 1952 to recover damages for personal injuries sustained while a passenger in his automobile. Judgment was entered in her favor on November 10, 1955, in the sum of $2,250. At the time of the accident Rucker, a nonresident, carried a liability insurance policy with The State Automobile Association (hereinafter called the Association). Pursuant to its terms, the Association was to defend, settle or dispose of all suits, and pay all judgments to the limits of the policy. When it refused to satisfy the judgment against Rucker, appellant filed suit in the Municipal Court.

A summons and a copy of the complaint were served on the Superintendent of Insurance of the District of Columbia on June 13, 1956, and, in due course, they were received by the Association's home office in Des Moines, Iowa. On June 28, 1956, the Association appearing specially filed a motion to quash service of process, supported by affidavits alleging that it had neither appointed the Superintendent of Insurance as its agent for service of process, nor authorized such appointment; that it did not transact business in the District of Columbia; that it did not solicit, sell, or write insurance on any resident of the District of Columbia through the medium of the United States mails; and that therefore the service was ineffective and contrary to law. While this motion was pending, an alias summons and complaint were served on the Director of Vehicles and Traffic of the District of Columbia.

At the hearing on the motion it was stipulated that argument might be presented on the question of validity of service on both of these officials. The motion to quash was granted and this appeal followed. However, in bringing this appeal appellant apparently has abandoned her position on the question of validity of service on the Superintendent of Insurance since she has not assigned it as error, nor has she argued the point in her brief. Accordingly, our opinion is limited to the validity of service on the Director of Vehicles and Traffic.

A much clearer picture will be presented if we first discuss, very briefly and generally, some of the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act of the District of Columbia1 which became effective May 25, 1955. The Act requires that a driver must file a report if he is involved in an accident in the District of Columbia which results in personal injury, death, or property damage in excess of $100. It also requires a security deposit, but excepts from this requirement a driver or owner who has in effect at the time of the accident an automobile liability policy or bond covering the vehicle involved.2

Section 19(b) of the Act makes ineffective a policy or bond with respect to any vehicle not registered in the District of Columbia or registered elsewhere at its effective date or the most recent renewal thereof, unless the insurance or surety company issuing it is authorized to do business in the District; or if the company is not so authorized, "unless it shall execute a power of attorney authorizing the Commissioners to accept service on its behalf of notice or process in any action upon such policy or bond arising out of such accident."

Section 55 of the Act provides that a. nonresident may give proof of financial responsibility (for the future) by filing with the Commissioners a written certificate of an insurance carrier authorized to transact business in the state in which his vehicle is registered, provided the certificate otherwise conforms to the provisions of the Act;. and the Commissioners shall accept the same upon condition that (1) the insurance carrier execute a power of attorney authorizing the Commissioners to accept on its. behalf service of notice or process in any action arising out of a motor vehicle accident in the District of Columbia; and (2) the insurance carrier agree in writing that such policies shall be deemed to comply with the laws of the District of Columbia relating to the terms of motor vehicle liability policies issued therein.

Section 83 provides that the Act shall not apply with respect to any accident, or judgment arising therefrom, or violation of the motor vehicle laws of the District of Columbia occurring prior to its effective date.

It appears that subsequent to the Act's effective date and before the Association filed a power of attorney with the Commissioners, another policyholder of the Association was involved in a collision in the District of Columbia, as a result of which the Association's board of directors executed a resolution and power of attorney dated June 11, 1955, and filed them with the administrator of the Act prior to November 1, 1955. The statement of proceedings and evidence reveals that an employee of the administrator's office was prepared to testify that the Association qualified under the Act from the date of receipt of such papers. The resolution of the board of directors provided in part as follows:

"Whereas The State Automobile Insurance Association of Des Moines, Iowa may desire to file with the Director of Vehicles and Traffic of the District of Columbia, a written certificate of insurance as proof of financial responsibility of one or more of its policyholders under Section 19 of Public Law 365, 83rd Congress, known as the Motor Vehicles Safety Responsibility Act of the District of Columbia,

"And Whereas it is necessary for the said The State Automobile Insurance Association to make several agreements and representations to enable the Director of Vehicles and Traffic to accept such proof,

"Therefore, Be It Resolved By the Board of Directors * * *

"1. That the Vice President and Treasurer of the Automobile Underwriters, Inc., Des Moines, Iowa, be and hereby are authorized to execute a power of attorney constituting and appointing the Director of Vehicles and...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • Boisse v. Miller
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Superior Court
    • August 8, 2013
    ... ... well as town, state, and federal regulatory approvals. The ... parties also submitted ... Id. (citing Orban v. State Automobile ... Ass'n , 127 A.2d 143, 146 (D.C. 1956)) ... ...
  • Boisse v. Miller
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Superior Court
    • August 8, 2013
    ...instrument is to be construed strictly, without enlarging its language through broad interpretation. Id. (citing Orban v. State Automobile Ass'n, 127 A.2d 143, 146 (D.C. 1956)). Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim arising out of the Second Purchase and Sale Agreement must fail pursuant to ......
  • Ricci v. Cappelluzzi
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • December 11, 1959
    ...in the instant case, these instruments are to be construed strictly and are not to be enlarged by construction. Orban v. State Automobile Ass'n, D.C.Mun.App., 127 A.2d 143; Bergman v. Dykhouse, 316 Mich. 315, 25 N.W.2d 210. And there is authority holding that such instruments are to be cons......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT