Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. v. Minidoka County
| Decision Date | 02 November 1918 |
| Citation | 175 P. 962,31 Idaho 719 |
| Parties | OREGON SHORT LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant, v. MINIDOKA COUNTY, a Legal Subdivision of the State of Idaho, INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 1 of MINIDOKA COUNTY, and C. L. TOYER, Treasurer and Ex-Officio Tax Collector Thereof, Respondents |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
SCHOOL DISTRICTS-SPECIAL LEVY FOR MAINTAINING GYMNASIUM-SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORITY NECESSARY.
1. The power and authority to levy and collect taxes is wholly statutory, and where the purpose for which and the circumstances under which a special tax may be levied are expressly defined and limited by statute, the prerequisite circumstances must exist in order to give legal effect to a pretended tax levy for such purpose.
2 Chap. 14, Sess. Laws 1913, p. 53, prior to its amendment by chap. 59, Sess. Laws 1917, p. 178, which authorized boards of trustees of independent school districts to purchase or otherwise acquire sites for playgrounds and gymnasiums, to equip and maintain the same, and to issue and sell bonds for such purposes, did not authorize the levying of a special school tax for the maintenance and care of a gymnasium and grounds, where no bonds were ever issued by the district for the purpose which said statute sought to provide for, and where such special school tax was in excess of and in addition to the maximum school taxes authorized by chap. 159 Sess. Laws 1913, p. 527, prior to its amendment by chap. 59 Sess. Laws 1917, p. 178.
[As to the purposes for which the power of taxation may be exercised, see notes in 2 Am.St. 94; 8 Am.St. 506; 16 Am.St 365]
APPEAL from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, for Minidoka County. Hon. James R. Bothwell, Judge.
Action against Independent School District No. 1 to enjoin the collection of a portion of a tax. Judgment reversed.
Reversed and remanded, with instructions. Costs awarded to appellant.
George H. Smith and H. B. Thompson, for Appellant.
"Taxes cannot be levied or collected at any other time nor in any other manner nor for any other purpose than that designated by law, and statutes authorizing the levy of special taxes should not be so construed as to extend their meaning beyond a clear import of the words used." (Shoup v. Willis, 2 Idaho 120, 6 P. 124; Weiser Nat. Bank v. Jeffreys, 14 Idaho 659, 95 P. 23.)
Sweeley & Sweeley, for Respondents.
The true intent and meaning must prevail over the literal sense of the terms and control the strict letter of the law when the letter would lead to possible injustice, contradiction and absurdity. (Chandler v. Lee, 1 Idaho 349.)
The whole purpose and intent of chapter 14 is to provide for the construction and maintenance of gymnasiums and playgrounds. The first proviso is "in the event of the issuance of bonds." The gymnasium was in fact built from the proceeds of bonds. Then follows the next provision, "as provided for in this section."
The word "as" has been judicially found to have a number of meanings. To accept it in the sense "in the specific way" or "by the exact means" would lead to a manifest injustice, would put a premium on form instead of substance, and would have the legislature say that the way in which the thing was to be done was of more importance than the thing itself. But the other and equally well-accepted meaning of the word, "for the purpose," resolves the matter in accord with the real purpose of the act. (Alexander v. Tolleston Club of Chicago, 110 Ill. 65; Smith v. Phillips, 131 Ala. 629, 30 So. 872; Carr v. State, 34 Ark. 448, 36 Am. Rep. 15; Lemmons v. State, 56 Ark. 559, 20 S.W. 404; 1 Words & Phrases, 518.)
This is an action to enjoin the collection of a portion of the taxes levied by respondent, Independent School District No. 1 of Minidoka county, for the year 1915. The cause was tried by the court. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed and a judgment entered dismissing the complaint and denying the injunction prayed for. This appeal is from the judgment.
It appears that the district, before becoming organized as an independent school district, issued bonds in the amount of $ 47,000, for the purpose of building a schoolhouse. With the proceeds of these bonds the schoolhouse was built and in connection therewith and as a part of the same building a gymnasium was partly equipped. Thereafter the district was organized into an independent school district and in 1915 the board of trustees thereof levied an assessment aggregating eighteen mills. The trial court found "That it was the intention of the board of trustees of Independent School District to levy ten mills for the payment of interest on the bonds and a sinking fund for the payment of the bonds at maturity and to provide funds for the maintenance of the schools in the district for nine months in the year; also four mills to maintain rural routes which were then being maintained by the district, and four mills for the maintenance and care of said gymnasium and grounds." As a conclusion of law the court found "That the board of trustees of Independent School District No. 1 has the right to make and levy for maintenance and care of a gymnasium and grounds, which, added to the levy made for all purposes, does not exceed twenty mills." The specifications of error attack the latter finding.
Section 129 of the Code of Laws on Education, approved March 7, 1911 as amended by chap. 159, Sess. Laws 1913, page 527, prior to its amend...
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