Oregon Auto-Dispatch v. Portland Cordage Co.

• Decision Date: 03 March 1908
• Citation: 51 Or. 583,94 P. 36
• Parties: OREGON AUTO-DISPATCH v. PORTLAND CORDAGE CO. [a1]
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

94 P. 36

51 Or. 583

OREGON AUTO-DISPATCH v. PORTLAND CORDAGE CO. ^[a1]

Supreme Court of Oregon

March 3, 1908

Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County; John B. Cleland, Judge.

Action by the Oregon Auto-Dispatch against the Portland Cordage Co. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

This is an action to recover damages for breach of warranty defendant having sold to plaintiff a manila rope, to be used by the plaintiff to lower a safe, weighing 4,700 pounds, from the third story of the Stearns building. It is alleged "tat defendant, with full knowledge of the purpose for which said rope was purchased, sold and delivered to plaintiff a certain four-strand manila rope, with the warranty that said rope so sold was of sufficient strength to safely lower and handle said safe." It is further alleged that the plaintiff, relying upon the said warranty attempted so to lower said safe, but that the rope was not of sufficient strength to carry said weight, and under the weight of said safe parted, and the safe dropped from the said third story to the basement, resulting in the damage. Defendant, by its answer, denied each allegation of the complaint, except that plaintiff purchased the rope from it and alleges affirmatively that the breaking of the rope and any damage resulting therefrom was occasioned by the careless and negligent manner in which said rope was handled and used by plaintiff, or by the careless and unskillful manner in which said safe was handled by plaintiff, or by the defective appliances used by plaintiff in moving said safe. The cause was tried by the court, and it made the following findings of fact: "(2) And on or about March 4, 1905, plaintiff purchased from defendant a rope with a warranty on the part of the defendant substantially as set forth in the amended complaint. (3) That the rope parted, but the plaintiff has failed to prove that said rope was inherently defective or that it was insufficient or defective in strength or otherwise for the purpose for which it was bought or sold, or that it was a defective or insufficient rope at all; and it has not been otherwise established or proved that said rope was inherently defective, or that it was insufficient or defective in strength or otherwise for the purpose for which it was bought or sold, or that it was a defective or insufficient rope at all." There are two other findings containing only a repetition of recitals in No. 3, and from a judgment rendered on said findings in favor of defendant plaintiff appeals.

C.A. Bell, for appellant.

S.B. Linthicum, for respondent.

EAKIN J. (after stating the facts as above).

There is but one question before us on this appeal, namely, are the findings of fact sufficient to support the judgment? The rule is that findings of fact, made by a court when an action is tried without the intervention of a jury, are equivalent to special verdicts and must be based upon, and as broad as, the material issues involved ( Freeman v. Trummer...