Oregon Coal & Nav. Co. v. Coos County

• Decision Date: 23 February 1897
• Citation: 47 P. 851,30 Or. 308
• Parties: OREGON COAL & NAVIGATION CO. v. COOS COUNTY et al.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

47 P. 851

30 Or. 308

OREGON COAL & NAVIGATION CO. v. COOS COUNTY et al.

Supreme Court of Oregon

February 23, 1897

Appeal from circuit court, Coos county; J.C. Fullerton, Judge.

Petition for writ of review by the Oregon Coal & Navigation Company against Coos county and the members of its board of commissioners to review the action of said board as a board of equalization in fixing the assessment of petitioners' property. The court set aside the assessment, and defendants appeal. Reversed.

This appeal is from the judgment of the circuit court for Coos county upon review of an order of the county court, sitting as a board of equalization, whereby it revised the assessor's appraisement of plaintiff's taxable property. The plaintiff complained before the board that the assessor had placed a valuation upon its property upon the assessment roll largely in excess of its real or actual cash value. The only evidence produced was in behalf of plaintiff which tended to show that the real or actual cash value of a large part of the property was much less than that fixed by the assessor upon the roll. The board reduced somewhat the assessed values, but not to the extent which it is claimed was established by the uncontradicted evidence. A transcript of all the testimony is certified up with the record. Defendants appeal.

S.H Hazard, for appellants.

J.W Hamilton and Rufus Mallory, for respondent.

WOLVERTON J. (after stating the facts).

In behalf of the defendants it is contended that the decision of the county court, acting as such board, upon a question of fact, is conclusive in a proceeding by writ of review. The doctrine of this state upon the subject may be summarized thus: Upon a writ of review under the statute the supervising court will not examine the evidence submitted to the inferior court or tribunal for the purpose of settling or deciding a new or disputed question of fact, but will review the decision of such court or tribunal only upon the ultimate facts appearing by the record. Smith v. City of Portland, 25 Or. 297, 35 P 665; Douglas County Road Co. v. Douglas Co., 5 Or 406; Id., 6 Or. 299; Poppleton v. Yamhill Co., 8 Or. 337; Vincent v. Umatilla Co., 14 Or. 377, 12 P. 732; Barton v. La Grande, 17 Or. 581, 22 P. 111. The plaintiff, however, without conceding the point, argues that the facts are practically admitted; that the evidence offered by it remains uncontradicted by any countervailing testimony, and should control in determining the true assessable value of plaintiff's property. In Smith v. City of Portland, supra, the present chief justice said: "It is only when there is an entire absence of proof on some material fact found that the finding becomes erroneous as a matter of law;" citing Hyde v. Nelson, 11 Mich. 353. And in Vincent v. Umatilla Co., supra, the converse of the proposition is stated. Strahan, J., says: "When the facts are all admitted, the sole question at issue is one of law, and the writ may furnish a cheap and expeditious remedy." And the same might be said in this case if the uncontradicted evidence were such as that but one conclusion could possibly be adduced therefrom. The vice of the argument is in assuming that such is the state of the record and the evidence in this proceeding. In the first place, the testimony for plaintiff is not at all uniform on the question of values. Different judges might draw different conclusions from it. And, secondly, it does not stand uncontradicted in the light in which we ...