Orchard v. Alexander Pierce v. Frace, s. 192 and 193

• Citation: 15 S.Ct. 635,157 U.S. 372,39 L.Ed. 737
• Decision Date: 01 April 1895
• Docket Number: Nos. 192 and 193,s. 192 and 193
• Parties: ORCHARD v. ALEXANDER. PIERCE v. FRACE
• Court: United States Supreme Court

157 U.S. 372

15 S.Ct. 635

39 L.Ed. 737

ORCHARD

v ALEXANDER.

PIERCE

v. FRACE.

Nos. 192 and 193.

April 1, 1895.

While these two cases differ in their particular facts, they agree in the questions involved, and for convenience may be considered together. As the opinion of the supreme court of the state of Washington was filed in the second case, the special facts of that will be stated. The action was commenced in the district court of the territory of Washington, sitting in and for the county of Pierce.

The complaint alleged that the plaintiff was the owner and entitled to the possession of a certain described tract or parcel of real estate situate in the county of Pierce, and prayed judgment for the recovery of possession, together with rents, issues, and profits.

The answer, beyond a general denial, set up by way of equitable defense that on December 20, 1880, the land described in plaintiff's complaint was unoccupied, unappropriated public land of the United States, and that on that day the plaintiff filed his declaratory statement therefor under the preemption laws of the United States; that on February 13, 1883, he made his final proof, and on March 12, 1883, his cash entry was allowed by the register and receiver of the local land office; that on August 7, 1883, the defendant filed in the office of the commissioner of the general land office, and afterwards with the local land officers, his corroborated affidavit, in which he alleged that plaintiff had at no time estab- lished his residence on the land; that he had failed to improve and cultivate the same as required by law, and that the cash entry had been procured by fraud; that on May 16, 1885, the commissioner of the general land office ordered a hearing on those charges before the local land officers, and that in pursuance of such order the plaintiff and defendant appeared before those officers on July 13, 1885, for a trial of the questions raised and presented by the defendant's affidavits; that a trial was had, evidence was submitted, and the case argued by counsel, and thereupon the local land officers found as facts that the plaintiff had at no time established his residence on the land embraced in his entry, and that he had failed to improve and cultivate the land as required by law, and, as a conclusion of law therefrom, that the plaintiff's entry should be canceled; that the plaintiff appealed to the commissioner of the general land office, who, on June 3, 1886, affirmed the decision of the local land officer; that he took a further appeal to the secretary of the interior, who, on March 31, 1888, sustained the commissioner of the general land office, and canceled plaintiff's entry; that, after, this defendant filed upon the land under the homestead laws of the United States, made final proofs thereon, paid to the government of the United States the required price, and on July 26, 1889, received from the receiver of the land office a patent certificate for the land, by virtue whereof he claimed to be the owner and entitled to the possession.

To this answer an amended reply was filed, in which the plaintiff alleged that the proceedings initiated by the defendant were wholly void, on the ground that the officers referred to had no jurisdiction over the lanas or of the plaintiff, for the reason that the United States had theretofore sold and disposed of the land to plaintiff, and received from him the sum of $400, in consideration of which sum the United States had undertaken and agreed to execute and deliver to him a patent. He set forth in detail that he had, in accordance with the pre-emption laws of the United States and the requirements of the general land office, published notice of his intention to make final proof; that on the date named in such publication he had appeared with his witnesses before the local land officers, and made such final proof, and paid to them the land-office fees and the sum of $400, the legal price of the land; that they had accepted such final proof as sufficient, and received such sum of money, and executed and delivered to him a duplicate receiver's receipt therefor, and that thereupon he became entitled to have and receive from the United States, in the due course of the administration of the general land office, a patent for the land; that no lawful proceedings had ever been taken by the United States to rescind the contract so entered into between the government and himself, nor had the sum of $400, or any part thereof, ever been repaid or tendered to him by the government. He denied that the defendant had, in his affidavits, alleged that the plaintiff failed to improve and cultivate the land as required by law, or that his entry had been procured by fraud. He also denied that the decision of the commissioner of the general land office was affirmed by the secretary of the interior, except as to finding that plaintiff had not made his residence upon the land.

To this amended reply the defendant demurred, on the ground that it did not contain facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the affirmative matter set up in the answer. The demurrer was sustained, the case at the time of the hearing being in the superior court of the state of Washington in and for the county of Pierce, Washington having been admitted as a state since the commencement of the action. No further amendment being desired, judgment was entered on the pleadings, in favor of the defendant. This judgment was affirmed by the supreme court of the state (2 Wash. 81), whereupon plaintiff brought this writ of error.

W. H. Prichard, S. F. Phillips, and F. D. McKenney, for plaintiff in error.

C. C. Lancaster, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice BREWER, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.

Section 2259, Rev. St., authorizes one possessed of certain personal qualifications, 'who has made, or hereafter makes, a settlement in person on the public lands subject to pre-emption, and who inhabits and improves the same, and who has erected or shall erect a dwelling thereon,' to enter not exceeding 160 acres. Section 2262 provides that before any person shall be allowed to enter lands he shall make oath before the register or receiver that he has never had the benefit of any right of pre-emption; that he is not the owner of 320 acres of land; that he has not settled upon and improved the land for speculation, but in good faith to appropriate it to his own exclusive use, and that he has not directly or indr ectly made any agreement or contract by which the title which he is to acquire is to inure in whole or in part to any person except himself; and, further, that a false oath in these respects shall forfeit the money which he has paid and all right and title to the land. This oath is to be filed in the local land office, and a duplicate thereof transmitted to the general land office. Section 2263 reads:

'Prior to any entries being made under and by virtue of the provisions of section twenty-two hundred and fifty-nine, proof of the settlement and improvement thereby required shall be made to the satisfaction of the register and receiver of the land district in which such lands lie, agreeably to such rules as may be prescribed by the secretary of the interior.'

The contention of the plaintiff is that this last section authorizes a quasi judicial hearing before the local land officers, whose decision is tantamount to a judgment binding both the government and the applicant in respect to the matter of settlement and improvement, and one which, inasmuch as no special right of appeal or review is given, is not subject to re-examination by the commissioner of the general land office or the secretary of the interior, but is a final adjudication as to those matters. As a necessary result therefrom, he contends that the order of the commissioner directing a hearing on the charges made by the defendant, as well as the hearing before the local land officers in pursuance thereof, were all without authority and unavailing to disturb the conclusive force of the adjudication theretofore made. Upon the question which this contention presents the case depends, and to it, therefore, we direct our attention.

If there were no other provision in the statutes than that found in section 2263, the contention of the plaintiff would find support in the decisions of this court. By the act of May 29, 1830 (4 Stat. 420), the right of preemption was given to certain settlers on the public lands. Section 3 was similar to section 2263, in that it required that prior to any entry 'proof of settlement or improvement shall be made to the satisfaction of the register and receiver.' In Lytle v. Arkansas, 9 How. 314, it was held that their decision was conclusive upon the questions of settlement and improvement, the court saying: 'The register and receiver were constituted, by the act, a tribunal to determine the rights of those who claimed pre-emptions under it. From their decision no appeal was given. If, therefore, they acted within their powers, as sanctioned by the commissioner, and within the law, and the decision cannot be impeached on the ground of fraud or unfairness, it must be considered final.'

Subsequently, and on July 4, 1836 (5 Stat. 107), congress, without any repeal of the act of 1830, passed an act to reorganize the general land office, the first section of which is as follows:

'That from and after the passage of this act, the executive duties now prescribed, or which may hereafter be prescribed by law, appertaining to the surveying and sale of the public lands of the United States, or in anywise respecting such public lands, and, also, such as relate to private claims of land and the issuing of patents for all grants of land under the authority of the government of the United States, shall be subject to the supervision and control of the commissioner of the general land office, under the direction of the...