Order of Railway Conductors of America v. Swan Williams v. Same

Decision Date13 January 1947
Docket NumberNos. 63,64,s. 63
Citation67 S.Ct. 405,91 L.Ed. 471,329 U.S. 520
PartiesORDER OF RAILWAY CONDUCTORS OF AMERICA et al. v. SWAN et al. WILLIAMS et al. v. SAME
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Mr.V. C. Shuttleworth, of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for petitioners.

Mr. Anan Raymond, of Chicago, Ill., for respondent Railroad Yardmasters of America.

Mr. Douglas F. Smith, of Chicago, Ill., for respondents Carrier Members of the First and Fourth Divisions et al.

Mr. Justice MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Our attention here is directed to a determination of which division of the National Railroad Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over disputes involving railroad yardmasters. The four divisions of the Board and their respective jurisdictions are established by § 3, First (h), of the Railway Labor Act, as amended in 1934.1

Each division of the Board is composed of an equal number of representatives of carriers and of national labor organizations. The statute authorizes the carriers and the national labor organizations to select their respective representatives and to designate the division on which each such representative shall serve. § 3, First (b) and (c). The jurisdiction of the divisions relates to disputes growing out of 'grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.' § 3, First (i). Disputes involving employees in certain specifically designated crafts are assigned to each division; the Fourth Division also has a 'catch-all' jurisdiction over all disputes not assigned to one of the other three divisions. Appropriate provisions are made for hearings and for the entry of an award, to be followed by an order directed to the carrier if the award be in favor of the petitioner. In the event that the carrier fails to comply with the order, the petitioner or any person for whose benefit the order was made may seek enforcement of the order in a federal district court. § 3, First (p). In such suits, 'the findings and order of the division of the Adjustment Board shall be prima face evidence of the facts therein stated.' And the court is given power to take such action as may be appropriate to enforce or set aside the order. See Switchmen's Union N.A. v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297, 305, 64 S.Ct. 95, 99, 88 L.Ed. 61.

Two of the national labor organizations are he Order of Railway Conductors and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, petitioners herein. Their membership includes a small portion of the total number of railroad yardmasters in the country, approximately 20% of the total on the basis of the railroad mileage represented. Each of these organizations has one representative on the First Division and each contends that all yardmaster disputes must be heard solely by that division. But that contention is contradicted by the Railroad Yardmasters of America, a national labor organization composed almost entirely of yardmasters and claiming to represent more than 70% of all the yardmasters in the country. That organization, which is an intervenor-respondent herein, has failed to place a representative on any of the four divisions. Along with certain other organizations representing the small balance of yardmasters, it claims that yardmaster disputes lie within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Fourth Division. Various carriers with representatives on both the First and the Fourth Divisions join in that claim.

The result of this controversy is a stalemate so far as yardmaster disputes are concerned. The carrier and the labor members of the First Division are split evenly, the carrier members claiming that the division has no jurisdiction over these matters. The members of the Fourth Division are also evenly divided on the jurisdictional question, the labor members being of the view that yardmaster disputes are outside that division's jurisdiction. And since all the parties concede that neither the Second nor the Third Division has jurisdiction, no settlement of these disputes is possible under the present situation.2

The Order of Railway Conductors and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen brought this action under 28 U.S.C. § 400(1), 28 U.S.C.A. § 400(1), to obtain a declaratory judgment to the effect that the First Division has sole jurisdiction over yardmaster disputes. Members of the First and Fourth Divisions were made parties defendant; and the Railroad Yardmasters of America, the Great Northern Railway Company and the Southern Pacific Company were allowed to intervene. The District Court, after a hearing, held that yardmaster disputes fall within the 'catch-all' jurisdiction of the Fourth Division. The Circuit Court of Appeals agreed. 7 Cir., 152 F.2d 325. We granted certiorari because the issue raised is one of importance in the orderly administration of the Railway Labor Act. 327 U.S. 776, 66 S.Ct. 968.

At the outstart it is important to note that judicial review of this matter is not precluded by the principles set forth in Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, supra, and companion cases, General Committee of Adjustment v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 320 U.S. 323, 64 S.Ct. 146, 88 L.Ed. 76 and General Committee v. Southern Pacific Co., 320 U.S. 338, 64 S.Ct. 142, 88 L.Ed. 85. We are dealing here with something quite different from an administrative determination which Congress has made final and beyond the realm of judicial scrutiny. We are dealing with a jurisdictional frustration on an administrative level, making impossible the issuance of administrative orders which Congress explicitly has opened to review by the courts. Until that basic jurisdictional controversy is settled, the procedure contemplated by § 3 of the Railway Labor Act remains a dead letter so far as yardmasters are concerned and the statutory rights of such persons become atrophied. A declaratory judgment action is therefore appropriate to remove such an administrative stagnation.

In other instances, we have left of the problem of jurisdiction to be determined in the first instance by the ad- ministrative agency. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, 303 U.S. 41, 58 S.Ct. 459, 82 L.Ed. 638. But here both the First and the Fourth Divisions of the Board, due to the evenly-matched membership of railroad and labor representatives, appear hopelessly divided on the jurisdictional issue, making a determination impossible. Judicial guidance at this stage is justified as long as such a condition exists.

The issue is primarily one of statutory interpretation. The First Division is given jurisdiction over disputes 'involving train- and yard-service employees of carriers; that is, engineers, firemen, hostlers, and outside hostler helpers, conductors, trainmen, and yard-service employees.' The Fourth Division's jurisdiction extends to disputes 'involving employees of carriers directly or indirectly engaged in transportation of passengers or property by water, and all other employees of carriers over which jurisdiction is not given to the first, second, and third divisions.' It is agreed that the only possible category under the First Division into which yardmasters might be placed is 'yard-service employees.' But if they cannot be so placed, they must necessarily fall into the 'catchall' jurisdiction of the Fourth Division. The problem thus is to determine what Congress meant when it used the term 'yard-service employees.'

There is no statutory definition of 'yard-service employees.' Nor is the term explained in any of the relevant legislative debates or reports; and it derives no meaning from the statutory policy or framework. Moreover, it is not in common or general usage outside of the railroad world. It is a technical term found only in railroad parlance. Evidence as to the meaning attached to it by those who are familiar with such parlance therefore becomes relevant in determining the meaning of the term as used by Congress. See O'Hara v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 269 U.S. 364, 370, 371, 46 S.Ct. 157, 159, 160, 70 L.Ed. 313.

The parties, all of whom are well acquainted with railroad terminology, stipulated certain facts. It was agreed that a railroad yard is a system of tracks within defined limits over which movements of engines and cars not authorized by timetable or train order may be made, subject to prescribed signals and rules or special instructions. It was further agreed that the 'yard-service employees' or 'yardmen' working in a yard perform such functions as switching, making and breaking up trains, moving and storing cars, inspecting cars and freight, repairing cars, maintaining equipment, sending and receiving messages, keeping records and making reports. As to yardmasters, the stipulation stated: 'All such yardmen and other employees performing work in a yard are directed and supervised in their work by a yardmaster, with the aid, if necessary, of one or more assistant yardmasters. Yardmasters do not and may not perform the work of yardmen and employees in train and engine service; they may perform some clerical work, if their entire time is not taken up with the direction and supervision of yardmen and other employees working in yards. * * * In general, yardmasters run the yards, of which they are in charge, and they are responsible for conditions within the same. Necessarily, they exercise a substantial measure of individual initiative and responsibility.'

All of the witnesses who testified at the hearing agreed that yardmasters are functionally differ nt from other employees working in yards due to their supervisory activities and responsibilities. The evidence also indicated that yardmasters have supervision over some who work within the yards but who are not spoken of as 'yardservice employees,' such as storekeepers, section men and clerks. On the crucial point, there was substantial agreement among the witnesses that yardmasters are not commonly designated in railroad parlance as 'yard-service employees,' that...

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