Orenberg v. Thecker
Decision Date | 26 June 1944 |
Docket Number | No. 8594.,8594. |
Parties | ORENBERG et al. v. THECKER et al. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Mr. Henry I. Quinn, of Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Joseph Sitnick, of Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellants.
Mr. Dorsey K. Offutt, of Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Thomas A. Farrell, of Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellees.
Before MILLER, EDGERTON and ARNOLD, Associate Justices.
It is contended on behalf of appellants in this case that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying a motion for new trial. Two allegations, specifying misconduct upon the part of jurors, constitute the basis for this contention The first is that two jurors, during the trial, without authorization, visited the scene of the accident involved in the case; that one of them made observations, inspections and experiments; and that both reported their observations to the other jurors. This specification was supported by the affidavits of three other jurors.
In Economon v. Barry-Pate Motor Co., Inc.,1 we said: "In unmistakable language both this court and the Supreme Court of the United States have held the general rule to be that the testimony of jurors will not be received to impeach their verdict, unless such testimony relates to extraneous influences brought to bear upon them." In the present case no extraneous influences, of the kind contemplated by the decisions of this court and of the Supreme Court, were brought to bear upon the jurors; hence the general rule is applicable and the first specification must fail. To avoid what might seem, at first glance, a summary application of an arbitrary rule it is well to consider the following language which the Supreme Court used in McDonald v. Pless:2 That the Supreme Court, in the McDonald case, did not overlook the arguments advanced by appellants in support of their motion is shown by the following additional language:3 It is not necessary to say more or to consider whether it would be reasonable to require jurors, during the course of a trial, to go by round-about routes, avoiding main traveled streets, or to close their eyes to traffic controls on such streets.4
The second specification is that some jurors gave false answers or concealed material information by silence when questioned on the voir dire, concerning claims for personal injuries previously suffered by them. The questions propounded to the panel — and in response to which two jurors remained silent — were: (1) and (2) "Is there anyone else who has had a claim of any kind involving personal injuries?" It can be too easily assumed that laymen, called from ways of life far removed from the courtroom, will understand words and terms of art customarily used by lawyers and judges. As a matter of fact, many such words are not well understood by lawyers and judges themselves.5 It would be a violent assumption that such laymen will be alert to give considered answers to questions containing several such words or terms, or that failure to respond constitutes concealment or a false answer. For example, even to lawyers and judges, such words as claim6 and presented7 have varied meanings. Some laymen, who have had no courtroom experience, do not know the meaning of plaintiffs, personal injuries and other words which were used in the questions propounded by counsel for appellants. Within the last year this court had occasion to decide a dispute between able counsel as to the meaning of the words plaintiff and defendant,8 as used by Congress in recent legislation. It would be asking a great deal of laymen that they be certain and confident in the use of lawyers' words when lawyers themselves disagree as to their meaning. It would be grim irony to insist that our juries must constitute a representative cross section of all the people9 if at the same time impossible standards of performance were imposed. Moreover, in the present case, the questions propounded were not directed to each venireman separately. Instead, they called for voluntary responses upon the initiative of each. Many lawyers, remembering their own first appearances in court, will understand the trepidation of a layman who, for perhaps the first time in his life, occupies the spotlighted position of the jury box; and his reluctance to discuss with able counsel, abstract legal issues such as those implicit in the questions propounded in the present case. These are the considerations which must be kept in mind in determining whether there was such giving of false answers or concealment of material information as to constitute misconduct and require, so compellingly, the granting of a new trial as to establish abuse of discretion upon the part of the trial judge.10 We...
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Sherman v. Smith
...that it had failed to order the jurors not to visit the scene of the crime. Id. at 296. Another case invoking Roberts, Orenberg v. Thecker, 143 F.2d 375 (D.C.Cir.1944), found that an unauthorized visit to the scene brought no extraneous influences to bear upon the jurors and therefore affir......
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Akiachak Native Cmty. v. Salazar
...within the discretion of the Secretary, see25 U.S.C. § 465, and a “claim” is necessarily an assertion of right, see Orenberg v. Thecker, 143 F.2d 375, 377 n. 6 (D.C.Cir.1944) (“ ‘Claim,’ in its primary meaning, is used to indicate the assertion of an existing right. In its secondary meaning......
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Olson v. Bradrick, Civ. No. H-84-1082(AHN).
...in the meanings of words or the art of grammatical construction. See McDonough, 464 U.S. at 555, 105 S.Ct. at 849; Orenberg v. Thecker, 143 F.2d 375, 377 (D.C.Cir.1944). A juror's failure to understand the full meaning of an unclear question is not comparable to intentional misrepresentatio......
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In re Greenlee
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