Ordonez v. Stanley
| Decision Date | 16 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 2:20-cv-02779-CBM-PJWx |
| Citation | 495 F.Supp.3d 855 |
| Parties | Yaquelin Sevastiana ORDONEZ, Plaintiff, v. Warren A. STANLEY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
Donald Webster Cook, Donald W Cook Law Offices, Los Angeles CA, for Plaintiff.
Donna M. Dean, Office of Attorney General California Department of Justice, Los Angeles CA, for Defendants.
The matter before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (the "Motion"). (Dkt. No. 11.) Also pending before the Court is Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN") (see Dkt. No. 12), and Plaintiff's objections thereto (Dkt. No. 16-1). The Motion and RJN are fully briefed.
This is a civil rights case arising from the alleged seizure and impoundment of Plaintiff Yaquelin Sevestiana Ordonez's ("Plaintiff") vehicle by members of the California Highway Patrol ("CHP").
The Complaint alleges CHP maintains a policy by which a CHP officer "may direct or cause a vehicle to be seized and impounded for 30 days without a warrant" if the CHP officer concludes: (A) the driver of the vehicle has never been issued a driver's license; (B) the driver's license of the vehicle's driver is suspended or revoked; or (C) the driver of the vehicle may only drive a vehicle with a functioning, certified interlock device, and the vehicle lacks such a device.1 (Dkt. No. 1 (Compl.) ¶ 10.)
When a vehicle is subject to the CHP Impound Policy, the vehicle is held at a tow yard designated by the CHP and the owner is barred from reclaiming possession of the vehicle even if the owner has or is accompanied by someone with a valid driver's license, is willing and able to reclaim possession, has automobile insurance, "is tending payment of accrued administrative fees and storage charges," and the vehicle is not posing a danger to public safety. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Vehicle storage charges accrue during this 30-day period, and those charges must be paid in full before the vehicle will be released. (Id. at ¶ 13.) If the charges go unpaid, the privately-owned storage yard sells the vehicle at a lien sale to satisfy unpaid storage charges and administrative fees. (Id. ) If the sale of the vehicle does not fully satisfy those unpaid charges and fees, the former registered owner of the vehicle is liable to the tow-yard for the difference. (Id. ) A 30-day impoundment of a vehicle subject to the CHP Impound Policy typically amounts to $2,000 or more in administrative fees and storage charges. (Id. )
Under the CHP Impound Policy, both the initial vehicle seizure and 30-day impoundment are made by the CHP without warrants or judicial review of any type. (Id. at ¶¶ 12, 15.) Notice to the owner is required under the CHP Impound Policy. (Id. at ¶ 16.) Furthermore, if the impoundment is made pursuant to Cal. Veh. Code § 14602.6 (" Section 14602.6"), the CHP Impound Policy mandates the CHP officers apply its provisions. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Amongst other things, Section 14602.6 provides that "[t]he registered owner of a vehicle that is removed and seized ... or their agents shall be provided the opportunity for a storage hearing to determine the validity of, or consider any mitigating circumstances attendant to, the storage, in accordance with Section 22852." Cal. Veh. Code § 14602.6(b). The Complaint alleges that the CHP Impound Policy only permits the owner of a vehicle to argue at the storage hearing either that "mitigating circumstances" apply or that the initial decision to have the vehicle removed from the street was invalid. (Id. at ¶ 17.)
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Warrant A. Stanley ("Defendant Stanley"), commissioner of the CHP, "personally approved" the CHP Impound Policy. (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 10.)
Plaintiff is the registered owner of a 2009 Toyota Matrix (the "car" or "vehicle"). (Id. at ¶ 18.) On October 24, 2019, defendant CHP Officer E. Bailey ("Defendant Bailey") stopped the vehicle while it was being driven by Francisco Gomez Lopez ("Mr. Lopez"), the spouse of Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 19.) During this traffic stop, Defendant Bailey "seized and impounded" the car pursuant to Cal. Veh. Code § 14602.6(a)(1), on the ground that Mr. Lopez had a suspended driver's license. (Id. ) Mr. Lopez informed Defendant Bailey that Plaintiff's sister, a licensed driver, would arrive in minutes to legally take the car, but Defendant Bailey nevertheless had the car towed away and imposed a 30-day impound of the car. (Id. at ¶ 20.)
The next day, October 25, 2019, Plaintiff, accompanied by an individual with a California driver's license, requested that officials present at the CHP Central Los Angeles office release her vehicle from impound. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Plaintiff spoke with Defendant CHP Sergeant S. Pool ("Defendant Pool"), who refused to release the vehicle, even though Plaintiff informed him that she was accompanied by a licensed driver and was willing to pay towing and storage fees, the car was registered and insured, and there was "no safety or other community caretaking justification" for refusing release of the vehicle.2 (Id.) The same day, Plaintiff, through her counsel, delivered to Defendant Stanley and Defendant CHP Captain Charles Sampson ("Defendant Sampson") a letter requesting the release of the car and stating refusal to release the car was in violation of Brewster v. Beck , 859 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 2017) and Sandoval v. County of Sonoma , 912 F.3d 509 (9th Cir. 2018).
On October 30, 2019, Plaintiff attended a storage hearing in which CHP officials, including Defendant CHP Sergeant A. Braaksma ("Defendant Braaksma"), refused to release her vehicle. (Id. at ¶ 22.)
Plaintiff did not receive her vehicle until thirty days had passed and she tendered payment of $2,350 to the storage yard. (Id. at ¶ 26.)
Plaintiff filed the Complaint on March 25, 2020, asserting three causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and two causes of action under the laws of California.
The Court has jurisdiction over this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Rule 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 663, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). All well-pleaded facts are taken as true, with all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Labels, conclusions, or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not suffice. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint must state "evidentiary facts which, if true, will prove [the claim]." Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. , 518 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008). If a complaint cannot be cured by additional factual allegations, dismissal without leave to amend is proper.
Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court may only consider the allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to or referenced in the complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial notice. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. , 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007).
Courts may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it can be "accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). Courts may take judicial notice of matters in the public record, but not those which may be subject to reasonable dispute. Lee v. City of L.A. , 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001).
Defendants request the Court to judicially notice: (1) HPM 81.2, Ch. 2 – Storage Impound and Release Procedures and Ch. 4 – Post Storage Hearings, marked as "Exhibit 1;" (2) a CHP 180 form entitled "Vehicle Report" allegedly issued to Plaintiff by CHP on October 24, 2019, marked as "Exhibit 2;" and (3) a Post Storage Hearing Report (CHP 422B form) dated October 30, 2019, marked as "Exhibit 3" (collectively, the "Exhibits"). (See Dkt. No. 12, Ex. 1-3.) Plaintiff objects to the request for judicial notice.
The Court sustains Plaintiff's objections and DENIES Defendants’ request for judicial notice. Because Defendants do not disclose the source of the Exhibits, the Court cannot determine whether they were obtained "from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). Moreover, the facts allegedly contained in Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 3 are subject to reasonable dispute. (See Dkt. No. 16-1 (Objections to Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice).)
Defendants object to the declaration of Donald W. Cook, filed by Plaintiff in support of her opposition to the Motion. (See Dkt. No. 17 (); Dkt. No. Dkt No. 16-2 (Cook Decl.).) The Cook Declaration is offered "to refute or correct factual claims defendants assert ... in the event that the Court ... believes it can judicially notice the purported facts defendants offer[.]"
The Court, having denied Defendants’ request for judicial notice, finds that the Cook Declaration is unnecessary to resolve this motion to dismiss. Therefore, the Court SUSTAINS the objections and does not consider the Cook Declaration.
The First Cause of Action (against all Defendants) alleges the seizure and 30-day impoundment of the...
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